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ABSTRACT 
In extensive review of the literature gathered during the past 
fifteen years under the title of "Social Perception" or "Empathy" 
revealed little consensus of opinion as to the exact definition of 
the concept and the nature of mental abilities or processes underlying it. 
On the basis of this review, a tentative attempt has been made 
to re-define Social Perception as the process of predicting the 
attitudes of other persons. The importance of such a process or 
ability for interpersonal communication has been discussed and its 
links with the ordinary processes of thinking and perceiving have 
been demonstrated. It has been argued that Social Perception in this 
operational sense is an inferential process depending on two main 
classes of evidence s Evidence provided by the person whose responses 
are to be predicted and evidence derived from the context of prediction, 
i. e.., from the predictee's larger class-memberships, the kind of 
response that is to be predicted I and the connotative properties 
of the medium of expression employed. 
A consideration of the second type of evidence has given rise 
to the hypothesis that accuracy of prediction should be largely 
dependent on the prevalence and cultural value of the response 
categoly to be predicted. The multiplicity of possible sources of 
inference in each case has given rise to some serious doubts as to 
the possibility of finding a general predictive ability except when 
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the common features of the media of prediction or the responses to 
be predicted predetermine such a generality. 
Two experiments have been carried out. The first was concerned 
with the ability of a group of 240 school children between the ages 
of 13 and 14 years to predict the positive and negative affective 
and evaluative responses of their classmates towards themselves. It 
was found that while children acted significantly better than comparable 
robots in predicting the positive and socially desirable responses 
of their classmates, their achievement in predicting the negative 
and socially undesirable attitudes of others was not significantly 
different from that of a chance model. Similarly, while accuracy 
scores in predicting either positive or negative responses on 
different criteria correlated significantly, there was only a slight 
negative correlation between the two kinds of accuracy. Nor was there 
any significant correlation between accuracy of predicting others' 
affective and evaluative responses. 
In the second experiment, a sample of 106 training college 
students were asked to predict the responses of the majority of men 
and women of their cultural sub-groups and those of two specific 
individuals on a battery of tests covering the areas of social attitudes, 
values, and personal dispositions. The amount of accuracy was 
found to vary positively with the degree of prevalence and objectivity 
and, negatively, with the variance of the response variable concerned. 
Predictions of own-sex others' responses were highest in terms of 
accuracy and those of a relatively unknown other's responses lowest. 
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Predictions of a well-known individual's responses and those of the 
opposite-sex others-in-general occupied the second and third places 
in terms of accuracyo 
There was little sign of generality in predicting the responses 
of the same category of others on various dimensions or in predicting 
the responses of several others on the same dimension or medium of 
response. Of correlations between the sums of accuracy scores over 
the four types of prediotees only that for the two individual others 
was significant at . 05 level. A consideration of the inconsistent 
correlations obtaining between different types of accuracy and certain 
personality measures cast farther doubt on the generality of the 
underlying capacity. Intelligence, for instance, was found to correlate 
positively and significantly with accuracy in predicting the 
well-known other's responses but negatively -albeit nonsignificantly- 
with accuracy in predicting the responses of others-in-generalo 
The results, thus, appear to bear out the tentative hypotheses 
derived from our conceptual analysis. 
-4- 
PREFACE 
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CHAPTER I: 
SOCIAL PERCEPTION : ITS SCOPE AND DEFINITION 
The last two decades or so have witnessed an ever 
increasing interest in and study of the phenomena of 
perception on the part of social psychologists. This 
new trend of emphasis which came to be known as "the 
new look in psychology" in early 1950's, may be traced 
back to the original field studies of Bartlett (1932) 
and the pioneer experiments of Muzefer Sherif (1935) in 
1930's. By early 1950 the "new look" psychologists 
had established themselves in any and every field of 
psychology - both pure and practical - so much so that 
in 1949 Werner could speak of perception as becoming "a 
general meeting grdund of general experimental and clini- 
cal and social psychology". (Werner, 1949). The same 
opinion was expressed by Krech (1951) who called the 
social psychology of his time "a-theoretical" and after 
reviewing the sporadic and incoherent theories put 
forward by different schools came to the conclusion 
that all these theories and indeed all social psychologi- 
cal investigation could best be reorganised around a 
nucleus of cognition or perception. That this faith is 
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still alive is evidenced by Krech and his colleagues' 
new book (Krech et al, 1962) in which the social psycho- 
logists' increased interest in and knowledge of the 
perceptual phenomena are regarded as one of the "most 
heartening developments in American psychology". 
From this concentration of effort and interest has 
emerged a new field in social psychology - viz. the 
field of "social perception". Although the term had 
been used by some psychologists in connection with the 
recognition of emotional states from facial expressions 
since early 1920's (e. g., Gatos, 1923) it did not appear 
in the index of the "Psychological Abstracts" until late 
1945. Since then, it has become one of the most fre- 
quently used terms of social psychology and has occupied 
a high position in the study of social behaviour. De- 
spite this increased use of and interest in the term 
social perception, the area covered by it is still far 
from clear and hardly defined or delineated. Indeed, 
one of the latest reviewers of this field. has reached 
the conclusion that: "Investigations referred to in 
one context or another as concerned with it add up to a 
patchwork, not to a pattern. Therefore, to-attempt a 
-8- 
definition ( or a series of definitions) of social 
perception would be a sterile task". (Ta3fel, 1962, 
p. 20). 
Loosely, social perception may be defined as a field 
of investigation which is mainly concerned with the in- 
teraction between the process of perception on the one 
hand and the multitude of factors arising from the 
social nature of the perceiver and/or the perceived. 
In this context the word perception is often used in a 
much wider sense than that accepted by the experimental 
psychologist concerned with perception (e. g. Bartley, 
1957), covering all the ways and processes through which 
man gets information about his environment. More often 
than not, this involves one or all of other processes 
underlying cognition, such as remembering, judging, 
thinking as well as perceiving. 
Our definition is similar to one proposed by 
Macleod, (1951). He distinguished between the two 
senses in which the term was used. These two meanings 
are the social determination of perception on the one 
hand and the perception of the "social" on the other. 
This distinction has been recognised by later workers 
-9 -- 
as well (e. g. Cartwright, 1959; Tajfel, 1962). 
The question of the social determination of 
' 1e 
perception received much attention inAl940's. It 
was argued that the social behaviour of man is de- 
termined by and conditional upon the social environ- 
ment in which he lives. This social environment is 
not the same as defined by an independent observer - 
even if this observer happens to be an omniscient 
sociologist - but it is what is actually apprehended 
by the behaving individual himself. This argument 
enhanced the place of perception in the study of 
social behaviour culminating in a state of "perceptual 
imperialism" - as Krech called it (Krech, 1949). At 
the same time, it was recognised that perception is 
rarely, if ever, a perfect "mirroring" of the exter- 
nal world. But, what we perceive, is, to a considera- 
ble degree, determined by our wants, hopes, expectations 
and experiences - in short our whole personality. In 
other words, what we see is what we are made to see, 
and what makes us to see as we do is the social milieu 
in which wa are brought up, hence the characterisation 
"social". 
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This emphasis on the social determinants of per- 
ception was a survival of the well-known controversy 
between nativists and empirists in the domain of philo- 
sophy which dominated the history of philosophy in 
the 19th century. The only novelty was the introduc- 
tion of the term "social" to cover all experiential 
factors and conditions. This emphasis on the social 
origin of experience was a result of the social psycho- 
logists' acceptance of the importance of the sociali- 
zation process in shaping the individual's personality. 
A good example of this is provided by Hartley & Hartley 
(1952) who have stressed thatt: "It is illogical to 
separate socialization and personality development. 
The two terms refer to two aspects of the same thing. 
Socialization emphasises the process of learning to 
conform to social demands; personality refers to the 
end product of that process". (p. 203). 
This aspect of perception has been subjected to a 
vast amount of experimental investigation and theoreti- 
cal speculation. The number of these studies is too 
large to permit a review here, and there exist some 
exhaustive reviews (Pastor, 1949; Allport, 1955; 
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Jenkin'ý, 1957; Bartley, 1958; Dreger 1961) which 
make a new attempt unnecessary. Allport (1955) 
lists six more or less independent propositions 
which have been experimentally tested: (1) that 
bodily need determines, within limits, what a subject 
will perceive; (2) that reward and punishment can 
influence perception through raising or lowering the 
threshold levels; (3) that values represented in the 
personality of the perceiver tend to determine the 
threshold of recognition; (4) that size perceptions 
evoked by certain objects, such as coins, are influ- 
enced by the social background of the perceiver; (5) 
that the personality dynamics of the perceiver pre- 
4ispose him to perceive in a manner consistent with 
such features; and (6) that the perception of per- 
sonally disturbing stimuli is hindered or distorted by 
a "perceptual defense mechanism". Bruner and his 
disciples have made several attempts to build a theo- 
retical system on these findings. The earlier of 
these systems is the so-called directive-state theory 
of perception (Bruner & Postman, 1948) which differen- 
tiates between the structural or autochthanous and 
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behavioural determinants of perception, attributing 
the first class of determinants to the innate, unchan- 
geable endowment of the individual and the second 
class to high level processes that carry the effects 
of the past experience in general and include the or- 
ganism's needs, tensions, value systems and biases. 
The second theory is known as the Hypothesis ors Expec- 
tancy Theory (Bruner, 1951) and states that the percep- 
tual responses of an organism do not arise from blank 
neutral ground, but are based on or directed towards 
sets, hypotheses or expectancies held by the subject. 
The greater a set or hypothesis, the greater the pro- 
bability of its activation in a given situation and 
the less stimulus information that will be needed to 
activate it. Hypotheses may be confirmed or infirmed 
by perception. 
Unfortunately, most of the experiments done in 
this field suffer from some form of methodological 
weakness, theoretical confusion and/or statistical 
misinterpretation. In most cases the term "perception" 
has been used in an unjustifiably loose sense. More 
often than not, experimental conditions have been such 
i 
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as to a4low the subjects to report on judgement, think- 
ing or remembering rather than perceiving. This seems 
to have been inevitable in view of the phenomenological 
properties of social events. As Macleod has pointed 
out: "The social world may include the here and now 
(the two essential components of perception) but it 
extends far beyond both in time and space. -In function- 
al terms, the social world is a product of memory and 
imagination rather than of perception" (Macleod, 19L7, 
p. L7-48). Moreover, not all findings have been con- 
firmed by later repetition of the experiment, and con- 
flicting interpretations of the same data are not hard 
to find. These criticisms seem to have dispelled much 
of the enthusiasm and optimism of the early "new look" 
psychologists. The present attitude of most psycholo- 
gists is well summarised by the following commentary by 
Macleod - himself one of the earliest advocates of per- 
ceptual-phenomenological approach in social psychology: 
". .. It has been demonstrated to almost everyone's 
satisfaction that the wishes, anxieties, and expectations 
of the perceiver can influence his judgements, but there 
has been no suggestion that motivation alone will trans- 
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form squares into circles or reds into blues. In 
general, the modern Darwinians have done little more 
than shift the emphasis from stimulus - determination 
to need determination, according slightly more to the 
latter but without seriously challenging the fundamental 
proposition that there is an independently existing 
reality of which our percepts are imperfect copies. " 
(Macleod, 1960,230-31). 
That this conclusion is not shared by all psycholo- 
gists is evidenced by G. W. Allport's new book in which 
he has borrowed the term "ptoeeption" from the phild- 
sopher Josef Buehler (1955) to indicate the part played 
by the perceiver's personality and past experiences in 
shaping his perceptions of the world. "The term re- 
cognises the fact that each individual carries with 
him his past relations to the world, his emotional 
dispositions, and his own experiences for the future. 
These "proceptive directions" provide his potentialities 
for seeing, hearing, doing, thinking, making and saying. 
... I shall employ the term proception to cover any and 
all influences of set that intervene between sensory 
it:, and act. Whereas the term "perceive" should 
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rightly refer to sensory appearance, the term "proceive" 
covers whatever influence set may have not only on 
sensory appearance, but also on imagery, remembering 
and forgetting, judgement, reasoning and reporting. " 
(Allport, 1961,264-265). Aliport's view is repre- 
sentative of many personality psychologists, some of 
whom have gone so far as to define personality in terms 
of the unique way in which an individual perceives his 
world (Stagner, 1960) and others have found in percep- 
tion a new basis for their typological classifications 
(e. g. Eysenck et al, 1957). 
However, the second type of social perception - 
that is, the "perception of the social" - has gained 
in importance and has become the centre of much experi- 
mental effort. Of late, this type of perception has 
been christened "person perception" (Tagiuri & Petlaulb (eds. ) 
1958) or "person cognition" (Taft, 1960) or "person in- 
terpretation" (Vernon, 1963). The former rubric seems 
to be more frequently used than the latter and it will 
be used in this study, regardless of the limitations 
inherent in the term "perception" in this context. 
Despite the fact that most of an individual's life 
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time is spent with or among other individuals and 
much of his well-being and happiness depends on his 
interactions with other individuals, this "human" 
aspect of the environment has been mostly overlooked 
by the traditional psychology of perception. As 
Macleod has put it: "In the traditional textbooks 
the chapters on perception have dealt with space, 
time, movement, form, etc., never with persons". 
(Macleod, 1960). Even in those rare instances when 
a modern writer on the psychology of perception (e. g. 
Bartley, 1958) has deviated from the tradition and 
devoted a chapter of his work to the field of social 
perception, this is wholly ccn cerned with the first 
type of social perception, that is the social deter- 
mination of perception. This may reflect either the 
experimental psychologists' conviction that problems 
of perceiving other people are not different from those 
of perceiving inanimate objects and require no separate 
treatment; or it may be another example of the criti- 
cism often made by clinical psychologists that experi- 
mental psychologists tend to shun those characteristi- 
cally human phenomena which are not amenable to study. 
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by their well tried experimental techniques but require 
new approaches. Whatever the real point at issue, we 
have run the unfortunate risk of dividing the study of 
perception into two air-tight compartments of "percep- 
tion" and "social perception" -a danger against which 
we were warned long ago by Bruner and Postman (1918). 
Thus the area of person perception has been largely left 
to social, clinical and personality psychologists. 
It begs no question that persons are to a large 
extent perceived in the same manner as other objects. 
Laws governing and processes involved in seeing a person, 
hearing his voice and touching his skin are, no doubt, 
the same as seeing a tree, hearing a bell or touching a 
piece of wood. But, over and above these common objec- 
tive characteristics, a human being has something pecu- 
liar about himself which is not shared by other objects 
of our environment. He is a man or woman like us. 
He is a self -a "self" with all the peculiarities and 
complexities of our own selves. He not only is an 
object of our perception and awareness, but, at the same 
time, he too can and does perceive us. He is not a pas- 
sive object of my perception and intention as an inani- 
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mate object usually is. He also is active, attentive, 
purposeful and can do something to me. He can harm 
or benefit me and I too, if I am not careful, may hurt 
him even by merely looking at him. He can love or 
hate me; he can offend me or satisfy me. He can make 
me feel ashamed or proud. He, a person, can and does 
all these things and many more. In Heider's (1958x1 
terms: "In contrast to things, persons are rarely 
mere manipulanda, rather they are action centres, 
they can do something to us, ... persons are perceived 
as having abilities, as acting purposefully, as having 
wishes or sentiments, as perceiving or watching us. 
They are systems having representations, they can be 
our friends or our enemies, and each has his character- 
istic traits. Enumerating the contents of the percep- 
tion of other persons is equal to listing the concepts 
of naive, common sense psychology. " (p. 22). And "they 
are systems having an awareness of their surroundings and their 
conduct refers to this environment, an environment that 
sometimes includes ourselves. " (Heider, 1958b, p. 21. ) 
This emphasis on purpose, ability and awareness as de- 
termining factors in differentiating person perception from 
other types of perception, is shared by nearly all other 
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workers in this field (Allport, 1961). What is not 
made clear is the fact that nearly all other forms of 
animate objects of perception - and., sometimes, some 
inanimate objects as well - share some or all of these 
qualifications to one degree or another. This fact 
has escaped most of the writers on this topic. Heider 
(1958b), for example, - states that: "We shall speak of 
'thing perception' or 'non-social perception' when we 
mean the perception of inanimate objects and of 'person 
perception' or 'social perception' when we mean the 
perception of another person" (Heider, 1958b, 21). 
Thus he leaves no place for the perception of other 
animate objects or animals - even those time-honoured 
members of human society, cogs and cats - who also are 
not mere manipulanda, but are action centres and capable 
or doing a good deal of harm or benefit. As Hebb & 
Thompson (1954) have suggested the study of social be- 
haviour in animals can greatly increase our insight into 
social behaviour and its perceptual concomitants in man. 
Purposes, emotions, beliefs, wishes and traits of 
a person differ in one important respect from other objects 
of his environment: Cues underlying their perception or 
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inference are not as easily and explicitly available 
as those underlying the perception of a physical ob- 
ject's colour, size or distance. As Heider puts it: 
"It is probably fair to say that the stimulus fields 
basic for person perception are usually more extended 
in time than those relevant to thing perception ... 
Although we believe that we get to know something about 
a person from the shape of his face or even the colour 
of his hair, these physiognomic properties are far 
outweighed by his actions as cues to his personality. 
In most cases we cognise a person's traits, and especially 
his wishes, sentiments, or intentions, from what he does 
and says, and we know considerably less when we are 
limited to what we can see of him as a static object. " 
(Heider, 1958b, p. 39). This quality of being more 
extended in time has required that more cognitive pro- 
ceases than pure perception - in the sense of that which 
is given to us here and now - he used in getting to 
understand the other person. As Macleod has pointed 
out "The social world is too large to be encompassed in 
a single act of apprehension" (Macleod, 1947, P"48)" 
This quality of person perception as requiring more 
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than perception alone, has cast some doubt as to the justifiability 
of using Uperception in this context. To overcome this difficulty 
some writers have re-defined perception so as to make it include 
all processes of getting information about the environment, from 
direct 
perception to explicit inference (Heider, 1958b, P. 27). 
Others have proposed using more general terms such as proception 
or judgement (Allport, 1961) or cognitidn (Tajfel, 1962; Newcomb, 
1958) instead of perception. 
The difficulty seems to have arisen from some experimental 
psychologists' insistence on using perception in a highly restricted 
sense covering the immediate apprehension of what is going on here 
and how and through definite stimulus-response relationship 
obtaining between the organism and the environment. The ultimate 
aim is to rid perception from the effects of the perceiver's 
memory, past experience and learning. Such a complete divorce 
of perception from memory, however, is highly improbable, if at 
all possible. Hebb'a (1949) review of evidence appears to leave 
little place for doubt that even the most primitive acts of 
perceptual differentiation, i. e. the differentiation of figure 
from the ground, depends upon learning and experience. 
More one;, not only are many psychologists satisfied with 
much less rigorous definitions of perception (e. g., F. H. Allport, 
19559 P. 14) but also, as Hamlyn's (1961) historical review shows, 
modern philosophy has long abandoned the idea of perception as a 
unitary process. As Wittgenstein and Eyle have argued, wo can 
perceive things and "things as"9 and the latter always involves 
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many other processes besides the immediate mirroring of the here 
and now. As to the distinction between perception and cognition 
as Allport (1955) has argued the two processes are so closely 
intertwined that it would scarcely be feasible, especially from 
the stand point of theory, to consider one of them in isolation 
from the other. 
Notwithstanding these suspicions, many recent studies have 
tried to apply the techniques of experimental psychology to the 
study of person perception. For instance, Moore (1958) has tried 
to handle person perception as a form of problem solving behaviour. 
Rudin (1959) has applied the psychophysical methods of bisection 
and equal-appearing intervals to the perception of persons. Rudin 
& Stagner (1958) have shown that figure and ground phenomena are 
also true of person perception. Levy (1960) has verified a 
Weber-Fraction -Analogue in person perception. He has also 
demonstrated the applications of Conditioning and Generalization 
to the changes in social perceptual dispositions (Levy, 1961) 
Berger (1962) has presented a conceptual framework in terms of 
conditioning through vicarious instigation to account for empathy. 
These studies have gone a long distance to bridge the gap between 
social and non-social (object) perception. 
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Among theoretical treatments of the field, Asch 0 1952) 
and Heider (1958) have tried to apply the Gestalt principles 
of thing perception to person perception. Asch has argued for 
the existence of physiognomic characteristics and an isomorphic 
relationship between a person's action and his experiences 
which make it possible to perceive his character directly from 
his physical appearance and behaviour. Oldfield (1943), whose 
classical analysis of the process of person perception remains 
one of the most interesting and detailed efforts ever made, 
finds no difference between the conditions and processes 
governing judgements of persons and judgements of such objects 
as eggso To him, "both acts are manifestations of a skill 
requiring the construction through experience of an implicit 
and well-articulated standard...... I will call these combined 
standards derived from past experience , 'Schemata'. " (Oldfield, 
1943, P" 44-45)- 
Before the "new look" psychology set ins person perception 
had been mainly a field of Soti*ity of the experimantal psycholo- 
gibts concerned with t he study of emotions, and, later, of 
0 
personality psychlogists. The first group was interested in 
the study of facial experssion of emotions and the scope and 
pwecision of its recognition by different observers. For this 
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purpose, several standard tests were devised and norms 
according to the age and sex of the judges were estab- 
lished. As usual relationship between the recognition 
of emotional states and the personality traits of the 
judge, attracted a great deal of attention and the 
question of the capacity to infer emotional states being 
innate or acquired and general or specific became the 
centre of much effort and argument. (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954) 
The second group of investigators - mainly persona- 
lity psychologists - were concerned with the evaluation 
of personality traits by observers. They wanted to 
see how a person perceives and judges another person's 
personality, what are the basic processes involved in 
this kind of judgement and what characteristics of the 
judge and the judged promote or impede the outcome of 
this judgement. Their interest in the field of person 
perception stemmed from the practical exigencies of 
their work. Rating being one of the main techniques 
of personality assessment it was of vital importance to 
find a common criterion against which the judgements 
of different judges could reliably be examined. Of 
parallel importance were the characteristics of the 
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good and poor judges of personality and the hypothetical 
ability or abilities underlying accuracy of Opdgement. 
These practical approaches to the perception4or 
judgemen hf people were preceded by, and later ' carried 
on along wit ha heated theoretical argument as to the 
nature of the ability involved and the mental processes 
employed in perceiving people. A detailed account of these 
theoretical developments is beyond the scope of this study. 
However as social perception in the senoe of the perception 
of the social has come to be used as an alternative for the 
theortical stand point known as empathy, it seems desirable 
to present a historical account of this theory pointing 
out, whenever possible, its linksw with other important 
concepival. developments in the field of social psychology 
in general and person perception in particular. 
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The historical development of the concept of 
"empathy", 
Historically, the problem of the knowledge of 
other people had occupied a central position in the 
periodic arguments of the epistemologically oriented 
philosophers. The heart of this controversey has been 
centered round the perception of and insight into such 
peculiar aspects of human beings that have been known 
as their minds, the physical stimuli for which are 
either completely lacking or not readily available, 
Most of these philosophical discussions, however, 
have tended to be of a metaphysical and logical 
nature. But, as Allport (1937) has suggested, the 
explanations put forward by different schools of thought 
have largely been of two general types, some favouring 
inference as the key process and others emphasizing 
the role of intuition. Traditionally, Anglo-Saxon 
philosophers have tended to subscribe to the inference 
theory of understanding and the Continental philosphers 
have advocated intuition as the keystone of man's 
understanding of other mortals. 
The young science of psychology inherited these 
philosophical controversies from its Anglo-German 
parentage, with the predominantly British associat- 
ionists adhering to the principle of inference and the 
German Configurationists following the intuitive 
tradition of German idealism. Some German psychologists, 
caught between the contradictory demands of their 
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scientific and philosophical loyalties, came out 
with conciliatory views which, while retaining 
inference as the basic mechanism, would integrate 
it with some form of intuition or immediate 
apprehension called for by the particular nature 
of persons as objects of understanding. Thus Wundt 
(1895), conceded that knowledge of other persons 
demands, in addition to inference, a process of 
re-thinking (UMDENKEN) of one's own personality 
in terms of the other's6 This type of mental activity 
he held to be common among historians, actors, and 
others whose business it is to understand people. 
Although Wundt regarded this process of "putting 
oneself into another's Ego" as one of the major 
problems of psychology, he did not himself offer 
a closer analysis, nor did he abandon the inference 
theory. 
Theodor lipps' theory of "empathy" (Einftlhlung) 
was another example of these conciliatory efforts. 
His theory of person perception was an extension of 
his general theory of aesthetic understanding. In 
1897, the study of optical illusions led Lippe, to 
the conclusion that the observing subject tends to 
project himself into the pattern. A vertical line, 
for example, gives the observer the sense of 
contending against gravity, while the angles and 
curves of many illusions make the subject expand, 
bend, or whirl. The theory has very important 
consequences for aesthetics A man "feels himself 
into" the material of visual art, and the nature i'° 
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of the tension or relaxation which he experiences 
determines many aspects of his aesthetic response 
(Murphy, 1949). in 1903, Lipps extended the principle 
to the perception of people. 
"There are three spheres of knowledge. I know 
about things, about myself, and about others. The 
first type of knowledge has its source in sensory 
perception. The second in inner perception, that 
is to say in the retrospective view of the self 
with all its qualities, feelings and relations to 
its contents and to objects. The source of the 
third type of knowledge is empathy (iinfühlung)". 
(Zipps, 1903, p. 187). 
The mechanism underlying this type of understanding 
is a sort of motor mimicry of the other's action or 
state. Kinesthetic cues originally associated 
with subjective experience give rise to the same 
experiences whenever they recur. The process of 
imitation, however, is so spontaneous and unconscious 
that the resulting understanding approaches a high 
degree of immediacy, and the associative nature of 
the act of inference is largely lost sight of in the 
face of the demanding quality of the objective world. 
On the face of it, empathy appears to be no 
more than "kinesthetic inference". hipps (19u8), 
however, had a much more complex view of it. Although 
the primary mechanism is one of projecting oneself 
into the other, of incorporating the other into one's 
self, nevertheless, the outer object is never lost sight 
* Empathy, as a mode of aesthetic understanding, has 
been traced back to Aristotle who deals with it in 
connection with the problem of the metaphor (Rhetoric 
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of. The outer object is all the time there and insep- 
arable from the subjective experience. Empathic 
meaning may be dependent upon our own past experiences, 
yet it has exclusively objective reference. Since 
there is no recognition that the activity is located 
in one's own body, it should not be considered to be a 
merely imitative process. There is no duality between 
the strain, the depression, or the excitement, which 
I feel empathically and the personality of the one 
whom I am seeking to understand. Lipps does not 
explain why we realize that the conscious life apprehended 
by empathy is the conscious life of another self. 
This objectivity is simply a "given" attribute inherent 
in empathy, marking it off from the ordinary process 
of inference. (Allport, 1937). 
The ensuing forty years produced little in the 
way of the experimental investigation of Lipps' theory, 
'with the consolidation of the division between 
intuitionist and inferential approaches to the under- 
standing of people in the form of the psychological 
schools of Gestalt and Behaviourism such middle-of-the 
way interpretations as empathy lost their raison d'etre 
and were relegated to the emerging field of personality 
psychology. The 22 volumes of the Psychological 
Abstracts (1927-1949) contain no more than nine items 
111,2 (1411b, 34). The modern term Einfühlung was first 
used by Robert Vischer in 1873. His suggestions were taken 
up and developed in Germany by Theodor Lipps, Johannes Volkelt, 
and Karl Groos, in France by Victor Basch and in England by 
Vernon Lee. (Gilbert, K. E. & Kuhn, H... A History of Esthetics. 
Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. 1953, pp"537-5401. 
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under the title of empathy. Of these only two are 
of an experimental nature. (Gordon, 1934; Walton, 1936). 
The concept itself, however, recurred in many a 
theoretical discussions of the problem of person 
perception. In 1913, Scheler (1954) discussed 
Lipp's'theory in connection with his own theory of 
sympathy. As Pear (1964) has suggested, the subsequent 
interest in the concept of empathy was actually the 
result;; of Scheler's rather than Lipps' influence. 
In effect, however, Scheler used the term only to 
indicate Lipps' theory and reject it as an explanation 
of the awareness on the part of one person of the 
feelings of another. 
"It only needs to be emphasized that this 
acceptance and understanding does not come about 
as the conclusion to an"argument from analogy" 
(Lipps)'o If this apprehension itself were only 
made possible (as Lipps believes)* by a tendency to 
imitate and by the reproduction, thus evoked, of a 
previously experienced joy or fear (plus an empathic 
projection of what is reproduced into the other 
person), we should obviously be moving in a circle". 
(Scheler, 1954, pp. 9- 11). 
In Scheler's phenomenological analysis, 
Einfühlung or empathy is the name of the first and 
the most primitive form of sympathetic orientation 
denoting a reflex process of elementary motor 
mimicry, There is also a similarly named phenomenon 
- Einsfühlung or unipathy - which ranks much higher 
in the echelon of Scheler's eight forms of sympathy. 
This denoted an identification of feelings such as 
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that between lovers who feel keenly the joys and 
sorrows of each other. (Allport, 1954a, pp 20 - 21) 
Becker's (1931) use of the term "empathy" in 
translating part of Scheler's work may have been 
responsible for the confusion between the notions 
of empathy and sympathy among the English-speaking 
psychologists* Part of the blame, however, must be 
borne by the shortcomings mings of English language in 
translating the stibl^ties of German language. 
Psychiatrists soon grasped the importance of 
empathy in understanding and diagnosing their patients. 
Southard (1918) defined empathy as the process of 
"reading or feeling ourselves into the person, group, 
nation or race" and elaborated upon its social and 
clinical implications. He proposed to use empathy as 
an index for classifying the various forms of mental 
disorders and gave an introspective account of the use 
of this process in dealing with different forms of 
mental diseases, 
Fraud (1922) while emphasizing the role of 
identification-based upon an important emotional 
quality - in bringing about the mutual ties between 
the members of a group as well as between them and 
the group leader, conceded the suspicion that his 
account of the problem might be "far from exhausting 
the problem of identification"; 
_, 
'-, and that he might be 
faced by the "process which psychology calls 'empathy' 
(Einfühlung) and which plays the largest part in our 
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understanding of what is inherently foreign to our 
ego in other people" (pp. 65 - 66). In a footnote 
added to the end of his chapter on identification, 
he again returned to this matter and reiterated 
his suspicion. 
"we are very well aware that we have not 
exhausted the nature of identification with these 
examples taken from pathology and that we have 
consequently left the riddle of group formations 
untouched. A far more fundamental and comprehensive 
psychological analysis would have to intervene at 
this point. A path leads from identification by way 
of imitation to empathy, that is to the comprehension 
of the mechanisms by means of which we are enabledto 
take up any attitude at all towards another mental 
life". (p. 70, n. 2. ). 
This passage of Freud's although tootangential 
to convey much information, has been regarded as 
indicative of his recognition of the importance of 
empathy, and as such, has been frequently called 
to the witness box by psychoanalyst proponents of 
the theory. (e. g. Maddaloni, 1961). Allport (1937, 
P. 532; 1954, p024) has interpreted Freud's reference 
as implying that people who have no particular emotional 
signikicance for us are understood through empathy 
but those who are of emotional value to us are 
understood through identification. This interpretation 
does not seem to read with the text of Freud's 
reference. Nor is it accepted by other more- 
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psychoanalytically oriented commentators (e. g. Murray, 
1938) 0"01 
*Jung (1921) spoke of empathy-or"feeling-into" 
as his translator prefers to render it - in 
connection with the aesthetic correlates of his 
famous typology. Adapting Worringer's (1911,1953) 
basic classification of aesthetic attitudes into 
empathy and abstraction, he argued that empathy or 
feeling-into is the characteristic aesthetic mode 
of the extrovert, whereas abstraction should be 
regarded as the peculiar way of aesthetic understanding 
of the introvert. To Jung, empathy, or feeling-into 
is"a kind of perception process distinguished by the 
fact that it transveys, through the agency of feeling, 
an essential psychic content into the object; whereby 
the object is introjected. This content, by virtue 
of its intimate relation with the subject assimilates 
the object to the subject, and so links it up with 
the subject that the latter senses himself, so to 
speak, in the object. " (p. 359. )* 
If Freud paid only a passing attention to the 
concept of empathy, Alfred Adler, with his emphasis 
on social and interpersonal rather than genetic factors 
in the shaping of human behaviour, made it part and 
parcel of the tenets of his school of individual 
psychology, in his-and his followers'-works, empathy 
was used in-. a much more general sense than was intended 
by Lipps; it left any implication of motor mimicry and 
became equivalent to identification and understanding. 
* White9(1925) adopted Jung's definition and stressed 
the role of empathy for understanding the "children, 
the savages and the insane". To him, empathy implies 
"a certain identification of the subject with the object. 
This identification does not necessarily imply sympathy 
nor does it partake of sentimentalism. " Po 33) 
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"To see with the eyes of another, to hear with the 
ears of another, to feel with the heart of another".... 
or the time being this seems to me an admissible 
definition of what we call social feeling. we see 
immediately that this ability coincides in part with 
what we call identification or empathy. Individual 
psychology may claim as its contribution t6 have 
painted out that empathy and understanding are facts 
of social feeling, of harmony with the Universe. This 
kind of identification or empathy always depends on 
the degree of our social interest; it is one aspect 
of social interest, and is absolutely essential to 
the achievement of social living. sympathy is partial 
expression of identification. The ability to identify 
must be trained, and it can be trained only if one 
grows up in relation to others and feels a part of a 
whole. " (Adler, 1928) 
To Adler (1930) "to hear, see or speak correctly 
means to lose one's self completely in another or in 
a situation, to become identified with him or with it. 
In this intended assimilation to another person or to 
a situation lies the whole meaning of comprehension. " 
Adler criticizes Freud's notion of "identification" 
in the sense of seizing the role of another in order 
to gain a personal advantage. His notion of identification 
or empathy covers both aspects of Lipps' "Einfühlung" 
- either with persons or with inanimate objects. He 
has emphasized the role of empathy in dreams and in 
group psychology (Adler, 1928,1930). 
Rasey (1929) also emphasized the role of empathy 
in understanding others' attitudes, claiming it to be 
the method of individual psychologist. Baumgarten 
(1930) differentiated between the three forms Of 
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a device for demonstrating empathy. tight photos 
consisting of front, rear, and side views of a 
Mexican image with its arms in various upright 
positions were presented to the subject, who was 
asked to list the eight views as A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H. 
Starting with A, he was told to write down the answer 
to the question: Is it the right arm or the left 
arm which the statue is lifting in the air? It was 
found that some persons showed marked gesticulations 
before they could answer the question. Others showed 
slight movements of the hands, and some, whose 
movements were not publicly perceptible, reported 
that they had been aware of the twitching of their 
muscles. In Germany, the idea of empathic under- 
standing had been established enough to justify a 
textbook coverage of its implications for direct 
education (Krägeloh, 1936). Nevertheless, both Köhler 
(1928) - implicitly - and Beffka (1935) - explicitly - 
criticized the notion of empathy and dismissed it 
in favour of a more direct and physiognomic theory 
of social understanding. 
With the appearance of systematic textbooks on 
personality, empathy gained in importance and was sub- 
jected to more systematic treatment. Thus, Allport 
(1937) gave a detailed - although more or less critical - 
account of empathy as a process of understanding 
other personalities, putting it in a mid-way 
position between the intuitionist and inferential 
theories of understanding. 
"From the point of view of the inference theory 
Lippe is guilty of adding an intuitive element in 
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the perception of the fremde seele; from the point 
of view of the philosophical intuitionist, he 
remains too close to the psychology of association. 
Actually, he stands midway between these views. " 
(Allport, 1937, p. 533) 
To Murray (1938) personological diagnosis seemed as 
an appreciative process which does not proceed 
consciously by logical steps. 
"Adams 01928) is perhaps correct in saying that 
it is an inference based on the assumption that a 
person who moves or speaks in a certain way must be 
experiencing subjectively what we experience when we 
behave in that way. The name for this process is 
"empathy", an involuntary accurrence whereby an 
observer experiences the feelings or emotions which 
in his personality are associated 1, with the 
situation in which the subject is placed, or 2, 
with the forms of behaviour that the subject exhibits. 
The complement of empathy is projection. We feel 
something (by empathy) and we imagine that the other 
person feels the same (projection). This seems to be 
the initial phase of all intuitive understanding. The 
two phases together might be called 'critical empathy'. 
(p" 247))) 
As it is apparent, Murray's notion of'empathy' 
has little in common with the notion as originally 
developed by Lipps and used by Allport (1937). 
Shorn of its kinaesthetic concomittants, empathy 
is reduced to a simple act of inference. More 
similar to the original usage of the term is Murray's 
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concept of "identification" which is degined as 
"consciously putting oneself in the place of another 
or allowing the flow of one's thought and feeling 
to fallow his words" (p. 248). This process, Murray 
believes, furthers the empathic process. Yet all 
these three supplementary processes are not deemed 
sufficient to account for the various aspects of 
understanding others. But, to Murray, there is 
another, a fourth, emotional process that greatly 
aids understanding. 
"It is not the resonating supplement, but the 
complement (reciprocal) of the subjects' innCer 
processes. The E sets himself opposite to, rather 
than flowing with the subjects movements and words, 
and, becoming as open and sensitive as possible, 
feels how the subjects' attitude is affecting 
him (the E), In this way he apprehends the 
press (as it "hits" him). If he feels excluded 
he imagines Rejection in the S: if he feels that 
e is being swayed to do something he imagines 
Dominance: if he feels anxious or irritated her 
infers Aggression, and so forth. Finally, there 
is the cathartis(rather than the press) of the 
subject. An E can ask himself; what drive is 
the subject evoking in me? Anger and aggression 
in the E suggest the same in the S; compassion 
and tenderness suggest succorance, and so forth. 
For this, I cannot think of a less awkward term 
than 'recipathy'_ (reciprocal feeling rather 
than resonoting feeling). Recipathy seems to 
be the mode most commonly adopted with strangers, 
whereas empathy is more appropriate for familiar, 
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allied objects. Perhaps recipathy is the preferred 
method of the introvert ( to whom all men are strangers) 
and empathy the habitual made of the extrovert (as 
Jung suggests). (p. 248) Murray's interpretation of 
the relationship between empathy and identification 
casts some doubt as to the plausibility of Allports' 
interpretation of Freud's above-quoted passage. In 
this connection it must be recognized that Murray's 
outlook is more psychoanalystical than that of Allport's. 
As an indication of the lack of experimental work 
on empathy, it is interesting that Murray gives no 
factual data to support his theoretical classification 
of empathy and Allport resorts to indirect evidence 
from graphological studies to demonstrate the role 
of motor mimicry in understanding. 
In 1939, wiersma discussed the importance of 
empathic understanding - i, e. " arousing subjective 
reactions of others in ourselves through imitating 
their expressive movements or by following their 
train of thoughts" - for parents, teachers, 
psychologists and physicians. He also presented some 
evidence of the techniques adopted by 170 Netherlands 
physicians, Ames (1943) discussed the theory of empathy 
in relation to aesthetics, pointed out its deficiencies 
and emphasized th6-ý significance of art as a record of 
social change. The same topic was dealt with by Lanfeld 
(1947)0 
Murphy's (1947) definition of the term as "putting 
oneself in the place of either a living or a non- 
living thing"(p. 494) was more in line with the original 




"Exactly as an individual puts himself 
in another's place, assume' his spatial position and 
its appurtenances, glows with his pride, suffers 
in his embarrassment, so he puts himself in the 
place of the pillar that is too slender to support 
the shaft, and he judges it inappropriate; he 
is pulled awry by the Picasso painting which tilts 
the house upon its foundation". (Murphy 1947. p. 494). 
Murphy finds no sharp line of cleavage between empathy 
and sympathy (p. 493), but regards it as indispensable 
for explaining those more complex types of sympathy 
which are hard to explain in terms of conditioning (p. 222). 
This detailed historical account of the development 
of the notion of empathy from 1908 to 1947 is intended 
to highlight the dearth of experimental work in 
this area. Of the studies cited above - which have been 
traced through the 22 volumes of the Psychological Abstracts, 
1927 - 1948, only the two studies by Gordon and Walton 
were experimental and both of these were concerned with 
the perception of objects rather than persons. This 
does not mean that the problem of knowing and understanding 
other people had been completely overlooked by the 
experimental - and the experimentally oriented-personality 
psychologists. What was neglected was not persons or 
personalities as such, but those subjective and idiosyncratic 
characteristics which mark persons off as special categories 
of objects. Instead, the field of person perception had 
been limited to the study of such static aspects as the 
recognition of emotional expressions or judgments of character. 
These early studies of person perception, however, did 
little in the way of investigating the deeper and more 
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human aspects of the persons as interacting, under- 
standing and responsive individuals. in their zeal 
to follow the footsteps of the physical scientists, the 
experimental psychologists of personality restricted 
their area of investigation to the study of such facets 
of personality that were open and easily available 
to their none-too-crude methods of observation and 
data collecting. Persons and personalities were 
taken bonny fide at their face values and little atten- 
tion was paid to such subjective and invisible factors 
as lay behind these objective manifestations and 
behaviours. This was in line with the dominant ob- 
jective trend in the field of cognitive psychology 
in general. That the outcome of their efforts was 
not very encouraging is well attested by the concluding 
remarks of Bruner & Tagiuris'(1954) exhaustive review 
of the field. 
"Studies on the "accuracy" of judging others have 
not progressed to a point at which firm substantial 
conclusions can be brought to bear upon a theory of 
judgement. The criteria employed have been too often 
of a consensual kind: accuracy is mostly defined as 
agreement with others regarding a person's characteristicso.. 
Accuracy may mean simply that a particular judge 
shares the most common bias found among his fellow 
judges, Taken from the point of view of a theory 
of judgement, relatively few firm conclusions can be 
drawn. " ( Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954. p. 646) 
Towards the end of 1930s there was already a 
movement among social and personality psychologists 
which culminated in the "perceptual imperialism" of 
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of 1940a and led to the re-emergence of persons as 
legitimate objects of psychological inquiry. The 
story of this movement - as far as it concerns the 
"persons" - has been admirably recorded in a chapter 
by Hilgard & Lerner (1951) and need not be entered 
upon here. The movement was the resultant of various 
forces working inside the domain of American psychology. 
In the first place, the successful transplantation 
of the Gestalt psychology in the U. S. A., had placed 
the psychology of perception right at the centre 
of the psychological currents. In the second place, 
Kurt Lewin6' field theory - with its emphasis on such 
subjective concepts as the "life space" and "psychic 
systems" had demonstrated the application of Gestalt - 
field principles in the study of persons and inter- 
personal relations. The reinterpretation of Freud's 
dynamic psychology in terms of social and interpersonal 
influences rather than biologically fixed instincts, 
by such "left-wing" psychoanalysts as Otto Ranks 
Erich Fromm and Karen Harney had contributed much towards 
the achievement of this new outlook in personality 
psychology. Like many other aspects of their thought, 
H®riey and Fromms' emphasis on social interaction and 
interpersonal relations in the development of personality 
is more a sign of their much-denied Adlerian leanings 
than any orthodox Freudian orientation'. Of equal 
importance was the emerging school of personalistic 
psychology as represented by G. W. Allport (1937) and 
later by Gardener Murphy (1947)0 
On the sociological side, people like C. H. Cooley and 
G. H. Mead had long stressed the importance of social 
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interaction in the development of the self-concept. 
To Cooley (1902) one's self-image is formed on the basis 
of perceiving how others react toward him, hence the 
characterization "looking-glass self". "In a very large 
and interesting class of cases the social" reference takes 
the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how 
one's self appears in a particular mind, and the kind 
of self-feeling one has is determindd by the attitude 
toward this attributed to that other mind. A social 
self of this sort might be called the reflected or 
looking-glass self. Each to each a looking glass, 
Reflects the other that doth pass". 
"The self that is most important is a reflection, largely 
from the minds of others.... "(Cooley, 1902. p. ) 
It is interesting to note that McDougal, despite 
his over-emphasis on instincts, has proposed a very 
similar explanation for the development of the self 
and the self-regarding sentiment. 
"For we find the idea of the self and the self- 
regarding sentiment are essentially social products; 
that their development is affected by constant interplay 
between personalities, between the self and society; 
that, for this reason, the complex conception of 
self thus attained implies constant reference to others 
and to society in general, and is, in fact, not 
merely a concenption of self, but always of one's self 
in relation to other selves, "(McDougal, 1918, p. 185. ). 
Even more interesting is McDougal'd account of 
the way a child comes to perceive or understand other 
persons in his environment: 
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"As the differentiation of persons and inert 
objects proceeds, persons continue to be the more 
interesting to the young child for they continue 
to be the main sources of his pains and pleasures and 
satisfactions .... But much more important than the 
actions of the people about him are the feelings and 
emotions that prompt them... (The child) widens his 
experience and his understanding of the emotional 
attitudes and motives of others by copying them in his 
imitative play; he puts himself into some personal 
relations he has observed, assumes the part of parent 
or teacher or elder sister, makes some smaller child, 
a dog, a cat, or a doll, stand for himself, and acts 
out his part, so realizing more fully the meaning of the 
behaviour of other persons. In this way the content 
of his idea of his self and its capacities for action 
and feeling grows hand in hand with his idea of other 
selves .... He gets his idea of his self in large part 
b'r accepting the ideas of himself that he finds 
expressed by those about him. " (pp. 190 - 191), 
Besides its striking similarity to the above-quoted 
views of Cooley, McDougal's' theory seems to foreshadow 
the current notion of interpersonal perception as under- 
stood by the term empathy or social perception. It is 
also a forerunner of the later developments in role 
theory and the social significance of play. It is 
notable that McDougal does not mention the term 
"empathy", nor any of the later writers on this subject - 
to the extent I have been able to follow - have named 
him among the founding fathers of their creed. Another 
significant point in McDougal's passage is his explicit 
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recognition of the importance of subjective feelings 
and emotions behind the overt actions of people. 
By far the most elaborate and influential exposition 
of the social theory of self is that of G. H. Mead 
whose posthumous book (Morris, 1934) has provided 
intellectual stimulation to much of what has been done 
by the "new-look" psychologists. Mead's general 
stand is a combination of the social philosophy of John 
Dewey and a slightly moderate version of Watson's 
behaviourism. He has called himself a "Social behaviourist". 
To him, everything human is necessarily social in nature 
and dependent on other persons. "The self is something 
which has a development, it is not initially there at 
births but arises in the process of social experience 
and activity"(p. 135) Self-awareness is indirect and 
depends on the awareness of the others, for an individual 
"enters his own experience as a self or individual 
not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject 
to himself but only in so far as he first becomes an 
object to himself just as other individuals are objects 
to him or in his experience; and he becomes an object 
to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals 
toward himself within a social environment or context 
of experience and behaviour in which both he and they 
are involved". (p. 138) Signs of an empathic notion of 
understanding is already apparent in thig formulation 
of self development through taking the attitudes of 
others. The view is expressed more fully in a footnote 
describing what Mead calls "social intelligence". 
"It is generally recognized that the specifically 
social expressions of intelligence, or the exercise 
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of what is often called "social intelligence" depend 
upon the given individuals ability to take the roles 
of, or "put himself in the place of" the other 
individuals implicated with him in given social 
situations; and upon his consequent sensitivity to 
their attitudes toward himself and toward one another. 
These specifically social expressions of intelligence, 
of course, acquire unique significance in terms of 
our view that the whole nature of intelligence is 
social to the very core - that this putting of one's 
self in the places of others, this taking by ones self 
of their roles or attitudes, is not merely one of the 
various aspects or expressions of intelligence or of 
intelligent behaviour, but is the very essence of its 
character. Spearman's "1 factor" in intelligence is 
simply this ability of the intelligent individual to 
take the attitude of the other, or the attitudes of 
others, thus realizing the signitications or grasping 
the meanings of the symbols or gestures in terms of 
which thinking proceeds; and thus being able to carry 
on with himself the internal conversation with those 
symbols or gestures which thinking involves. "(p. 141, 
f. n. 3)0 
Mead's notion of social intelligence as defined above 
has an unmistakable resemblance to what has come to be 
known as social perception or empathy by present-day 
psychologists. Wider implications of this role-taking hypothesis 
of communication, however, B`* have little been 
investigated by later workers. 
The first repercussions of these converging 
theoretical developments found expression in the 
interpersonal theory of psychiatrj; advanced by H. S. 
Sulligan (1947). His repeated emphasis on persons 
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and interpersonal relations did a great deal to reintroduce 
persons to psychology. Reading his book, one gets the 
impression of an obsessive preoccupation with persons and 
interpersonal relations. To Sullivan, (1947) psychiatry 
is the study of interpersonal relations (P. v). Every form 
of behaviour, even that of the acutely schizophrenic 
patient, "is made up of interpersonal processes" (p"7)", 
and personality is no more than "the relatively enduring 
patterns of recurrent interpersonal situations which 
characterize a human life" (p. 34). He is well aware of the 
complications besetting the perception of persons, particularly 
of those arising from the perceiver's past experiences with 
other persons and his attitudes regarding himself; ... 
"It is not that as ye Judge so shall ye be judged, but 
as ye Judge yourself so shall ye Judge others. " (p. 6). 
Among the network of interpersonal relations 
spanning the life of an individual, the earliest and by far 
the most significant are those obtaining between an infant 
and its mother. The main medium of communication in those 
early months of life is a sort of emotional relationship 
that Sullivan calls empathy. He defines "empathy" 
as "the peculiar emotional linkage that subtends the 
relationship of the infant with other significant 
people" (p. 8). It is a kind of "emotional contagion 
or communion" which precedes "signs of understanding 
of emotional-expression" (Ibid). The main function of 
empathy at this stage is the communication of the basic 
feelings of anxiety and satisfaction between the 
infant and the mothering person. In his later 
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teachings - published posthuomously - Sullivan has 
summarized his views in the following terms: 
"The tension of anxiety, when present in the 
mothering one, induces anxiety in the infant. The 
rationale of this induction - that is, how anxiety in 
the mother induces anxiety in the infant - is 
thoroughly obscure .... I bridge the gap simply by refer- 
ring to it as a manifestation of an indefinite - 
that is, not yet defined - interpersonal process to which 
i aptly the term empathy. " (Sullivan, 1953, pp 41 - 42). 
As the child grows older, empathic communion gives 
way to verbal communication and perception. As it 
appears, Sullivan's notion of empathy has little 
in common with the one we have been dealing with so 
far, in effect, his conception of empathy seems to 
be based can a biological mechanism similar to the 
so-called Innate Releasing Mechanisms of the 
ethologists. But, even in the case of animal behaviour, 
the concept of IRM is beset by many conceptual and 
experimental problems (of. Hinde, 1959). Sullivan 
was well aware of the mysterious nature of his concept 
of empathy and advised his readers to remember 
".... that there is much that sounds mysterious 
in the Universe, only you have got used to it; 
and perhaps you will get used to empathy. " 
(Sullivan, 1953, p"42). 
Sullivan's thesis was accepted by many other 
"dynamic" psychiatrists and psychotherapists. Thus, 
Masserman (1946) discussed the importance of "empathic 
or intuitive communication" in addition to the purely 
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verbal, transfer of ideas and attitudes (p. 225). 
Hoskins (1946) pointed out that schizophrenia may 
be due to a failure in empathy. At about the same 
time Client-centered therapists were stressing the 
role of empathy in therapeutic relationships (Rogers, 1951). 
The conceptual developments outlined above, along 
with the new look psychologists' enthusiasm for anything 
connected with perception, had set the stage for the 
triumphant re-entry of empathy into the realm of 
brass-instrument experimental psychology in late 
1940so Thus, when, in 1950, Cottrell, in his presidential 
address to the American Sociological Society, spoke 
of"empathic responses" as"one of the most fascinating 
and challenging as well as one of the most critical 
processes in the whole range of social psychology" 
which social psychologists had succeeded to ignore, 
he was in effect heralding an already full-fledged 
movement. In fact, as far back as 1942, Cottrell 
himself had included an empathic process of understanding 
others in a sense similar to that implied by Mead's 
"social intelligence" - in his analysis of situational 
fields in social psychology. He had also s-gpervised 
Dymand's doctoral work which may be regarded as the 
first experimental study of empathy as a process of 
understanding others. 
Before going on to describe Dymend's study, however, 
mention must be made of certain very significant 
contributions to the field of person perception by a 
number of Gestalt psychologists. As suggested above, 
both Höhlen (1928) and Kaffka (1935) had stressed the 
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configurational properties of persons as objects of 
perception. To them, the Gestalt theory of direct 
apprehension based on the notions of the Ehrenfels 
qualities and isomorphism was as true of ' persons 
perception as of any other kind of perception, there 
being no need for such second-order mechanisms as 
inference or empathy. The experimental proof of 
these assertions, however, had to wait until mid 1940s 
In 1944, Heider & Simmel showed that certain sequences 
of movements of small circles and triangles in a 
moving picture evoked unmistakeably anthropoimorphistic 
responses in their viewers: the triangle was seen as 
"chasing" or "hitting" the circle and the circle as 
"hiding" to escape. In the same way a large triangle 
was described as "agressive" the smaller triangle as 
heroic" and the circle as "timid" and "feminine". 
These findings were corroborated by similar anthropoýmorphistic 
inferences found in Michotte's well-known study of 
caU al perception (Michotte, 1946). In the same way 
Asch's (1946) pioneer study of the process of impression 
formation revealed the importance of some central traits 
in building up a picture of the other's personality. 
Ashc's findings drew the attention of psychologists 
to the importance of first impressions in judging others' 
personalities and opened a new chapter in the study of 
person perception. Despite a number of methodological 
criticisms made of and alternative interpretations 
tffered for Asch's work, his findings have been largely 
confirmed by later workers. (cf. Veness & Brierley, 1963)0 
These studies went a long way to rid the studies of 
person perception of their preoccupation with the accuracy 
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of judgment. Instead, it was demonstrated that 
inaccuracy of Judgement and misperception were as 
important and worthy of study as wiy other aspect 
of interpersonal behaviour. The point had -already 
been hammered by progective psychologists and the :. _ 
experimental psychologists had collected some interesting 
data bearing on the distortion of perception by the Parýeýtual 
so-called mechanisms of,, defence. (Brown, 1961). 
The appearance, in 1948, of Dymondts study of 
"empathy" marked the beginning of a new phase in the 
field of social perception. Dymond's definition of 
empathy as "the imaginative transposing of oneself 
into the thinking, feeling, and acting of another 
and so structuring the world as he does" (Dymond, 1949) 
was much broader than those put forward by Lipps, Allport 
and Murray. it was more similar to and influenced by 
Mead's definition of role thking as quoted above. Her test 
of empathy consisted of asking a subject to predict the 
ratings and self-ratings of another subject an a six- 
item rating scale. The empathy score was determined 
by comparing the predictions against the actual ratings 
and self-ratings of the subjects. She found the amount 
of accuracy to be well above that expected on a purely 
chance level. 
Like so many other things under the sun of psychology, 
Dymond's test of empathy could not be credited with 
novelty. A similar technique had already been employed 
by Bender (1935) to test his own understanding of persons 
he had interviewed by attempting to predict their scores 
on various personality tests. In the same manner, 
Winslow (1937) had asked Judges to predict how 
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acquaintances would fill in a questionaire on 
political attitudes. Neither of these workers, 
however, had called their techniques a measure of 
empathy. Nor had they paid much attention to the 
processes and the psychological implications of 
their techniques. The time was not yet ripe for 
such conceptual developments. 
The novelty of Dymond's approach was that, for 
the first time, it shifted the attention from the 
objective world of the judges to the sub jective'ýw ld of 
the judged. Instead of being asked to rate their 
subjects as they saw or as they believed them to be, 
the judges were required to guess or predict the potential 
self-images of their subjects in terms of a rating 
scale. This was well in line with the prevailing 
mood of the time we have just summarized. More 
important was the pragmatic implications of Dymond's 
operationally defined measure of empathy, which seemed 
to hold great promises for the future. No wonder, then, 
that this new approach was eagerly - and at first, 
uncritically - adopted by many other psychologists and 
journals of psychology seemed to be inundated with 
experimental studies of empathy done on variants of 
Dymond's technique. As a result, the term "social 
perception" became more or less restricted to studies 
of empathy on the line proposed by Dymond. 
As a sign of the ripeness of the time, it is 
significant that at about the same time that Dymond 
published her study, Kerr & Speroff (1947 - 1954) 
published an "Empathy Test" purporting to measure 
"Massempathy" or"the ability 'to feel into' the average 
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or hypothetically average person's situation and so 
react". The test consists of asking the subjects to 
rank (a) the popularity of 15 types of music for the 
non-office factory workers of the U. S. A., (b) the 
circulation of 15 well-known current magazines, and 
(c) the prevalence of ten types of annoyances. The key 
is based on certain empirical facts in each case 
(Kerr & Speroff, 1951.. The test has been employed 
in a number of industrial situations and the authors 
have claimed a very high degree of validity and 
reliability for their measure. Some of their claims 
are very impressive indeed. Empathy has been found 
related to such diverse abilities and characteristics 
as automobile salesmanships (Taholski & Kerr, 1952) 
accident proneness (Speroff, 1953), supervisory know- 
ledge (Speroff, 1954) and Union leadership (Van Zelst, 
1952) However, workers not associated with the authors 
have failed to corroborate these findings. (Thorndike, 
1959). 
Kerr & Speroff's Test of Empathy, is different 
from the test proposed by Dymond in that the former is 
more concerned with the ability to comprehend the public 
taste or the preferences of certain "generalized others" - 
to borrow Mead's term - whereas the latter is more 
interested in the others as specific individuals. There 
is little reason that the two abilities should 
necessarily be correlated. In fact, studies employing; 
both measures of empathy have repeatedly produced 
insignificant correlations. (Siegel, 1954: Patterson, 
1962: 11ahoney & Auston, 1958). In view of the post- 
new look psychologists' emphasis on "persons" Dymond's 
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technique has been preferred by the overwhelming 
majority of psychologists working on empathy and 
the use of Kerr & Speroff's Test of empathy has 
been mainly limited to those interested in the 
commercial production of psychological gadgets. 
The basic procedure has remained the same; a 
person is asked to predict or guess the responses 
of another person in a given situation. The 
situations or mddia of prediction have varied all the 
way from a rating-scale to a personality questionnaire 
(Bender & HastOrf, 1950), an attitude scale 
(Cho'dhury & Newcomb, 1952), an interest blank 
tGate, 1952) or a value inventory (Wertheimer, 1960), 
others have employed sociametric or near-sociametric 
measures. As the first part of this study is on a 
similar line, the field will be discussed in full 
detail separately at the end of this chapter. 
the predictions acquired in this manner have been 
interpreted in various ways, in the ma7jority of 
cases, they have been compared against the actual 
responses of others and the deviation scores thus 
obtained have been used as indices of empathy. Another 
group of workers - headed by riedler kl953, '54, '58) - 
have employed the predictors'own responses as the 
criteria of Judgment and have calculated indices of 
assumed similarity IAS) or assumed dissimilarity. 
Others have employed this same technique to 
investigate the psychoanalytic concepts of identification, 
projection and transference (5f. Branfenfrenner, 1958), 
Still another group of students have interpreted it as 
a measure of role-playing ability (Sarbin, 1954). 
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In the same vein, the ability under study has been 
called by such different names as "empathic ability, " 
"Social sensitivity, " "interpersonal sensitivity, " 
"insight" "clinical competence" and the "ability to 
understand others". This is an indication of the 
experimental richness of Dymond's technique, which, 
to a large extent, is due to the conceptual vagueness 
and imprecision of her operational definition. 
Early workers were so strongly impressed by the 
operational simplicity of Dymond's test that they paid 
little heed to the none-too obvious short-comings of 
her operational approach. Part of this was doubtless 
due to the high expectations created by the new-look 
psychologists regarding the concept of empathy or 
social perception. For the rest, the psychological 
climate of America must be taken as responsible. 
Branfenfirenner has put the situation very succinctly: 
"For an American psychologist, nothing is so 
attractive as an operational definition* And 
when such a definition can be combined with an 
"objective" procedure yielding a numerical score 
the temptation to gather data is virtually 
irresistible. Nowhere is this tendency more 
clearly evidenced than in the field of inter- 
personal perception, where the ready availability 
and adaptability of questionnaire methods for 
measuring correspondence and discrepancy in social 
perceptions have resulted in the wide, if not 
always wise, application of these techniques 
to a variety of problems, " (Bronfenbrenner, 1958,110) 
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The old idea of accuracy has again crept in and occupied 
more than its share of the psychologists' time and 
effort. This has been accompanied by an enthusiastic 
search for the personality correlates of this assumed 
"ability" as well as its effects on various aspects 
of interpersonal behaviour. As Cronbaoh (1955) has 
suggested, this over-enthusiasm for the pragmatic 
implications of interpersonal sensitivity has blinded 
many researchers to the very fact of what they have meant 
by the term empathy or social sensitivity. They seem 
to have taken the term operationally defined as "that 
which is measured by a test of empathy" and plunged head 
on into a sea of practical inferences and correlations 
revealed by it. Reviewing the field in 1957, Cartwright 
(1957) likened these early investigations to a driver 
racing wildly over unpaved roads, with little concern 
over the condition of his steering wheels and tyres. 
The publication in 1955 of Gage & Cronbach's (1955) and 
of Cronbach's (1955) critical evaluation of the field 
was. 
opportune 
and timely "danger sign" erected in this 
wasteful path of psychological endeavour. Even before 
the publication of Cronbach's critical analyses, some 
workers had indicated some of the uncontrolled factors 
vitiating the results of Dymond's test of empathy. As 
early as 1950, Bender & Hastorf found that much of what 
had been regarded as empathy was in fact the result of 
projection, in the non-analytical sense of the term. It 
was quite apparent that when a person was required to 
predict the responses of two other people on a test like 
Allport & Allport A-S Reaction Study, his predictions 
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were much more highly related to each other and to the 
predictors own score on that test than they were to 
the score of: the people predicted for. 
in a second study, Hastorf & Bender (1952) 
proposed a measure of "refined empathy" which tmg7 
purported to partial out the effect of projection. 
This was achieved by subtracting the empathy score 
(i. e. the deviation between the S's predictions and 
the 0's actual responses on a test) from the projection 
score (i. e. the difference between the S's predictions 
for 0 and his own responses. ) They found that of the 
50 predictors, 20 were closer to their associates' 
score and thus might be called "empathizers", while 
28 were closer to their own score, hence to be called 
projectors. The remaining two had equal projection 
and empathy deviation scores. Thus the phenomenon of 
projection seemed to be more prevalent. However, the 
interpretation of these results ise made difficult by 
another finding that the top ten projectors were in 
fact more similar to their associates than were the 
ten top empathizers. Moreover, there appeared to be 
a rank-order correlation of . 30 
(P405) between the 
two measures of raw and refined empathy. 
Ha4storf & Bender recognized the shortcomings of 
their measure of refined empathy by stating that "It 
may be overly severe to grade empathic ability by means 
of subtracting the projection score, since it would be 
dangerous to label as projection all the overlap between 
the prediction and the predictors own answers". (p. 575). 
However, they felt that without some correction for 
projection, attempts to, measure empathy do not seem to 
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to make psychological sense. One way to control the 
influence of similarity was to obtain predictions 
for a number of associates with varying degrees of 
similarity to the predictt]r'_. In a further study, 
Bender & Hastorf (1953) asked 50 ßs to predict the 
responses of 4 persons, all well known to them, on a 
42 item scale. Four deviation scores were obtained 
from the data thus collected for the variables of 
similarity, projection, raw empathy and refined empathy. 
It was found that while the raw empathy score was 
significantly correlated with similarity (r=. 53 ± , 07) 
the refined empathy score showed only a slight negative 
correlation, r =-. 12 ± 009, with empathy. Furthermore, 
it was found that the refined empathy scores showed a 
fair degree of consistency, althought the greatest 
consistency was shown by the projection scores. There 
was also some degree of consistency in the raw empathy 
score which the authors attribute to their Ss' tendency 
to select uniformly similar or dissimlar associates. 
Bender & Hastorf interpreted these findings as a 
justification for the use of refined empathy score, as 
an operational measure of empathic ability. They 
further argued that the refined empathy scores were 
consistent enough to be regarded as measuring a generalized 
ability. 
A later study by Hastorf, Bender & Weintraub 
(1955), however, revealed that the refined empathy 
score was crippled by the operation of such response 
patterns as the tendency to subscribe to end-scale responses 
on self-rating and to mid-scale responses in giredicting 
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others' responses. It was found, for example, that 
Be high in the refined empathy score tended (a) to 
give end-scale self-responses, (b) to choose associates 
who give midscale responses, and (c) to predict 
midecale responses for these associates. In contrast, 
Be scoring low in refined empathy tended (a) to give 
midscale self-responses (b) to choose associates who 
give more end-scale responses, and (c) to predict 
midscale responses for their associates. These findings 
led the authors to impugn the refined empathy score as 
a true measure of empathic ability. The implications 
of these findings for interpersonal relations have not 
been given the attention they deserve and the relationships 
between Real Similarity, Assumed Similarity (or 
projection) and Accuracy of Perceptions still remain a 
moot question. 
A similar response tendency was reported by 
Lindgren & Robinson (1953) who found that there was 
a definite tendency for one of the positions in the 
scale to be preferred with regard to each item. This 
observation led them to the hypothesis that perhaps 
respondents were actually not empathizing but were 
responding to a cultural norm or stereotype. Empathy 
scores derived from a comparison of the subjects' 
predictions against a normative key based on the res- 
ponse tendencies of 100 Ss correlated from . 74 to 0*56 
with the original empathy scores obtained by subtracting 
the predictions from the actual responses of others. 
Gaga, -. & Cronbach's (1955) conceptual and methodological 
analysis of the area of interpersonal perception was 
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was by far the most deep-going evaluation of the 
operations underlying the new notion of empathy. 
They questioned the prevalent notion of empathy 
as a general ability indicating that the variety 
of tasks involved and operations employed hardly 
justified such an assumption of generality. 
"If we ask a person questions about others 
where he has had ample opportunity to learn the 
answers by experience we are primarily measuring 
his knowledge. When we present him with 
questions which he cannot answer on the basis 
of past experience alone, we are measuring ability 
to acquire new knowledge. But different abilities 
are required, depending upon whether the dif- 
ficulty he faces is that of gathering information, 
or of drawing inferences, or both. " (Gage & Cronbacli 
1955,413) 
Of equal importance is the kind of others for whom 
predictions are made. Unless this is explicitly 
specified, the investigator can be suspected of a 
bias towards a generalized ability. This same point 
has recently been emphasized by Crow (1957) who has 
argued that the principles of the random sampling of 
subjects should be extended to the objects of study in 
person perception in order to justify any sort of 
generalization. Another point emphasized by Gage 
& Cronbach was the intricate relationship between the 
different components of accuracy. They have demonstrated 
that of the three variables of Assumed Similarity, (or 
projection) Real Similarity and Accuracy only two were 
independent. 
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Whenever two persons are similar in respect of a trait 
and tend to assume similarity in predicting each other's 
responses they are logically bound to be accurate and 
vice versa. This makes Hastorf & Bender's (1952) measure 
of "refined empathy" conceptually untenable. 
Another important point in Gage & Cronbach's (1955) 
analysis is the differentiation between the two components 
of an accuracy score, to wit, the "stereotype accuracy" 
and "differential accuracy". The former refers to 
the individual's ability to predict the pooled responses 
of a given category of persons, whereas the latter 
refers to his ability to differentiate among individuals 
within the category. The two components are not 
necessarily correlated with each other and must be 
investigated separately. As will be seen in the next 
section, the differentiation of the accuracy score 
into these two components has been fully borne out 
by later studies. 
At a more technical level, Cronbach (1955) demon- 
strated that the ordinary accuracy score is the sum of 
four components which he called Elevation (E), Differential 
Elevation (DE), Stereotype Accuracy (SA) and 
Differential Accuracy (D. A. ) By Elevation was meant 
the average of a Judge's predictions over all items and 
all objects of judgment vthich reflects his way of using 
response scale. By Differential Elevation was meant the degree of' 
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closeness between t14e Judges average prediction and 
the subject's central tendency of response, all items 
pooled and Judges central tendency of response held 
constant. otereotype accuracy or "accuracy in predicting 
generalized other" described the judge's ability 
to predict the norm for objects and depended on his 
knowledge of the relative frequency or popularity of 
the possible responses. Finally, Differential Accuracy 
was defined as the ability to predict differences between 
objects on any item. Apparently only this last 
component could be regarded as representing a pure 
measure of interpersonal sensitivity and Cronbach (1955, 
& 1958) has proposed special statistical techniques for 
partialing out and studying this component. 
In a similar manner, Cronbach has distinguished 
seven aspects in the performance of the Judge and 
four components in the ordinary Assumed Similarity 
score, For further description and mathematical 
derivation of these, the original article must be 
consulted. Having presented his detailed analysis, 
gronbach (1955) concludes that: "All results to date 
lead us to doubt whether accuracy in differentiating 
personalities of others can be reliably measured, -where 
reliable variance is found it seems to result from some 
constant mental get. " (p. 185). 
The most significant practical implication of 
Cronbach's mathematical analysis-is that the variation 
in predictions should never exceed the variation in 
true responses, and should ordinarily be much smaller, 
This principle indicates that there is an optimal 
degree of differentiation in making judgments ý. ý. 
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and hence, contrary to current emphasis, teachers 
and therapists should be cautioned not to exceed this 
optional level of differentiation in their dealings 
with "individuals". In fact a study by Crow (1957 b) 
has shown that training programmes devoted to increasing 
accuracy of interpersonal perception run the risk 
of decreasing accuracy when they increase the trainee's 
responsiveness to individual differences. 
In a later paper, Cronbach (1958) has criticized 
the use of dyadic and global indices in the study of 
interpersonal perceptions on the grounds that the 
former leads to an unparsimonious description of events, 
is laden with artifacts, disregards the direction 
of differences in perception, treats regression 
effects as if they represented real changes and 41t 
assumes an interval scale, while the latter -a global 
index - gives rise to a false impression of generality 
in the absence of sufficient evidence and overlooks 
other kinds of significant relations, Instead, he 
proposes to replace the global index with a series of 
components of perceptual relation, and a separate analysis 
for each of these components, taking into account 
the traits being perceived, the constant tendencies 
in the perceiver - his perceptual space - with respect 
to those traits, and finally the effect of the 
particular other as a social stimulus. The full 
implications of these proposals, however, have not 
yet been experimentally worked out. 
The critical evaluations reviewed above did a 
great deal A clarifying the concept of empathy and 
shearing it from the operational artifacts attending 
its early development. Despite all these, however, 
the notion of empathy as an ability or skill has 
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has lingered on, and the question of its generality 
or specificity has given rise to much controversey. 
As noted above, early workers on empathy took the 
generality of the ability under study for granted. 
This was, at least partly, due to the implicit idea 
of generality inherent in the current definitions of 
ability, where an "ability" is taken to imply"the 
existance of a group or category of performances 
which correlate highly with one another, and which 
are relatively distinct from (i. e. give low correlations 
with) other performances "(Vernon, 1956, p. 131). 
Another part of this assumed generality of empathy was 
a residual of the former studies of the good Judges 
of personality. Reviewing the literature in 1937, 
Allport had reached the conclusion that: "It seems 
more of an error to consider the ability entirely 
specific than to consider it entirely general, " (p. 512 
Par. 8)o The same conclusion had been accepted by 
most later workers (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954,645; Taft 
1955, p. 6. ). 
Some workers in the new field of social perception 
have in fact found experimental support for the 
generality of empathic ability (e. g. Gase, 1952, 
Stone, Leavitt & Gage 1954). But as the above 
discussion of Cronbach's work would indicate, most 
of these findings are suspect of being artifactq of the 
complicated and unanalytical designs of experiment 
adopted. Moreover, not all studies have produced the 
same result (e. g, Crow, 1954). Even those who had found 
evidence of generality had recognized the necessity of 
differentiating between the two aspects of the ability 
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to predict the responses of others in general and the 
ability to predict the responses of specific others. 
(Stone, Leavitt & Gage, 1954). 
In 1955 Cline; presented 316 Judges with sound- 
films of four persons under stress interviews/ and 
asked them to a) post-dirt the real-life behaviour 
of the interviewees in certain situations, and b) to 
predict their self-ratings in terms of an adjective check- 
list. The correlation between the two measures of 
accuracy varied all the way from . 22 + . 17 (a nursing 
trainee group. N= 43) to . 44 + . 10 (College sample 
N= 109), Crow & Hammond (1957) administered 15 measures 
of interpersonal perception accuracy to 65 senior medical 
students. Only 8 of the 105 correlations produced 
by these measures were significant at the . 05 level 
of confidence and two of these were negative, Three 
repetitions of the test at six months intervals (using 
72 new Ss) revealed (a) significant but low relationships 
among accuracy scores over time, and (b) signigicant 
and high relationships among the response-set scores 
over time. The results were interpreted to mean that 
response sets were more stable elements of the S's 
performance than differential accuracy. 
Bronfenbrenner, Harding & Gallwey (1958) 
differentiated between two kinds of abilitysin their 
Judges: (1) Sensitivity to the generalized other, 
and (2) Interpersonal sensitivity, or the ability to 
predict the feelings, attitudes or opinions of a given 
individual about an issue or another person. They 
found that the two abilites are largely independent, 
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Those who are good Judges of "the public" are not 
necessarily good Judges of"the person". It was also 
felt necessary to differentiate between four kinds of 
sensitivity in terms of the refent of judgement on 
prediction. These are a) first-person sensitivity i. e, 
the recognition by ego of how others feel towards 
him; (b) second-person sensitivity, or an ego's awareness 
of how another ego feels about itself; (c) third-person 
sensitivity, which deals with an individual A's 
recognition of another individual's, B's, feelings towards 
a third individual C, and (d) non-personal sensitivity such 
as that represented by A's recognition of B's feelings 
about certain physical objects. Of these, the measures 
of first person sensitivity showed a corrected reliabilty 
of o67 for two alternate forms of the test based on 
different items. However, it seemed necessary to distinguish 
between sensitivity to one's own sex and sensitivity to 
the opposite sex. Yet in all instances there was evidence 
for the existence of genuine abilities in interpersonal 
perceptions 
Quereshi (1959) comparing the self-ratings of 
students and their estimates of their father's self-ratings 
found that what generality most of the deviation 
scores thus obtained possess can be attributed to overlap 
between the content areas on which the ratings were based. 
Appreciable drop in generality was consistently found 
when the sign of difference was disregarded. The 
generality of D score, however, seemed to justify its 
use as a defensible global measure. Reliability estimates 
were also appreciably reduced in magnitude when the signs 
of the distance measures were not taken into consideration. 
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Cline & Richards (1960) using a refined version 
of the technique employed by Cline (1955) found enough 
consistency between the predictions of their Judges 
over various media of prediction and different others 
to justify the existence of a general ability to perceive 
others accurately. This general ability, however, 
consisted of two (at least) independent parts: Sensitivity 
to the generalized other and interpersonal sensitivity 
in Bronfenbrenner's terminology or Stereotype Accuracy 
and Differential Accuracy in Cranbach's terminwlogy. 
These components were interpreted as reflecting the 
factorial complexity of the over-all Judging scores. Four 
replication studies by Cline & Richards (1961) with 
somewhat revised measures of judging ability have mainly 
confirmed their previous findings of a low but 
consistent degree of generality of judging ability. 
They found the average inter-instrument correlation 
between different measures of the ability in question 
to be . 25 and the average corrected part-whole correlation 
between individual judging instruments and a total 
Judging score was . 41. These correlations, although 
significant beyond . 01 level, are too small to be 
impressive, O'Connor (1963) has criticized the findings 
of Cline & Richards on the grounds that as the aim of 
their studies was to see if a general ability to judge 
did in fact exist, the use of a technique (i. e. 
internal consistency item analysis) the aim and effect 
of which is to build a general factor, becomes a 
critical error in method. A similar logic could be 
employed to serve a directly opposite approach. 
c-ý 
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Cline & Richards (1963), while defending the soundness 
of their technique, have acceded the possibility that 
while their scale might be reliable its construct va- 
lidity remains to be demonstrated. In other words, 
they admit that their 1rocedure, while necessary, is 
not sufficient. 
Allport's (1961) survey of this area is 
ended by a verbal repetition of his 1937 position. 
"To sum up, although we do not know just 
what subtypes may be involved in the ability to judge 
others, and although we have considerable difficulty 
in proving that judgements are good or poor-still the 
preponderance of evidence favours the view that the 
ability is to a considerable extent generalized. It is 
certainly more of an error to say that the ability is 
entirely specific than to say that it is entirely general". 
(Allport, 1961,506). 
Vernon's (1963) review, though decidedly more 
cautious, leads to no firm conclusion regarding the 
nature of this ability. But Guilfard (1959) has en- 
visaged the possibility of finding a new dimension or 
factor of intellect to account for the findings on social 
intelligence or empathy. 
As to the personality correlates of 
s 
empathy, there are a number of easily available and more /s 
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up-to-date reviews (e. g. Allport, 1961; Vernon, 1963; 
Taft, 1960; 1956; 1955; Tagiuri & Bruner, 1954) which 
make a new attempt unnecessary. However, some of these, 
findings will be considered later on in connection with 
our own study. 
SOCIOMETRIC PERCEPTION - As suggested above, ore 
of the various branches of social perception is that 
of perceiving the network of interpersonal feelings, 
likes and dislikes or attractions and repulsions - in 
a group. With the advent of sociometry in 1930's the affec- 
tive side of group behaviour became the centre of much in- 
terest and emphasis. The passing of three decades has 
but dzarpened this early interest and sensitised more and 
more psychologists as well as other students of man to its 
vital importance. Thus not only sociometry has become of 
"singular importance to the empirically oriented social 
psychologist" (Lindzey and Bargatts, 1954), but sociolo- 
gists, psychiatrists and educationists too have come to 
realise the place of positive or negative interpersonal 
feelings and relations in the development of man's persona- 
lity and in the effective functioning of his groups. 
On the one hand, an eminent sociologist, G. C. Homan 
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(1950) has employed ante rpe8onal feelings of like or 
dislike - or "sentiments" as he prefers to call them - 
as one of the building blocks of his social system, the 
two others being activity and interaction. It is true 
that Hamans has adopted a more behaviouristic approach 
in his later writings (Humans, 1961) and has re-structured 
his system on the basis of elementary economics and the 
concept of reinforcement as developed by the Skinner School 
of behaviourism. In this new system activity has gained 
the upper hand, rendering sentiment and interaction into 
special classes of activity. Nevertheless, sentiments - 
redefined as "the activities that the members of a particu- 
lar verbal or symbolic community say are signs of the 
attitudes and feelings a man takes toward another man or 
other men. " (p. 33) - still have their place in his system. 
Other sociologists have stressed the importance of inter- 
personal relations in the development of the self. The 
point is well summarised by Kingsley Davis (1948) : "Since 
it is built out of the attitudes of others, the self 
cannot help but place a value on these attitudes apart 
from or in spite of organic satisfaction. This is espec- 
ially true of one kind of attitude - the attitude of 
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approval and disapproval; for this offers a key to 
much else. It is only through the approval of others 
that the self can tolerate the self. " (Sprott, 1958, 
p. 27). 
On the other hand, as famous a psychiatrist as H. S. 
Sullivan (1955) has founded a whole theory of psycho- 
logical illness and treatment on a basis of interpersonal 
relations. Among Educationists, people like Bonney, 
Northway, Gronlund and - in this country - Fleming, to 
name only a few of them, have stressed the affective 
aspects of school life and have demonstrated the value 
of sociometric techniques in reorganising the school 
into a centre of warm human relations. That these 
assertions have not been mere assertions arising from 
idle arm-chair theorising of the inhabitants of Cli nicia 
(cf. Cronbach, 1954) - have been amply demonstrated by 
euch respectable and trustworthy techniques as factor 
analysis. At least four studies of this kind - (Wherry 
1950; Couch & Carter, 1952; Clark, 1953; and Hempnill 
& Coons, 1957) - based on mutual ratings by members of 
small groups concur on the presence of three basic factors 
in group behaviour - influence and initiative, task com- 
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petence and like-dislike. While the first two factors 
may not always apply to all groups, the last one must 
always be considered. (Tagiuri, 1960) These conclusions 
are further confirmed by Dsgood and his students' finding 
of an "evaluative" factor occupying the larger part of 
the so-called "semantic space" (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 
1951). In view of these facts no wonder that the study 
of attitudes towards other people - or "interpersonal 
attraction" as Newcomb calls it - has received the lion's 
share of all studies in the field of attitudes. (Newcomb 
1956). 
The conventional sociometric test provides two types 
of information regarding the affective relations in a 
group: how each group member feels towards others, and 
how others feel towards him. The picture thus provided 
is incomplete in that it does not include anything about 
the subjective side of the choice process. One's choice 
behaviour - his likes and dislikes - is more a product of 
what he perceives in his human environment than what is 
objectively revealed by that environment. Thus by asking 
for the perceptions of the subjects as well as their 
choices and/or -rejections., a more complete picture of 
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their relations can be obtained. 
behind perceptual sociometry. 
This is the rationale 
Early sociometric studies showed little interest 
in this perceptual or subjective side of sociometric 
choice and rejection. They were mainly interested in 
the sociometric process as a piece of objective behaviour 
or performance, and did little in the way of investigating 
its perceptual or representational basis in the minds of 
those concerned. This was partly because the process of 
perception had not yet been recognised as a factor in 
determining social behaviour, and partly because the 
perceptual aspect was taken for granted by the pioneers 
of the sociometric movement. Moreno's (1953) definition 
of "tele" as "two-way empathy" ensuring the minimum trans- 
fer of meaning between two persons reflected this implicit 
recognition of the subjective facet of interpersonal 
choice or rejection. His later comments make this point 
more explicit: "Tele is the factor responsible for the 
increased mutuality of choices surpassing chance possibi- 
lity and for the increased rate of interaction between 
members of a group. Tele operates on the wish level, 
the social desire level, the choice level, and the behavioural 
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level of a relationship. It has, besides a conative, 
also a cognitive aspect. Choice sociometry and 
perceptual sociometry supplement one another". (Moreno, 
1960, p. 18). 
The relationship depicted by a sociometric test 
can be viewed from two different points: from the point 
of view of the people involved and from the vantage points 
of outside observers. How accurately can an outsider 
predict the choices and rejections of a group? The 
study of this problem began much earlier. Indeed, 
even before the publication of M©reno's "-Who shall surviva" 
(1934), Nestetter & Feldstein (1930) had reported some 
observations regarding the camp counsellor's ability to 
predict the acceptability of a child to his peers. They 
found an average correlation of . 75 between the ratings 
of the counsellor and that of the children. 
In 1931, Mareno made an inquiry into the ability of 
teachers to estimate their pupils' sociometric choices 
and rejections in a fifth grade. The result seemed too 
discouraging to justify any repetition. "The estimates 
of the teachers as to who were their most desired and 
least desired pupils from the view point of the children 
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were surprisingly inaccurate. " (Moreno et al, 1943). 
Again in 1934 Moreno touched upon this problem. He 
administered a sociometric test asking for those whom 
they preferred "to have in their classroom" and "sit 
next to" to all the pupils of all classes from kinder- 
garten through eighth grade. Then he asked each teacher 
to write the names of the boy and the girl in her class- 
room whom she would judge would receive most of the 
choices from their classmates and the two who would 
receive next most; also the names of the boy and the 
girl whom she would judge would receive the lease choices 
and the two who would receive next least. This time 
the teachers' performance was more encouraging: "In 
48% of the instances the teachers' judgements coincided 
with the findings through the sociometric test in res- 
pect to the two most chosen boys and girls; in 383 of 
the instances in respect to the two least chosen boys 
and girls in her classroom" (Moreno, 1934')" 
It took another nine years before a more detailed 
and more systematic study of this type occurred. This 
was Bonney's (1943) study of teachers' perceptions of 
interpersonal feelings among their pupils. She concluded: 
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"Thus approximately 90% of the children were placed 
by the teachers, either in the same quartile or only 
one removed from that which they were placed by pupil 
choices". (Bonney, 1943,419). 
In 1942 Moreno published a paper entitled "$ocio- 
metry in Action" in which he described a short cut socio- 
metric test he had tried recently. He called it "socio- 
metric, self rating" and described it as follows: ". 
It is based on the fact that every individual "intuitively" 
has some intimation of the position he holds in the group 
9.. an individual tries to rate his own relations to 
the members of his group, and their relationship to him 
... Self-rating is obviously like a sociometric test 
carried out in the mind of the tester himself, in which 
the other individuals are like dolls. ... The validity 
and reliability of data from sociometric self-rating 
can be determined by giving to a group of individuals an 
open sociometric test immediately after they have rated 
themselves ... " (Moreno, 1942,301-302). 
Surprisingly enough this new technique was not used 
by Moreno or his followers. In 1949, Maucorps published 
a sociometric study in the French army in which he had 
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asked the subjects whether they felt reciprocated by 
those whom they had chosen. This was the first attempt 
to investigate the group members' awareness of their 
sociometric status. His conclusion was: ". .. The 
more individuals are associated the more they tend to 
judge adequately the mutualities they exchange with 
others, but that they do not develop a better idea of 
their own sociometric status than the isolated indivi- 
duals. " (Maucorps, 19L9, p. 62. ) 
In 1951, Renato Tagiuri devoted his doctoral dis- 
sertation to this field, calling it "Relational Analysis". 
(Tagiuri, 1952). He gave his subjects a sociometric 
test, which besides asking for their choices and rejections 
on certain criteria, required them to guess those who 
would choose or reject them. The analysis of the data 
was based on the number and nature of dyadic relation- 
ships obtaining between each pair of group members. 
He distinguished between the two types of determinants 
of a subject's perception of his sociometric status. 
These he called external determinants, i. e. actual posi- 
tive or negative responses received, and internal 
determinants, i. e. factors within the subject that con- 
tribute to the nature of his perceptual hypotheses. 
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He found that "Individuals have a realistic conception 
of who chooses them and who rejects them", at the same 
time realising that "other things being equal, the sub- 
jects' perception (guess) of others' positive or nega- 
tive feelings toward him would be related to the subject's 
own feelings toward others".. (Tagiuri, 1952,98). 
Tagiuri's work marked the beginning of a new era 
in the study of the perception of interpersonal attraction 
and repulsion. Those who, earlier, had shown no interest 
in the subject and had taken no heed of Moreno's and others' 
hints in this direction now accepted Tagiuri's approach 
and a stream of experimental work started. This was, no 
doubt, due to the psychologists' lowered threshold of 
sensitivity to the importance of perception in human 
behaviour - both social and individual. 
Ausubel, Schiff & Gasser (1952), re-christened the 
field as "sociempathy" and carried out a study of its 
developmental trends from childhood to adolescence. To 
them, sociempathy meant "a form of social perception which 
refers to an individual's awareness of his own and others' 
sociometric status in a given group of which he is a mem- 
ber" (p. 111. ) Implicit in this definition is a concept 
of sociempathy as an ability - reminiscent of Dymond's 
- 78 - 
(1949) "empathic ability". They asked children of 
several grade levels to rate all of their classmates 
in terms of acceptability as friends and to predict 
how each of their classmates would rate them and. be 
rated by the group on the same criterion. They found 
high positive correlations at all grade levels between 
measures of actual and predicted sociometric status. 
Prom inspection of the probable errors of these cor- 
relational scores it became evident that they represented 
an ability to perceive own and others' sociometric status 
which was significantly greater than chance far beyond 
the . 01 level. The growth curves obtained for sociem- 
pathic ability showed some indication of a trend toward 
increased ability with age, but this was not definitive 
since the various age groups were not matched for sex or 
socio-economic status. 
With this notion of "sociernpathy" as a cognitive 
ability, the problem of accuracy of perception occupied the 
central position in later studies and much effort was spent 
in searching for personality correlates and behavioural 
implications of this ability. Tagiuri, Bruner and Blake's 
(1953) analysis of the accuracy scores obtained by tests 
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of "sociempathy" showed that they contained at least 
three components, those of congruency, mutuality and 
accuracy per se. By congruency they meant a general 
tendency among their subjects to give their choices 
and guesses to the same people. In otherwords, most 
subjects tended to guess those members as choosing or 
rejecting them whom they had chosen or rejected. This 
tendency combined by the general tendency of sociometric 
choices or rejections tobe mutual, accounted for the 
larger part of the subjects' accuracy scores. At 
about the same time, Ausubel (1953) found high and 
moderate degrees of generality over persons in pre- 
dicting own and others' sociometric status. One 
hundred juniors and seniors in a University high school 
were asked to rate their classmates on a five point 
scale in terms of personal acceptability as friends, 
and to predict how each of their classmates would 
rate them and be rated in turn by the group on the 
same basis. Four scores were assembled for each sub- 
ject: the mean acceptance rating he gave to his class- 
mates; his mean prediction of the acceptance ratings 
given him by his classmates; his mean prediction of his 
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classmates' sociometric status, and his own sociometric 
status. It was found that predictions of own and 
others' status enjoyed moderate and high degrees of 
generality over persons respectively, as indicated by 
the reliability coefficients of . 53 and . 98. However 
generality over these two perceptual functions (i. e. 
awareness of own and others' status) was completely 
lacking. Thus, individuals tended to perceive themselves 
and others as consistently enjoying a characteristic 
degree of acceptance from the group; but this perceptual 
self-considtency was not upheld when the object of per- 
ception was shifted from the sociometric status of self to 
the sociometric status of others or vice versa. There 
was a marked tendency, reliably greater on the part of 
girls than boys, for subjects to assume reciprocity of 
acceptance between themselves and others. This tendency 
was interpreted 13 Ausubel as indicative of both subjective 
distortion of perception (projection) and of realistic 
awareness of the actual operation of affective reciprocity 
between pairs of individuals. (Aueubel, 1953,347. ) 
Schiff (1954) differentiated four judgmental response 
sets in predicting one's own and others' sociometric 
position, these are a tendency to over or underestimate 
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one's own status; a tendency to over or underestimate 
others' status; a tendency to perceive oneself as a 
highly acceptable or unacceptable person, and a tendency 
to perceive oneself as a highly accepting or unaccepting 
person. Schiff concludes that these four perceptual 
response sets are sufficiently stable and general over 
individuals and over judgemental tasks, and presents 
some experimental data relating them to such personality 
dimensions as level of aspiration, general adjustment, 
anxiety as well as sociometric status. It deserves 
mentioning that the method used by Schiff 
(1954), Ausubel 
(1953) and Ausubel, Schiff & Gasser (1952) has not been 
an ordinary sociometric teat but a rating scale asking 
the subject to rate himself and others as well as to pre- 
dict the ratings of others on the criterion of accepta- 
bility as friends. Thus it is difficult to partial out the 
effect of ordinary judgmental sets inherent in any and 
every act of judging others. Thus, Ausubel, Schiff and 
Gasser (1952) report a disproportionate tendency among 
children of all ages to use the upper portion of the 
rating and prediction scales. Interestingly enough, 
they found an insignificant correlation between the socio- 
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metric status of subjects as determined by their rating 
scale and that defined by a conventional sociometric 
test. 
Gronlund (1956a) has presented some evidence sug- 
gesting generality of sociometric perception as demon- 
strated by teachers' ability to predict accurately their 
pupils' choices on three criteria of seating companion, 
play companion and work companion in forty sixth-grade 
classes. Generality in this connection is defined as 
the extent of agreement between a teacher's accuracy on 
one criterion with his degree of accuracy on each of the 
other two criteria. The correlations obtained ranged 
from . 32 to . 52 for boys and from . 59 to . 67 for girls, 
all being significant at, or beyond . 05 level. The 
results were interpreted as supporting the hypothesis of 
generality. The same author (Gronlund 1956b) carried 
out another investigation correlating the accuracy of 
elementary student teachers' judgements of the sociometric 
status of their classmates with the accuracy of their 
judgements of the sociometric status of their pupils. 
The correlation coefficient obtained, 0-499 was signifi- 
cant beyond the one per cent level, indicating the pres- 
ence of a general ability to judge the sociometric status 
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of others. This last finding seems to run counter to 
that found by Ausubel, Schiff, and Gasser (1952) and 
Ausubel (1953). This may be due to the different 
techniques employed. 
The problem of the reliability of these measures 
of socj. ometric perception is fraught with all the diffi- 
culties - both practical and conceptual - besetting the 
question of reliability in ordinary sociometric tests. 
In view of the stress put on the subjective nature of 
the measures, test-retest reliability seems to be out 
of the question. Several investigators have reported 
high reliability scores in terms of the internal consis- 
tency of the test (e. g., Ausubel, 1955; Schiff, 1954; 
etc. ) Others have reported high reliability in terms 
of inter-criteria correlation coefficients (e. g. Gronlund, 
1956a, 1956b). None of these two methods of depicting 
reliability is very satisfactory, and both are subject 
to criticisms levelled against the use of these methods 
in sociometric tests (cf. Lindsey & BBrgatta, 1954)9 
The same difficulties are encountered in determining 
the validity of these measures. Most studies have at- 
tempted to validate their findings in terms of their 
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correlations with some independent variable. These 
independent criteria of validity have ranged from 
various measures of personality such as age, sex, 
level of aspiration, general adjustment and anxiety, 
to effectiveness in group as revealed by one's socio- 
metric status and leadership position in the group, and 
such antra-group phenomena as racial prejudice and 
religious cleavage. These results will be discussed 
in later chapters, where it will be seen that the 
interpretation of these findings is far from simple. 
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CHAPTER II $ 
A CRITICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
The foregoing chapter has summarized the historical 
development and present status of the field of Social Perception. 
It has also indicated some of the conceptual and methodological 
problems besetting this area of investigation and has highlighted 
the main trends of enquiry in'the past fifteen years. The picture 
as presented there leaves much to be desired, both in terms of 
theoretical approaches and experimental findings. Part of the 
confusion and lack of systematic organization in our own 
presentation is also due to the ill-defined and confused state 
of the field of study. 
Our presentation is also seriously incomplete in that it 
gives no account of the contemporary psychoanalytical approaches 
to empathy. True, we have given a detailed account of the views 
of Freud, Jung, Adler and Sullivan in connection with the 
historical development of the concept of empathy. Since their 
time, however, psychoanalysts of different soho&le have giieen much, 
thought to the problem of 'empathic understanding' and the concept 
has been fully incorporated into the theoretical edifice of 
psychoanalysis. 
Greenson's (1959, P. 1412) summary statement on the matter 
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is a good example of what the orthodox psychoanalysis has to 
contribute to the theory of empathy. He writes 3 
"The most important single method for determining the 
patient's capacity to deal with the given situation is derived 
from the analyst's capacity for empathy. Empathy refers to the 
capacity of a human being to share in the feelings of another, 
person, to experiences in effect, his feelings. One shares in 
this experience in quality but not in degree., in kind but not 
in quantity. It is a procedure which one permits oneself to 
engage in temporarily and for the purpose of understanding. 
..... Empathy cannot be taught or learned. It is a capacity 
which everyone has had but has often lost as th result of 
anxieties, insecurities, and inhibitions. Sometimes one can 
be treated and have thesd inhibitions and anxieties removed, 
and then one can develop the capacity to empathize again. " 
In interpreting this quotation, it must be borne in mind 
that present-day psychoanalysts are as varied in their definitions 
of empathy as any other group of psychologists. A comparison of 
Greenson's description with those oßß say, Stewart (1954; 1956), 
Schafer (1959) or Maddaloni (1961) will bear out this conclusion. 
The lack of consensus, howver, is not limited to the 
psychoanalysts only. As the quotation from Tajfel (1962) in the 
previous chapter suggested, despite all the efforts made during 
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the past 15 years there is still little agreement among the 
social psychologists either. As eminent a social psychologist as 
Gardner Murphy (1959), for instance, has mentioned no more than 
Sherif's classical experiments on autokinetic movement as examples 
of social perception. On the side of empathy, a recent textbook 
on communication (Berlo, 1960), while giving an otherwise excellent 
account of interpersonal communication, tries to explain such a 
communication on an inference theory of empathy explicitly derived 
from Asch's (1952) critical account of understanding through 
inference supplemented by Mead's role-taking theory. In point of 
fact Asch does not mention empathy except in a very short footnote 
branding it as another version of inference theory and subject 
to all the criticisms levelled against it. 
Notwithstanding such divergence of opinion as to the real 
nature or definition of the ability or abilities involved# however, 
psychologists from various walks of professional life have ? 
emphasized the importance of social perception or empathy. 
Even among tough-minded Neo behaviouriets, Hebb's (1960) manifesto 
for a second revolution in American psychology implicitly includes. 
empathy,, along with the self concept, among the higher-order 
mental processes that must be brought back to the area of 
behaviouristic psychology. 
The recognition does not stop shortºt the theoretical level. 
Among the recent medical advocates of the empathic understanding 
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Spiegel's (1959) chapter on "Psychiatric Communication" is a 
good example. Parker (1955) and Schultz (1954) have discussed the 
importance of empathy for management. Gompertz ( 1960) hasgiven 
a detailed account of the empathic ability and its implications 
for journalism. Others have claimed international significance 
fo r social perception in bringing about better international 
understanding and promoting the cause of peace and coexistanoe 
( Blum, 1956)0 
As to the differences, in usage or meaning, between the two 
terms "empathy" and "smoial perception" the literature, to the 
extent we have been able to trace, is silent. Analytically 
inclined psychologists and psychoanalysts seem to favour the 
term "empathy", whereas experimentally inclined writers prefer 
the term "social perception°. Very often, hoover, the two terms 
are used interchangeably. And the majority of studies would seem 
to agree on the following differentiation of the field. 
On the one hand, there is supposed to be a particular class 
of events, uniquely human and social in nature, which require 
a particular cognitive process for their understanding, i. e., 
the process of Social Perception. The mental capacity underlying 
this process is some more or less mysterious faculty called 
Empathy, In the same way as a faculty of intellect is prerequisite 
for any cognitive activity or achievement, a similar faculty of 
empathy is pre-requisite for understanding human behaviour, 
particularly those aspects of human behaviour which constitute 
.,.. - 
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the human mind. Indeed, the recurrent controversy over clinical 
versus actuarial inference and prediction is no more than a 
reflection of such dichotomous view of cognitive processes 
( Meehl, 1954)0 
The psychoanalytically-oriented advocates of this view, 
who, as attested by the quotation above, are explicit about the 
innate nature of empathy, have little more to say as to its 
detailed structure, locus or modus operandi. They, like Sullivan, 
would rather leave these problems&for t posterity to solve. 
Some of them appear to use empathy in a moral sense similar to 
that conveyed by Scheler's concept of sympathy. Thus Stewart 
(1954) has contended that "Empathy is grounded in good will and 
is the common ground. 'of ethics and of personality theory. " 
Such a confusion adds little to the explanation of empathy. 
On the other hand, those experimentally-inolined psyohologists 
who have developed the modern experimental approaoh to empathy 
adhere to. an operational notion of empathy as an ability or 
process of understanding others' subjective responses. The 
operational measure of this understanding is the degree of 
accuracy in predicting others' responses in a given situation. 
The index of accuracy is determined by comparing the predictions 
against the criterion responses of others concerned. The 
procedure is well in accord with the logic of scientific enquiry 
which requires that the ultimate validity of any hypothesis be 
judged by the accuracy of predictions derived from it. It. is on 
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od this ground that Notcutt (1953, p. 215) has proposed to use 
the operational measure of empathy -or specific prediction as 
he has called it - as a criterion of validity for other means of 
personality assessment. 
The mechanism underlying this kind of understanding, 
according to this second group of investigators, is a sort of 
imaginiLry projection of one's self into the other's situation 
which enables one to view tha situation from the vantage point 
of the other. How this projection is achieved is not made clear. 
One thing, however, is clear : the achievement is not through 
the known mechanisms of inference but depends on some form of 
intuition. The idea of empathy as a more or lese general mental 
capacity is widely held and many attempts have been made to 
find its intellectual and personality correlates (Dymond, 1950) 
as well as its effects on such aspects of group life as leadership 
(e. g., Gage, 1953 ; Mann, 1959)" 
In the remaining part of this chapter an attempt will be 
made to analyze the process of empathy -as currently defined - 
and, if possible, to point out its links with the ordinary 
processes of cognitive achievement. Before entering the main 
analysis, however, some agreement must be- reached as to the 
proper limits of the concept of empathy and its usage. 
To reduce all kinds of human understanding of other human 
beings to the miraculous functioning of a general empathic 
ability is to go far beyond the legitimate boundaries of the 
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scientific principle of parsimony, Not all aspects of human 
behaviour are equally "human" - ors for that matters equally 
"social" - in nature to require the intervention of social 
perception or empathy for their comprehension. No "empathic 
abilitys for example, is required to enable us in sizing up, 
say, the height of a stranger o 
Even in the case of such human and social phenomena as 
the expressions of emotional states an empathic theory can . äa 
little that the ordinary stimulus - response theories of inference 
(e. g., Allport, 1924) or the Gestalt doctrine of direct 
apprehension (e. g., Asch, 1952) cannot do more parsimoniously. 
After all, many of these emotional expressions are shared by 
other animals as well as man. To say that the understanding of 
such emotional responses as fear or anger in a dog depends on a 
form of empathic projection of one's self into the personality 
of the experiencing animal does little in the way of explaining 
the mental processes involved. In the same ways in Heider and 
Simmel's (1944) experiments cited in the previous chapter, to 
claim that we put ourselves in the shoes of the small triangle 
and hence see the large one as aggressive, mean and bullying,, 
makes little contribution to the explanation of the phenomenon. 
Nor does Lipps' original notion of empathy as a process of 
kinesthetic inference solve the problem. 
In a similar manner, ordinary judgements of personality 
traits require little empathic ability in the currently used 
- 92 ý- 
operational sense of the term. To judge whether A is two points 
above or below average on a given trait, or whether he occupies 
the first or the Nth position in his group in terms of an ability 
X, does not need any empathic process of transposing oneself into 
the position or situation of A. What is needed, instead, is that 
the judge should have a clear view of what the trait ob the ability 
in question means, that is its behavioural implications, and 
should have had reasonably sufficient opportunity to observe his 
object of rating . The degree of accuracy or judging skill will$ 
no doubts depend on the judge's capacity to exploit his evidence 
and make inferences. 
What remains of the domain of empathy, then, is the capacity 
to predict auch subjective aspects of Brothers' behaviour that 
constitute their attitudes. What is meant by attitudes ? Allport's 
(1935) classical definition of an attitude as "a mental and 
neural state of readiness exerting a directive influence upon 
the individual's response to all objects and situations with 
which it is related" (P. 810) does aptly convey our notion of 
an attitude. Defined in this way, an attitude is an intervening 
variable and, like any other intervening variable, has to be 
iäferred from its antecedent stimuli and consequent responses. 
Still operationally more appropriate for our purpose is Fuson's 
(1942) definition of an attitude as " the probability of 
occurrence o,,, f a defined behavior in a defined situation"" 
Indeed, the customary test of empathy requires no more than 
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the prediction of a defined behaviour in a defined situation. 
On the face of it, such an ability to predict others' 
attitudes may not seem of much consequence. Yet, in point of 
fact, the process of social interaction and communication 
consists, to a very considerable extents of such predictive 
activity. From dawn to dusk, every instance of interpersonal 
behaviour involves a series of predidtions of, and anticipatory 
reactions to, the potential reactions of others. We are always 
on the look out to see what others in our life-space think, say 
or do about us or about things which have some"propriate'-in the 
sense defined by Allport (1960)- significance for us. Our own 
responses to others, in return, are more influenced by our own 
expectations and anticipations than others' actual behaviour. 
"All human communication involves predictions 4 the source 
and receiver about how other people will respond to a 
message. ... Every communicator carries around with him 
an image of his receiver. He takes his receiver (as he 
pictures him to be) into account when he produces a 
message. He anticipates the possible responses of his 
receiver and tries to predict them ahead of time. These 
images affect his own message behaviour. " (Berlo, 1960,116-117) 
On a higher level, as Allport (1954b) has pointed out, 
the whole process of thinking is a constant endeavour to 
anticipate reality. By thinking we try to foresee consequences 
and plan actions that will avoid whatever threatens us . 
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This aspect of thinking is even more important for social 
and interpersonal situations. Such situations differ from ordinary 
physical situations in that they transcend the usually static and 
stable relationships obtaining among the non-human aspects of the 
environment. The menaces arising from the pjqsical environment 
are direct and unintentional; we can avoid them more or less 
simply by standing aside from their course. Human menaces, on the 
contrary, are usually intentional, directed and capable of pursuing 
many uncanny detours. And despite all the efforts made during the 
prooesa of socialization the possibility of such menaces is far 
from being exhausted. Hence the need to be on a constant guard 
against the potential attitudes of others, and hence the necessity 
of a predictive ability to anticipate such attitudes. 
As suggested above, attitudes are intervening variables to be 
inferred from their antecedent stimuli and consequent responses. 
More often than not, howeverp the consequent responses are the only 
source of inference. We usually do not know enough about the 
znteoedent stimuli to base our inferences upon them, or the responses 
simply alleviate any need for the stimuli as such. Hence we can 
use the term 'response' instead of the term 'attitude' and say 
that social perception or empathy is the process or capacity 
underlying man's ability to predict -or to expect and anticipate- 
the responses of other people in a given situation. 
Some of the terms used in this statement need to be explained 
before we proceed any farther. Our use of the terms 'ability' and 
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'process'asalternatives reflects ourrecognitionof recent 
developments in the field of human capacities where even the most 
basic and well-established of all human abilities, intelligence., 
has come to be regarded as a series of central processes and 
strategies for the processing of information rather than an innate 
and predetermined capacity (Hunt, 1961). It is only regrettable 
that such unfounded implications of the term 'ability' as 
traditionally understood in connection with intelligence have 
already plagued the notion of empathy or social perception. A 
recent text-book on empathy (Katz, 1963) has in fact called it a 
"nonverbal and nonlogical skill" which "suggests a somewhat odd and 
elusive skill, a divinatory art, a sixth senses an instinctive 
and primitive form of penetrating to the core of another person". 
(P. 1) 
We have used the terms anticipation or expectation as synonyms 
of 'prediction' to dispell any misunderstanding that may arise from 
the etymological derivation of the verb'to predict'. Prediction 
usually implies one kind of anticipatory response only, i. e., 
verbal prediction. One can anticipate or expect many events or attitudes 
however, without ever giving verbal exprossion. 
4'to his prediotions. 
Responses, on the other hand, can take any for* or shade 
from gross muscular activity through all kinds of verbal utterences 
to extremely delicate patterns of facial or postural expression. 
An attitude of hate, for example, can be expressed through such 
different forms of response as bodily assault, verbal abuse or 
an imperceptibly fine change in the ordinary position of one's 
eyebrows. 
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Now, such anticipatory functioning as is involved in 
social perception seems to be part and parcel of our cognitive 
system. Whatever its shortcomings, the New-Look psychology has 
taught us that our cognitive life, far from being a loyal and 
passive registration of events happening in the objective world, 
consists of a continuous series of anticipatory reactions to a 
selected range of physical stimuli impinging upon our sense- 
organs with a view to convertA them into categories of simple, 
orderly, manageable and coherent representations of the outside 
world (Bruner, 1957b). These categories are in turn utilized to 
jump further ahead of the given sense-data and to build up fresh 
hypotheses and expectations going far beyond the evidence at 
hand (Bruner, 1957a)" 
The biological reason for the development of such a predictive 
capacity is not difficult to postulate. As Hebb(1955) has argued, 
man's higher mental development is accompanied by a much higher 
sensitivity to anxiety evoking stimuli and a comparably high 
vulnerability to strong emotional reactions. This implies that 
he must be on a sort of constant look-out for such anxiety - 
evoking stimuli and get cognitively ready to tackle them. Living 
in a world of "booming buzzing confusion" -to borrow William 
James' phrase- man simply cannot afford to follow the wild wishes 
of the external stimuli, but rather he has to develop a "Cognitive 
Map" of his own, a tentative map which will indicate routes, 
paths and environmental relations, which will determine what 
responses, if any, he will finally release (Tolman, 1948)" 
..,.. .- 
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And according to, Hilgard (1951), the prime function of 
learning is to help'büild such cognitive maps'or sets of' 
expectations and' anticipations. Hilgard has tried to explain this 
property of human perception by considering the perceptual system 
as a statistical machine capable of quickly estimating probabi- 
lities. Eachoof the%cues, present now-is related to many past 
experiences. These past experiences provide a kind of table of 
probabilities according to! -which estimates are made. Such a 
probabilistic view of human perception-has been lent further 
support, by.. later developments in electronic computer techniques 
(c. f: Rosenblatt 1958). 
Whatever the true atrücture 6i our perceptual apparatus, it 
appears to be designed-in such a way'that it cannot take an 
impartial view of the incoming' ignal1'p6atponing judgement 
pending upon their alarifioation. Rather, our brain seems to 
have a'strong built-in tendency to jump ahead, to take a short 
out, to take : action . upon a few indications and to develop 
antioipations.. aß:, to the future-course or meaning of the incoming 
signal. In. Hilgard's (1951, p. 109) words ,s "We not only respond 
to the . stimuli- 
that confront us I but respond-in preparatory I I. 
ways to expected stimuli.. Such preparatory or` anticipatöry 
response te, an achievement c-of learning and intelligence in- 
which perceptionc. sharea". %- 
Over forty years ego", Spearman (1923) proposed three 
qualitative principles for 'knowing', namely, the principles of 
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experience, relations, and correlates. The first two principles 
mean no more than that we are able to get information through 
our senses, and that the data given through senses tend to be 
related to each other. The third principle, the "eduction of 
correlates", summarizes the creative capacity of human mind 
and underlies much of what we have said so far. The principle 
states that when any item and a relation to it are present to 
the mind, then mind can generate in itself another item so 
related. (Spearman, 1930, p. 23). The three principles together 
Spearman called "noegenesis" and went on to claim that 
" ... These same three processes.. have the further virtue, 
formerly ascribed to some ill-defined power called 
'intelligence', of attaining belief on adequate grounds. 
... Such knowledge upon adequate ground is sometimes 
characterized aa'insight' or 'intuition'. " (Spearman, 1930, 
Pp. 34 - 35 )- 
This definition of insight as knowledge upon adequate 
ground can be very usefully extended to the process oof empathy 
or social perception. In point of fact many writers have used 
the terms empathy, insight and intuition interchangeably. More 
interestingly some of the experimental evidence cited by Spearman 
(1930) in support of his noegenetic process of creativity bear 
striking resemblance to the present-day experimental approaches 
to empathy . In one study, for example, children were provided 
with an account of the siege of Babylon by Cyrus the Persian. 
.. ý. _. _. - 
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They were told of the impregnable walls and well-guarded gates 
of the city and the river that ran through it. They were then 
asked to put themselves in Cyrus' position and think how to 
capture the city without having to attack its well protected 
defenders. The expected true response, of course, is that the 
river should be directed and its dry bed used as a safe entrance 
to the city. Indeed, the situation used in this experiment is 
much more concrete and realistic than those used in current 
studies of empathy. 
In passing, it must be recognized that Spearman's principle 
of the reduction of correlates' has been incorporated into many 
modern theories of cognition, from Vernon's (1954) theory of 
sohematio perception to Bruner's (1957a) notion of 'coding systems' 
and (Bruner, 1957b) 'perceptual readiness' I to Bartlett's 
(1958) 
view of thinking as a process of 'filling up the gaps'. The 
concepts of 'evocative' and 'predictive' relations ( and 
integrations) in Osgood's (1957) behaviouristio analysis of 
perception and language also bear a close resemblance to 
Spearman's views. 
On the basis of foregoing discussion, then, empathy or 
social perception would appear to be a capacity or process of 
perceiving, understanding, or predicting the attitudes -iq eo 
potential response tendencies- of other human beings. This is 
very similar to Oldfield's (1943, P. 14) view of social judgement 
in an interview situation, which states that : 
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"It is chiefly the attitudes displayed by the candidate 
that form the basis of the interviewers' judgement. It is 
the interviewer's task, by skilful conversation, to cause a 
number of attitudes to be displayed by the candidate. " 
the mental process behind this predictive ability is the 
peculiar propensity of human mind to "educe correlates"p to go 
beyond the given evidence, to fill up the gaps. Thus empathy or 
social perception turns out to be more a kind of inferential 
reasoning than perception *s such. Before we run into another 
controversy over perception vs. thinking issue we must listen to 
Bartlett's (1951) argument to realize how tenuous the difference 
between the two'processes is s 
"... Whenever anybody interprets evidence from any source, 
and his interpretation contains characteristics that cannot 
be referred wholly to direct sensory observation or perception, 
this person thinks. The bother is that nobody has ever been 
able to find any case. of the human use of evidence which 
does not include characters that run beyond what is directly 
observed by the senses. Soy aocording to this, peoP1e think 
whenever they do anything at all with evidence. " (P. 1) 
Such characteristics o. f thinking '41reinherent in almost all 
experimental designs used for the study of social perception. In 
most of these studies in fact sensory cues are reduced to a minimum. 
and the subject is deliberately forced to rely on extrapolations 
from indirect and unknown sources of evidence. 
99 - 
Turning to the characterization "knowledge upon adequate 
ground"9 what kind of knowledge can be regarded as such? Taking 
Spearman's own advice, obviously, it is a knowledge based upon 
relevant evidence generated according to his basic principles of 
cognition. In most of the current studies of social perception two 
main kinds of such evidence are available. The first of these 
is provided by the other or the category of others whose attitudes 
are to be predicted. The second class of evidence is provided by 
the situation facing the other which embraces the object or reffrrent 
of the predicted response and more or less defines the form and 
range of the rsaonse. The main taskof, the, Frediotor is to put 
these two classes ofevidenoe togethert. to observe their relations, 
and to derive new conclusions or correlates. 
Basically, the first class of evidence is of greater importance 
and of more say, in, determining the outcome of prediction. If we 
happen to have had. plenty of. opportunity to observe the behaviour 
of an individual under various conditionss, then, we can easily 
rely upth this. information. in. predicting his possible reactions 
under similar situations. Here,. as GronbachLand Gage (1955) have 
argued, tests of empathy measure no more than our knowledge. As 
the degree of, aa uaintance with the. other decreases, external 
and situational clues. q, 1! e. evidenceof the second type, gain in 
importance and tend 
rto 
guide our inferences and predictions. By 
External clues we mean such clues as are not peoulUx to the 
other qua an individual but arise from his membership in larger 
classes, categories or universes, such as age$ sex, culture, 
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nationality and ethnic' memberships or social role and status 
relationships. 
Some workers in the field of empathy seem to think that by 
reducing the amount of acquaintance between the predictor and the 
prediotee they can deliver the empathic ability from ehe charge 
of being inferential. Hence the tendency to use complete strangers 
}. sometimes seen only through filmed interviews. as objects of 
prediction. These workers, however, have overlooked the fact that 
by reducing the possibility of inference from the past observation 
of the behhviour of the 'other' they have just managed to increase 
the relative amount of extrapolation from the external clues 
inherent in the situation. 
Obviously, situations. vary a great deal as to the clarity 
and potency of. their demands. Sometimes the stimulus configuration 
making up a situation is of such a forceful and clearly defined 
character that it imposes a more or less universal reaction on the 
organism facing it, irrespective of its identity or its class 
memberships. Innruch a siuation,, any information about the 
predictee is redundant. Thusj, it requires no knowledge about the 
'other' beyond the fact that he is anormal pain-conscious person 
to predict that he will withdi'aw his hand from 
. 
an. approaching flame. 
It bees no question that these demand oharaoteristios of 
situation, like, the equivalent res)onae oharaoteristics of the 
others concerned, are products of past experience and learning. 
We attribute a particular character to a situation only after having 
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seen them( occur together a sufficiently large number of times. 
In the course of these observations we acquire a more or less 
precise estimate of the probability of a situation being followed 
by a certain class of response sequences. Similarly, in the case of 
the prediotees, we learn to associate a person, or a category of 
persons, with the probability of one kind of response rather than 
another. Social learning, in other words, is largely probabilistic. 
As Brunsnrik (1939) has suggested, the olssio experimental 
procedure of rewarding responses to one stimulus all of the time 
while never rewarding responses to another stimulus is unrealistic 
and does not apply to everyday learning situations. In everyday life 
situations a specific response to a specific stimulus class has 
a probability generally less than 1.00 of being rewarded or correct. 
This formulation emphasizes the weighting of response decisions 
in terms of previously learned probabilities. In other words, in 
responding to a stimulus-category we choose those response-categories 
that are more likely to be rewarded or accurate. Such a probabilistic 
learning has been found to obtain in the animal level. Indeed, 
Brunswi W himself (1939) has shown that rats can learn to estimate 
ratios of toward going to that side of a T-maze where it would 
have the higher probability of being rewarded. With human beings, 
contrary to Piaget's (1950) earlier finding that children under 
seven years of age are unable to respond consistently to the 
quantitative proportions of elements, recent research indicates I Pitt 
that, given proper experimental conditions and reinforcements, 
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children of four years-ofläge'do have some understanding of 
probability and tend to adjust their responses according to the 
proportion of reward or reinforcement. (Yost, Siegel, & Andrews, 1962). 
The implication of this digression into probabilistic learning 
theory for our discussion is that in learning how to respond to a 
stimulus situation we also learn the likelihood of good or evil, 
reward or punishment, approval or reproach attending each mode of 
response. Such learnid probabilities provide the adequate ground 
of our future expectations and predictions. Sometimes our learned 
expectations may prove wrong* Even in our extreme example above, 
the predictee may turn out to be a member of that fire eating 
species of Persian Dervishes and show no withdrawl response in the 
face of the approaching flame. Yet, the''probabilistio table''of 
our past experiences 11th ordinary people would tell us-that such 
an example is extremely rare'and need not bother our dary-to=day 
predictions. 
The flame in the above example represents one extreme of the 
situational demands. The six-item rating-scale used in Dymond's 
studies may represent another extreme. Even here there exist a 
number of external clues, learned expectations, that may enhance 
the accuracy of prediction. Suppose that we are asked to predict 
the self-rating of some stranger on a trait, X. "Prom our past 
experience, we know the relative frequency of this trait in-the 
population as a whole. We also have some-idea of the social= 
approval or disapproval assooiated with this partioular---trait" 
. ý, a - 
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No need to say, that this second class of evidence largely determines -; c-;.. , a, i-. s i [i, `"!. i : ý-'"' .. ;tt dj¬'t K Wo't It ITZ m%--s-4 
the first class of evidence. In other words, socially approved 
traits have much more chances of being demonstrated and observed 
than the socially disapproved traits. Besides these, we usually 
have some notion of the prevalent 'response styles!. of the population 
with respect to different categories of traits. We know of the 
virtues of being modest, unassuming, etc. Puting all these bits 
and pieces of evidence together we can predict the other's self- 
rating with a pretty high degree of confidence. All these uncontrolled 
'bits and pieces' of evidence, combined together, make up the 
demand of a situation. and determine the possible range of responses 
to that situation. 
,,.; In. some oases q. such as the !, example -of w-the ". flame -above, . )the 
range of possible reactions is determined by the biological make 
up of the organism. In many other oases however, social normst 
ethos, role-expeotations, mores anc/or legislations define the 
range of possible, response to various stimulus situations. Of course 
responses include both overt and covert behaviour, both attitudes 
as response potentials and their verbal and physical expressions. 
The second type of determination is particularly true of social 
responses. 
Unity Wand. conformity being one iof-the prime-aime, of social- 
ization in almost all human"sooieties, a great deal of eduoation 
-formal-or inforaial- consists-of inculcating socially desirable 
patterns of behaviour in the individual. The whole process of 
socialization in fact is no more than a process of building up 
.... _. 
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proper-attitudes or response'tendenoies towards some significant 
situations, that is objects, persons or ideas,, inherent in the 
social life of the community. Learning of attitudeeýlike any other 
kinds of learning depends on a large number of reinforcements on N. t. 
the part of the agents of socialization. The reinforcement is largely 
in the form of approval or encouragemeüto Onoe'learned, auch 
socially approved resjonses become part of a person's self -system 
and acquire secondary reinforcing, powero As-the machinery of 
socialization applies, more'or less equally, to all members of a 
society suoh socially approved response tendencies or attitudes 
become of a very high probability of occurrence and easily 
predictable. Such oommonly,, held attitudes, indeed, form what, 
sociologists have called the  Common, Core of Culture".. As Rose 
(1956, P", 34) has put it sý4 
"There is a obre of our*cülture whioh practically 'all people 
in it do know and understand. This core includes knowledge 
abogt behaviour toward other people and about behaviour 
toward certain commonly used objects. ... So there is a 
core of common understandings in our culture, and on the 
basis of these understandings we have correct expectations 
most of the time regarding the behaviour of others. ... "The 
limits of a culture have to be described in terms of the 
extent of common understandings regarding how people can' 
be expected to behave toward one another. " 
The attachment of terbal tags -names- to these attitudes and 
.-, - 
105- 
their-referrents greatly facilitates. their acquisition and further 
enhances the, poaaibility. of deriving the probability or relative 
frequency of a response's being correct, that is rewarded, or not. 
In faotv Osgood'sýstudies of-what he has oalled "Semantic Differential" 
have shown that each unit of verbal symbolism possesses a 
'connotative' meaning-besides its ordinary 'denotative' meaning, 
and that the largest part of this connotative meaning is accounted 
for by, an "evaluative factor" of good or bad. (Oegood, Suai, and 
Tannenbaum, 1957).: Good and bad being largely a matter of social 
convention, it . is highly probable that this evaluative factor 
should reflect the social reward value of each verbal concepts 
In the traditional studies of. social perception, situations 
are usually represented by'verbal statements. Such verbal 
situations include one moreexternal clue, that is the social 
desirability value of the statement used. As Edwards (1957) 
has. suggestedp social, desirability summarizes the relative 
prevalence or cultural value of a characteristio or response 
in a given society. Edwards has claimed-that knowing the position 
of a statement on the social desirability-dimension,? one can 
predict, with a high. degreetofMaccuracyp. the proportion of 
individuals who will subscribe to it in, self-description. The 
significantly, high correlations obtained between, the, social 
desirability scale values of various personality test items and 'y 11 .. 4ým4.4, t1,. .. "trä .. Vn.,. . ... . 
.,, and 
their probability of endorsement in 
,a 
large number of studies 
seem to bear out this contention. 
In#summaryv then, social perception or empathy, as operationally 
defined and gauged, consists of predicting the behaviour of certain 
category of others in a given situation. This category of others 
may, vary from an individualotherl_with specific relationships to 
the predictor, to a collectivity of others known only through 
social norms and stereotypes. 
Such a predictive activity is of great importance for the 
process of social interaction and communicatian. The capacity to 
engage in such. a predictive activity can be regarded as another 
aspect, Spearman's concept of'naegenesiat or obtaining, knowledge 
upon adequate grounds, so characteristic, of human. cognitive, systemo 
In ordinary studies of social perception two main-classes of such 
'adequate grounds' fo r inference are provided. These, arep, evidence 
as to, the other whose responses are to be predictedt, and evidence 
arising out of the context of prediction or the demands of, the 
situation. The relative part played by each of these two , classes 
ofYevidence is largely a. unction of the requirements of the task om. ._aa... fr tU 
and the presence or absence of the evidence of first type. Both 
types of evidence are products of past learning and experience 
where 
In ordinary tests of_empathy, rsituations are represented 
by 
verbal propositions or descriptions, part of the contextual evidence 
is provided by the evaluative character of the statements used] or, 
in the oase., personality characterizations or trait namesq by their 
social desirability* This means that predictions of others self- 
., `assessment 
on a socially desirable variable is muoh easier to make. 
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Similarly, as the socially desirable attitudes are those attitudes 
that enjoy social approval and prevalence, such attitudes must be 
much easier to predict that attitudes dissonant with the norms 
and expectations of the society. 
On the basis of this analysis, as the outoome of prediotion2 
its accuracy or inaccuracy, depends on a series of inferences 
based upon differunt classes of evidence, varying in their relative 
strength from one prediotee to the other and from one situation to 
the next, little generality or oonsistenoey can be expected. There 
are of course certain inferential strategies that can be employed 
in more than one situation and thus result in some degree of 
generality. But the process is sooontaminated by response sets 
inherent in the particular medium of prediction used that it is 
extremely difficult to distinguish between the real source of 
generality and the artifaotual one. The high degree of generality 
found in studies using rating-scales as media of prediotion is an 
example of, this complication. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
The present study consists of two more or less independent 
parts. The first part is concerned with a study of children's 
ability to predict the affective and evaluative responses of 
their classmates towards themselves. These responses are gauged 
through a sociometrio test and a Guess Who test. Along with these 
data were collected concerning the personality dimensions of 
Extraversion and Neuroticism and such group variables as 
leadership and popularity. A fuller description of these tests 
and the rationale for their inclusion in this study will be 
given in the following pages. 
The second part is an attempt to investigate the ability of 
a sample of more mature training college students to predict the 
responses of certain others to certain situations as presented 
by a batch of tests bearing on social attitudes, personal valuesp 
and privatental states or feelings . The aim is to find out 
whether people, as represented by this particular sample, show 
any ability to predict the responses of others and, if soy 
whether this ability shows any degree of consistency from one 
situation to another and over different kinds of others involved. 
A fuller discussion of the rationale for and tests used in this 
part of the study will be presented in the second half of this 
chapter. 
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The main aim of the study as a whole is to re-examine some of the 
findings of the previous workers in the field of social perception 
in the light of the conceptual scheme presented in%the last chapter. 
The most important among these findings are the nature of the ability 
under study, its specificity or generality, and the personality, 
intellectual and group variables associated with it. As will be 
remembered from the previous chapter, our conceptual analysis cast 
some serious doubts as to the genuinwness of the positive findings 
reported in this connection. 
FIRST STUDY s 
As stated above, this study is concerned with the ability of 
a group of children to predict the affective and evaluative responses 
of their classmates towards them. It covers the area of social 
perception known as "sociempathy" or sociometric perception. Here, 
in the first place, we shall be concerned with the nature of the 
predictive achievement as such, that is , with its deviation from 
chance expectancy, its variation according to the object of prediction, 
etc. Having established this ability, we shall investigate some of 
the personality factors accompanying it and look into the possible 
relationships between this ability and such group variables as 
leadership, popularity, and sociometric choice status. In this 
section, our work will be oriented by the findings of previous workers 
on the characteristics of good judges of people (Taft, 1955) on the one 
hand and the findings 0f the investigations of personality factors 
in small group performance - so admirably summarized by Richard 
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Mann (1959) - on the other hand. In the second place 
we shall inquire into the subjective facet of the choice 
process and indicate the close relationship between 
choosing others and predicting or guessing their choices 
and we shall point out some of the difficulties beset- 
ting the concept of sociometric perception or sociempathy 
as an ability. 
In this chapter we shall give a detailed account 
of our experimental design, our tests and our subjects 
of study. At the same time we shall try to explain 
our rationale in using each test as well as our general 
guiding lines. 
SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND HOW IT WAS MEASURED 
In the previous chapter we showed that one of the 
several kinds of social perception was the perception 
of one's status in a group. As defined by a sociometric 
test, status is the number of choices received by an 
(i) 
individual on a specific criterion. To obtain social 
(i) More refined and complicated measures of sociometric 
status have been put forward by Proctor & Loomis (1951) 
and Katz (1953). 
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perception, the individual is simply asked to guess or 
predict those who would choose him on the given criter- 
ion, The accuracy of social perception is determined 
by comparing the guesses made by the individual against 
the choices he has actually received. This is the pro- 
cedure used in our study. 
Obviously, the use of "perception" in this context 
is subject to all the criticisms levelled against the 
concept of social perception. Asked to guess those 
members of his group who are likely to have chosen him 
as a companion for a certain purpose, the subject is 
faced with a decision-making problem which makes as much 
demand on his grasp of the' present situation as on his 
past experiences and observations. The final decision 
rests upon a process of inference, of putting bits and 
pieces together and reconstructing them in the light of 
one's subjective picture of what is demanded by the task 
in question and what one is willing and able to contribute 
to its accomplishment. All these are heavily dependent 
on memory, knowledge and the ability to infer new possi- 
bilities from old realities - not to mention one's pro- 
jections, wishes and self-enhancing fantasies. To use 
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"perception" to c over 
tors is to expand its 
its technical usage. 
to combine sociometry 
lack of public accept 
all these none-too-similar f'ac- 
meaning beyond the boundary of 
Ausubel's "sociempathy", saiued: d 
and empathy, suffers both from 
ance, and from all the weaknesses 
(ii) 
inherent in the concept of empathy as such. More- 
over, its adoption seems to be based on a conviction 
that the demonstrated ability of group members to predict 
their positions in the group is an independent mental 
"capacity" in its own right and apart from the hypo- 
thetical "empathic ability" in general. This view, 
we find hard to subscribe to before presenting our own 
data. Notwithstanding these criticisms, we shall use 
the term social perception in this study, partly for 
want of a better word and partly to comply with the 
current practice. 
Our first test of social perception consisted of 
a sociometric questionnaire asking the group members to 
choose a number of other members on three different 
(ii) According to Allport (1961): "The theoretical coin (of 
empathy, as defined by Dymond) has depreciated, pro- 
bably beyond redemption. " (Allport, 1961, p. 537. ) 
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criteria and to guess those members who would choose 
them on those criteria. These criteria were: 
I. To work with in a group in an English class; 
II. To work with in a group in a Mathematics class; and 
III. To spend one's free time with. 
The questions were put to the subjects all in one 
session and on one paper. In each case, the perceptual 
or guessing part followed the actual choosing part. 
Logically, it would seem more reasonable to separate 
the two parts and administer them in two separate sessions 
in order to avoid the creation of response sets which 
might carry the influence of choosing onto the guessing 
task. This was not done because of the time-limits 
imposed by the schools where the study was carried out. 
Besides, we had Tagiuri's (1958) evidence that such 
measures did little in the way of offsetting the impact 
of choosing process on guessing process. As was sug- 
gested in the previous chapter, there appears to be a 
very close relationship between the two processes and 
people tend to guess as choosing themselves those whom 
they have chosen or they would choose. In view of the 
repeatedly-found high stability over time of the socio- 
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metric choise (Manton, Blake & Fruchter, 1955a) the 
chances are very bleak that such spatial and temporal 
arrangements of the two processes should have any sig- 
nificant effect on their interaction. 
Our first two criteria were regarded as covering 
the area of work-task situations or the area of socio- 
telic relationships as some sociometrists prefer to call 
it (Jennings, 1959). The choice of English and Maths 
classes was further prompted by the existence of such 
group work in the first school where the study was 
carried out. The third criterion - to spend ore's 
free time with - was regarded as representative of 
what Helen Jennings (1950) has called "psychetelic" 
relations. This criterion was supplemented by a fourth 
question asking simply for the subjects' choices of those 
whom they liked most. The number of choices had been 
restricted to four in the first study and to five in 
the second. This restriction of the number of choices 
and guesses seemed necessary to render the statistical 
analysis of the test managable and to permit the appli- 
cation of probability models. 
The first three questions satisfied four of the six 
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conditions laid down by Mareno (1953), that is, they 
specified the limits of the group within which choice 
had to be done, they presented a specific criterion 
of choice, they were put to the subjects in privacy and 
with the assurance that their responses would be confi- 
dential and they were couched in terms understandable 
by the subjects. The two other conditions however, 
could not be satisfied: The number of choices had to 
be restricted and we were not in a position to re-structure 
the group according to the outcome of the test. After 
all, these two conditions have not been observed by over 
75 per cent of all sociometric inquiries (Hare, 1962). 
1 
The fourth question - whom do you like most? - falls 
short of fulfilling the condition of a specific criterion 
as well. But a number of studies has shown the superior- 
ity of such a general question in revealing group struc- 
ture. Croft & Grygier (1956) gave a sociometric test 
based on eight different criteria to 100 boys in a 
London secondary modern school and found that "the best 
indication of friendship or dislike was a general straight- 
forward question not related to any specific situation 
(i. e. which boys do you like most, which boys do you like 
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least? )"(p463) Gronlund (1955) found that social status 
scores based on a general criterion are more stable 
than those based on specific ones, possibly because 
choices on a general criterion are elicited by less 
modifiable characteristics of the total personality, 
while choices on a specific criterion depend more on 
constantly changing situational factors. 
The adoption of four choices on each criterion was 
based on the a priori assumption that this number 
would provide a reasonably satisfactory range for the 
individuals' expansiveness at the same time keeping it 
from becoming unmanageably large. The number was in- 
creased to five in the second study. This was in re- 
cognition of the finding by Gronlund (1955) that five 
choices proved to be more stable over time than any 
other number and could be regarded as of a higher ke- 
liability. 
The original test had included questions on the 
negative feelings among the group members as well as 
the positive choice. The study of this negative aspect 
of intra-group, relationships and its perception seemed 
more important in view of the relatively little work 
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done in this direction. Tagiuri (1960) has invited 
more attention to this area. Unfortunately, the in- 
vestigation of this negative aspect is more often than 
not objected to either by the subjects or by the school 
authorities or both. In this case, the head of the 
English department came out strongly against these 
negative items on the ground that they might lead to 
intra-group tension and open aggression by giving ex- 
pression to the members' negative feelings. Thus, in 
the first study, we had to drop the negative items. But 
in the second school, the authorities did not show any 
objection and the negative items were restored. In 
short, our sociometric test consisted of eight questions 
in the first study and sixteen questions in the second 
study, asking the subjects to indicate their choices'of 
five classmates whom they liked most (and five whom they 
liked least) on four particular criteria as well as those 
who, they thought, would most like (or least like) them 
on the same four criteria. The test was supplemented 
by a further question inquiring about four or five best 
friends of the subjects in the class. This question 
was designed to reveal the existing friedship patterns 
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in each class and serve as a reference point against 
which variations over criteria could be compared. 
Our second measure of social perception was a 
Guess Who test on which the subjects had to rate 
their group members in terms of a number of descriptions 
and to predict the items on which they had been named 
as well as those who had named them on each item. This 
test was designed to throw some light on the evaluative 
aspects of the sociometric choice process and to provide 
a somewhat different measure of social perception in 
terms of the ability to perceive or predict one's po- 
sition in the network of verbal evaluative reactions 
emanating from the other members of his group. The 
test will be described in a later section. 
LEADERSHIP AND HOW IT WAS MEASURED 
The study of leadership has occupied a central place 
in the social psychology of the last three decades. The 
mere range of the area is prohibitive of any attempt at 
a cursory summary or review in this text. Moreover, 
there are a number of excellent and up-to-date reviews 
(Jenkins, 1947; Stagdill, 1948; Gibb, 1954; Bass, 1960) 
which make any new attempt redundant. Therefore, our 
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discussion will be restricted to an account of the 
technique used for measuring leadership in this study 
and to the presentation of some data bearing on the 
reliability and validity of this technique. The 
rationale behind the inclusion of leadership in this 
study was that a considerable number of studies has 
found significant correlations between leadership status 
and social perception. These studies have been reviewed 
by Mann (1959) and will be discussed later on when we 
get to the analysis of the data collected in this study. 
Traditionally, studies of leadership have suffered 
from two fundamental difficulties, somewhat inherent in the 
nature of the field. The first difficulty has been the 
lack of a generally acceptable definition of the term "lea- 
der" and of the traits, functions and expectations charac- 
terising the office of leadership. The second snag has 
been that of finding a reliable measure of leadership. 
The first difficulty has resulted in a multitude of defi- 
nitions and ad hoc postulates; the second has led to a 
babel of tests and techniques (cf. Janda, 1960). That 
this state of affairs is not limited to the study of 
leadership but is as prevalent in other fields of social 
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psychology is only more regrettable. 
In our study, the definition of leadership was 
implicit in the technique of measurement employed. We 
simply asked our subjects to name five of their class- 
mates whom they would choose as their representatives in 
an important conference of student leaders in London. 
Thus our tacit assumption was that the members of our 
groups should have some degree of awareness of the kind 
of characteristics expected from a student leader as 
well as the potential bearers of these characteristics 
among themselves. We did not say anything about what 
these characteristics were; nor did we make any attempt 
to see what the pupils themselves had in mind when they 
made their choices. In analysing our data, however, we 
will see if there were any significant differences between 
those over-chosen on this question and the group as a 
whole on such personality measures as we have employed. 
Peer-nomination or peer-rating - as the technique 
in question is usually called - has been one of the well- 
known methods of assessing leadership. Its ease of con- 
struction and application has made it particularly suitable 
for military use (: enkins, 1947). Besides its simplicity 
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the method is credited with a high degree of reliability 
and validity. Wherry & Fryer (19L9), studying in an 
officer training school, found that "buddy ratings" as 
the method is known in the military circles, appeared to 
be the purest measure of leadership. The criterion of 
nomination was "five men who possess the personality 
traits most desirable in an army officer" and "five men 
who possess the personality traits least desirable in 
an army officer". They found that nominations by peers 
on these criteria provided more reliable measures than 
any other technique employed, such as graphic ratings by 
peers, by tactical officers, or by academic instructors. 
This was reflected in a test - retest coefficient of cor- 
relation of . 75 
(after one month) and . 58 
(after four 
months) between the scores on peer-nominations. No 
other criterion produced even half this degree of co- 
efficient of correlation. As to the validity of the 
peer-nomination method, they found that the correlation 
coefficient between buddy ratings and remaining in the 
school at least for two months or for graduation from 
the school were as high as those between academic grades 
and these criteria of success, (i. e. a . 70 and . 49 for 
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buddy ratings and . 71 and . 50 for the academic grade 
and the two criteria of success respectively). To the 
credit of the peer-nomination, it was also found that, 
except for prediction by the aptitude test, nominations 
were better predicted by all of the proposed selection 
devices than was the more commonly used academic grade 
criterion. These findings were confirmed in as tudy 
by Gibb (1950). Arguing against the identity of 
leadership and soeiometric status, Gibb asked the mem- 
bers of several groups to nominate their leaders, once 
in terms of a definition of leadership based on the con- 
cept of influence and once without any definition. He 
found a tetrachorfic correlation coefficient of . 80 be- 
tween leadership determined to this way and that deter- 
mined by the ratings of trained observers, whereas, the 
correlation between leadership position and sociometric 
status ranged from . 25 to . 65. Gibb concluded that 
members of a group had a sound idea of what was meant 
by leadership and that their idea of leadership presented 
a striking similarity to the notion of leadership defined 
by him in terms of influence, mutual interaction and 
integrative co-operation. At about the same time, Bell 
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and French (1950) found a high degree of stability in 
the leadership position of an individual, as determined 
by peer-nominations. This stability was represented by 
an average correlation coefficient of . 75 for the members of 
thirty small discussion groups. These findings have fur- 
ther been corroborated in a study by Hollander & Webb (1955) 
who have domonstrated that peer-nominationsfor leadership 
are by no means a total function of friendship ties and 
that friendship plays only a minor part in the nomination 
of leaders. The evidence so far presented , although by 
no means exhaustive or conclusive, seems sufficient enough 
to warrant the use of peer-nomination as a measure of 
leadership. 
The discussion above raised the question of the re- 
lationship between leadership position defined by peer 
nomination and sociometric status. Indeed, many students 
of leadership have based their whole studies on an ordinary 
sociometric test contending that the so-called over-chosen 
individuals or "stars" are nothing but the leaders of the 
group. Stagdill's (1948) survey of the leadership 
studies has recorded no less than 28 studies of this kind. 
The line of argument is best represented by the work of 
Jennings (1957,1950,1958). Jennings (1950) has treated 
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those scoring about one standard deviation above the 
mean choice status of their group as leaders and those 
scoring one standard deviation below the group mean as 
isolates. As evidence, she reported almost one-to-one 
relationship between being over-chosen on the criteria 
of living and working together and being elected as a 
member of the Community Council -a body responsible 
for the liaison between the school administration and 
the pupils. Her findings, however, have not been 
confirmed by other studies. Gibb (1950) found rela- 
tively low correlation between being nominated as a 
leader and being chosen on a sociometric test. He con- 
cluded that "socio-telic and psyche-telic choices are 
not identified in the minds of participants with leader- 
ship. " He proposed to call the over-chosen individuals 
"socio-centers" rather than leaders. Gibbs' (1950) 
findings seem to have been supported by many other workers 
(e. g. Bales, 1953; Cattell & Stice, 1954; Hollander & 
Webb, 1955). Bass (1960) has also argued against the 
identity of leadership and sociometric choice status. 
He has called the latter "esteem" rather than leadership. 
No doubt, there will be some degree of overlapping 
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between the sociometric status and the leadership 
position because of some common factor. This com- 
munality should be greater for the socio-telic situa- 
tions. And it is quite logical to expect the amount 
of overlapping to vary with the kind of group studied, 
with the criterion of choice employed and with the sort 
of demands imposed upon the leader. to be nominated. 
Nevertheless, to expect full identity between choice 
status and leadership position seems to run counter to 
the foundations of the sociometric technique. It is 
interesting to note that the term "leadership" does 
not occur in the index of R reno's Who Shall Survive" 
(1953). The term "sociometric leadership" does occur 
once in the index but there is no mention of it on page 
680 to which it is referred. The page, headed "Socio- 
metry and Group Dynamics" includes a critique of some of 
the errors made "in the course of the history of socio- 
metry which have added greatly to the confusion as to 
what sociometry represents" (p. 679). One of these 
cr 
errors is said to be "the blanket" assumption that an 
individual's sociometric score, whether calculated by 
the crudest or by the most refined techniques, is a 
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measure of his acceptance by the group. " This is, "if 
not a fallacy, at least a not wholly true interpretation 
of sociometric facts" (679-680). The rest of the page` 
is devoted to Lewin's "group decision" and bears no re- 
lationship to leadership, nor does the rest of the 
chapter! We will discuss this matter again in connection 
with the results of our own study. 
POPULARITY AND ITS MEASUREMENT 
Another item in our questionnaire asked for the 
subjects' choice of five classmates whom they regarded 
as most popular and, where we were permitted, five whom 
they regarded as least popular. The inclusion of this 
dimension of group relations in our study was prompted 
by the existence of a large number of studies indicating 
some degree of r'lationship between popularity and social 
perception. Our approach to popularity and indeed our 
tacit notion of its however, differed from that of other 
studies. The following discussion is an attempt to 
justify our approach. 
Since the advent of the sociometrid test, it has 
been widely used and interpreted as a measure of popula- 
rity. This interpretation is particularly prevalent 
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among those sociometrists who are essentially concerned 
with the educational situation (e. g. Evans, 1962). This 
use of the term "popularity" as an equivalent of sociomet- 
ric choice status does not appear to be in accord with 
the commonsense meaning of the term. In ordinary usage, 
"popularity" implies the quality of being liked by an 
aggregate of people but without reference to any specified 
reason or purpose. The sociometric choice status, on the 
other hand, is a matter of individual preference and with 
reference to a specific criterion of choice. Another 
difference, it seems to us, is that popularity is much 
less ego-involving, in the sense defined by Sherif & 
Sherif (1956), than the sociometric choice. One's 
choice of companions on a sociometric questionnaire takes 
place with direct reference to one's self-image and one's 
expectations as to the potential reactions of the other 
members of his group as well as the requirements of the 
purpose for which the choice is made. Whereas, the 
notion of popularity, and to some extent that of leader- 
ship, is free from these self-referent considerations. 
The founders of sociometry seem to have been well 
aware of this distinction, and have not used the term 
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popularity as an equivalent of sociometric status. 
Indeed, Mareno's (1953) work does not even mention the 
term in its index. Ngr does the term occur in the 
index of the recent reader edited by Mareno et al (1960). 
This indicates that the sociometrists themselves have 
been reluctant to use popularity as a technical term. 
Some of them, however, have used the term notwithstanding 
the coneeptual difficulties involved (e. g. Thorpe, 1953)" 
And Mann (1959) had enough material at hand to include 
popularity as one of his six measures of an individual's 
behaviour and status in a group. Although Mann is not 
explicit on what he means by popularity, it is apparent 
that he has used the term as an equivalent for socio- 
metric status and that the overwhelming majority of the 
studies surveyed by him are simply studies of sociomet- 
ric status. As far as we were able to trace the litera- 
ture, the only study using peer-nomination as a technique 
of measuring popularity, is a study carried out by Jennings 
and reported as a foot note 'io her original study (1937)9 
Jennings made a distinction between popularity and posi- 
tion in a psycholical structure. She compared the out- 
come of a popularity vote against the results of a socio- 
metric question and found that there was a wide discrep- 
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ancy between the two distributions. Her conclusion 
was: "It may be that the "votes" and the "choices" 
tapped two relatively different things. "Popularity" 
may be based more on qualities which appeal at distance 
and become flat within the relatively shorter psycholo- 
gical distance of the intimate group". (pp. 133-34 f. ) 
This same conclusion has been repeated in Jennings' 
later study (1950). 
Peer-nomination approach to the study of popularity 
not only can elucidate the relationship between social 
perception and popularity - in the common sense definition 
of the term - but can throw new light on the subjective- 
affective concommittants of sociometric choice process. 
The two items designed to measure leadership and 
popularity were presented as part of our sociometric test. 
In the second study, where negative items were allowed, 
a further question was asked concerning the least popular 
members of the class. The whole text of the sociocnetric 
test can be found in Appendiet" Ii of this work. 
PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS AND HOW THEY WERE MEASURED 
Reviewing the literature on the relationship between 
personality and small group status, Mann (1959) commented 
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that "the field of personality assessment is test rich 
and integration poor" (p. 2L2). He had found no less 
than 500 different measures of personality in the studies 
meeting his somewhat restrictive criteria of selection! 
This evidence suffices to indicate the difficulty of 
selecting from among the large number of tests of personality 
available. The existence of contending systems and schools 
but makes the position more difficult. 
Our choice of personality dimensions and measures was 
guided by a number of considerations. In the first place 
we decided that the dimension chosen should at legst bear 
some degree of face-relationship to the situational varia- 
bles under study. In the second place, it was deemed 
necessary that the dimensions chosen should be theoretically 
oriented and experimentally established. These conditions 
seemed to be satisfied by the dimensions of Extraversion- 
Introversion and Neuroticism as developed by H. J. Eysenck 
and his followers. On the one hand, most of the studies 
of the relationship between social perception and personal- 
ity factors agree in finding a positive relationship be- 
tween these dimensions and social perceptiveness or social 
sensitivity; on the other hand the two dimensions have 
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been subjected to enough experimental treatment, 
statistical handling and theoretical speculation to 
be regarded as established and worthy of further 
study. Cbrrigan's (1960) re-appraisal of the field 
deserves some attention here. 
Her extensive review of the literature seems to 
have cast some doubt on the status of Extraversion and 
Introversion as a dimension of personality. On the 
one hand, it failed to bear out the Unidimensionality 
of Extraversion as shown by Eysenck and his followers; 
on the other hand, it revealed that the hypothesis of 
no-relationship between Extraversion-Introversion and 
Neuroticism_Adjustment as held by Eysenck was far from 
proven. Since then, however, Eysenck & Eysenck (1963 
have provided new experimental evidence in support of 
their view. As a result of a factorial analysis of 
of a 66-item questionnaire given to a sample of 300 
men and wo: nen, they concluded that Extraversion may be 
regarded as a unitary factor depending somewhat on the 
definition of the term "unitary" (which they take to 
mean "composed of non-independent constituent units"); 
and that Extraversion and Adjustment are essentially 
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independent. However, they concede that Extraversion 
may be regarded as composed of two separate traits of 
sociability and impulsiveness which correlate about 
0.5 with each other in two independent samples. They 
also admit that sociability has a slightly positive 
correlation with adjustment, whilst impulsiveness has 
a slight negative correlation. As a theoretical 
speculation to fit these findings into Eysenck's (1957, 
1960) general theory of personality, they add: "It 
is not inconceivgble that sociability is more easily 
subject to environmental control, while impulsiveness 
may have deeper roots in heredity". (Eysenck & Eysenck, 
1963, P"5L. ) 
That Carrigan's (1960) disappointing conclusions 
have not detracted from the dimension of Extraversion- 
Introversion or the work of Eysenck is well attested 
by the space afforded them in such texts as Allport's 
(1961) and Vernon's (1963) as well as the spate of 
research published in current periodicals. Indeed, 
Allport has gone so far as to call Carrigan's (1960) 
criticisms "mathematical exercises rather than psycho- 
logical reasoning". Studies of the qualities of good 
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judges of personality have repeatedly found the intro- 
verted individuals to be superior to the extraverted 
people (Allport, 1937; 1961; Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; 
Taft, 1955). Allport's (1937) summary statement 
seems to enjoy the support of all later reviewers: 
"Experiments have shown that there are generally cer- 
tain asocial trends in the personalities of the best 
judges. Introversion is more common among them than 
extraversion, and the best judges tend themselves to 
be enigmatic and hard to judge. " (p. 515). Allport 
(1961) himself has somewhat qualified his earlier 
statement: "Although the good judge is successful in 
social relationships, and reasonably warm and friendly, 
he is also to a considerable extent detached. Very 
often he proves to be an introverted person who is 
hirpself enigmatic and hard ' to judge, even though he 
adjusts successfully to others. " (p. 510) This notion 
of introverted but well-adjusted fits well into Eysenck's 
theory of personality which does not admit any relation- 
ship between introversion and neuroticism dimensions 
(Eysenck, 1947). In the same way, most studies have 
found a negative relationship between social perception 
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and maladjustrrent. "Most studies show that good judges 
are socially skilful and emotionally stable. On 
the whole they are free from neurotic disorders. They 
are rated high in leadership and popularity" (Allport, 
1961, p. 510. ). Thus, granted that there is a general 
ability of social perception regardless of the technique 
used, we should expect to find some degree of negative 
correlation between our measures of social perception 
and Extraversion - Introversion and Neuroticism. But 
this hypothesis does not seem to be compatible with 
other experimental findings regarding the personality 
correlates of leadership and popularity in a group. 
Mann's (1959) review of the field leaves no doubt about 
the existence of a significantly positive - though 
small - relationship between leadership position and 
extraversion. The same is true of popularity. In 
view of the high relationship between leadership and 
popularity and social perception (Mann, 1959), the 
negative correlation between social perception and extra- 
version seems, at best, confusing. Is this a product 
of faulty experimental techniques employed in measuring 
social perception or an indication of the possibility 
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that there is more than one kind of social perception? 
We will come to this point again in discussing our own 
results. 
To measure personality we used the Junior Maudsley 
personality inventory. Designed by Furneaux & Gibson 
(1961) the test is the only one of its kind suitable 
for use with children between 9 and lL years of age. 
It consists of 50 items(iýi) derived by a factorial 
analysis from PintnersChildren's Personality Inventory 
(Pintner et al, 1938). Pintner's Inventory considted 
of 105 items and was designed to measure the dimensions 
of Ascendence-Submission, Extraversion-Introversion and 
Emotional Stability in children. A somewhat rearranged 
form of the inventory was administered to 156 children 
and the correlation coefficient between each of the 105 
items and each of the three scales were subjected to a 
factorial analysis. In the last analysis, two orthogonal 
factors were established each represented by 22 highly 
correlated items. Intercorrelations between extraversion 
items ranged from 0.29 to 0.80 with a mean of 0.52. 
Those between Neuroticism items ranged from 0.28 to 0.64, 
(iii, ) The first six items are not counted in scoring. 
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with a mean value of 0.145. The split-half reliability 
of the Extraversion scale proved to be 0.80 and that of 
the Neuroticism scale was 0.76. The correlation 
between the two scales was found to be -0.10 which can 
be regarded as very satisfactory. The interpretation 
of the scales as Extraversion and Neuroticism, the 
authors admit, rested on a purely subjective judgement 
of the items representing each scale. However, when 
administered to a group of 18 children from a school 
specialising in the education of difficult and malad- 
justed children, 80% of them obtained scores for Neurotic- 
ism which were greater than the median score for children 
in other schools (P = . 09). 
The original test was standardised on a group of 
78 girls and 78 boys between the ages of 9 and 14, and 
yielded means and standard deviations of 12.39 and 3.54 
on extraversion and 7.35 and 3.34 on Neuroticism. Since 
then, however, the test has been administered to several 
large groups both in this country and in Canada. Callard 
& Goodfellow (1962) gave it to 3559 boys between the ages 
of 11 and 14 years 11 months, comprising the whole sec- 
onday school population under the jurisdiction of the 
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L. E. A. in Exeter as well as a sample of secondary 
schools in Devon County. The general tendency for 
their population was somewhat lower on both Extraversion 
and Neuroticism. However, there were no significant 
differences between the Extraversion and the Neuroticism 
averages of rural and urban schools of the same type, 
though there was a slight tendency for the urban schools 
to have higher extraversion averages. In the case of 
the Neuroticism, the variance of the urban scores was 
slightly greater than that of the rural scores in the 
secondary modern schools and the children of the urban 
grammar schools had higher Neuroticism averages and 
variances than their rural counterparts. Grammar school 
children, both urban and rural, were lower in Neuroticism 
scores than the pupils of secondary modern schools of 
any kind and than the comprehensive school children. 
The Neuroticis: n average for the comprehensive school 
fell between the secondary modern and grammar school 
scores of both urban and rural schools. 
In all the urban secondary modern schools and in 
one of the three rural secondary modern schools under 
study, also in the only urban grammar technical school 
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included in the sample, the averages for the A (i. e. 
more intelligent) groups for the Neuroticism were sig- 
nificantly lower than the non "A" (less intelligent) 
averages. The three rural grammar schools and the 
comprehensive school showed no significant difference 
between A and non A group Neuroticism averages. However, 
a combined average score for Neuro'ticism for all the 
secondary modern A groups was found to be very signifi- 
cantly lower than a combined average for all the grammar 
non A groups. No significant differences were found 
between the extraversion averages of different types of 
schools. These findings are indicative of the diag- 
nostic validity of the Junior Maudsley Personality 
Inventory. 
In another study, Castello & Brachman (1962) applied 
the test to a group of 261 male and 248 female high 
school children in Canada, between the ages of 14 and 16, 
and to 304 male and 230 female English comprehensive 
school children between the ages of 14 and 16. They 
found that while the difference between the means of 
their Canadian and English samples and that found by 
Purneaux and Gibson was not significant for Extraversion 
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scores, it was significant (at . 01 level) for Neuroticism 
scores. Both English and Canadian groups scored lower 
on Neuroticism than the original population of Furneaux 
and Gibson. However, no significant difference was 
found between the mean Neuroticism scores of their own 
English and Canadian samples. The difference between 
the original English sample and their samples may have 
been caused by the age difference between the two 
samples. The age range of the original sample was from 
9 to 14 years, whereas their two samples ranged only 
from 14 to 16 years. Thislypothesis is supported by 
Callard and Goodfellow's finding of a tendency - some- 
times significant at 0.05 level - among their lower 
age groups (i. e. 11.11 to 12.11 years) to have higher 
Neuroticism scores than the older age groups (i. e. 13 
to 14 years 11 months). As for Extraversion scores, 
the tendency was reversed and the older age groups 
tended to have higher Extraversion scores. These large 
scale applications of the J. M. P. I. have produced 
sufficient data to warrant the use of the inventory 
in this study. 
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THE GUESS WHO TEST 
Peer-ratings have long been used for assessing 
personality. In many situations, the peer ratings 
can provide information unattainable by any other 
measure. Even where ratings by superiors or self- 
ratings by the subjects themselves are available, 
peer-ratings can profitably be used to cover different 
aspects of personality. Whereas only one or two 
superiors know a subject well, ten to thirty raters 
may give information when ratings in a class or a group 
are collected. As a consequence, the average rating 
on any trait is highly reliable. Indeed, for well 
defined traits in a group which has had reasonable 
opportunity to become acquainted, composite peer-ratings 
generally have reliabilities in the neighbourhood of 
. 90. They are not lacking in validity either: among 
adolescents, correlations between peer-ratings and 
careful observations of corresponding behaviours range 
from . L5 to . 70 
(Cronbach, 1960). 
As a peer-rating technique, the "Guess Who Test" 
is as old as the sociometric technique itself, since it 
goes back at least to the character studies of Hartshorne, 
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May and Mailer (1929). The technique involves presenting 
the subjects with samples of behaviour or descriptions of 
personality and asking them to guess or identify those 
among the members of, their group who best fit the descrip- 
tions. Thus the technique bears very close similarity 
to the sociometric test and has widely been used in con- 
nection with or as a supplement to it. A number of 
studies have found very high correlations between the 
results of the two techniques. Eng (1954) for example, 
has found that the Guess Who Test was the best single 
prediction of the sociometric status in a group. 
Pritchatt's (1964) recent study of some grammar school 
children in England confirms Eng's results in finding 
a high correlation between Guess Who and Sociometric 
Tests. But it fails to bear out the relationship 
between a person's Guess Who Test score and his sociometric 
choice status. It is concluded that Guess Who charac- 
teristics can tell us very little about the reason for 
sociometric choice. Though individuals put down the 
characteristics they find in a friend they often do not 
attribute them to the person they in fact choose as their 
friend. Its ease of construction and application makes 
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the Guess Who Test of singklar interest for use by 
teachers (Fleming, 1958) and some writers have argued 
that the more indirect manner in which the test is 
couched makes it more useful and productive than the 
ordinary sociometric test (Lindzey & B®rgatta, 1954)" 
The Guess Who Test was the latest measure applied 
in this study. Its adoption was prompted by two some- 
what different considerations. On the one hand, the 
diagnostic failure of our personality measure (J. M. P. I. ) 
to differentiate between the over-chosen - under-chosen 
or more sensitive and less sensitive members of our 
groups made us think of another measure of personality. 
The relatively high agreement between the mean scores 
of our groups on J. M. P. I. with those of other studies 
made it seem improbable that the diagnostic failure of 
the test be due to its lack of validity or reliability. 
Bearing in mind the low - although more or less signifi- 
cant - correlations found between sociometric status and 
some similarly designed and oriented measures of Extra- 
version and Neuroticism (Thorpe, 1953,1955) it was 
considered more probable that the lack of significant 
correlations might have arisen from the basic weakness 
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inherent in the construction of the test rather than 
any external disruption or genuine lack of correlation. 
It is a truism to say that the relationship - if any - 
between such dimensions of personality as Extraversion - 
Introversion and Neuroticism - stability and such group 
variables as sociometric choice status and leadership 
is given rise to by the behavioural implications of 
these basic personality dimensions in real interaction 
situations. Obviously, the greater the objective and 
palpable manifestations of these dimensions, the greater 
is the probability of their being observed by other par- 
ticipants in the interaction and the higher is their 
chance of influencing the process of interaction. Thus, 
to take the dimension of Extraversion, it is not sufficient 
that the subject should endorse a certain number of ques- 
tions with a certain degree of statistically defined 
"E-loading" in order for this endorsement to have any 
effect on the behaviour - objective or subjective - of 
other members of the situation. But, he should be seen 
as possessing those characteristics by others and, also, 
those characteristics should bear the same significance 
oth ¢. rS 
for these,. as they do to the designer of the test. J. M. P. I. 
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and other inventories of its kind fall somewhat short 
of attaining these ends for a number of reasons. In 
the first place, they are subject to such artificial 
influences as acquiescence response set, or the human 
tendency of yea-saying (Cronbach, 1950), and social 
desirability or the tendency to endorse socially 
agreeable items at the expense of the less agreeable 
items (Edwards 1957) as well as many other evils 
arising from lack of motivation or from straightforward 
dishonesty (conscious or unconscious) on the part of 
the subjects (iv). In the second place, items com- 
prising these E-N scales are usually biased towards 
a subjective type, making it difficult - if not impossible - 
to trace their manifestations back to the ordinary, obser- 
vable interaction situations. In fact, we found it very 
(iv) Indeed, Jackson & Messick (1958) after an extensive 
review of the field, have come to the conclusion that "In 
the light of accumulating evidence it seems likely that the 
major common factors in personality inventories of the true- 
false or agree-disagree type, such as the MMPI and the Cali- 
fornia Psychological Inventory, are interpretable primarily 
in terms of style rather than specific item content. " (p. 19) 
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difficult to find a dozen items among the 160 and add 
E-N items presented by Eysenck & Eysenck (1963a, 1963b) 
and the J. M. P. I. which could be regarded as sufficiently 
objective and observable to be included in our Guess Who 
Test'. Of course part of this was due to our a priori 
adopted criterion of judgement which stressed those 
aspects of personality and behaviour which appeared to 
be of direct consequence to the other members of the 
interaction situations at hand. 
One reason for the adoption of the Guess Who Test 
was to provide us with a picture, although admittedly 
crude and primitive, of the way the subjects regarded 
each other in terms of certain traits or descriptions 
which seemed to be of consequence to the efficient 
functioning of the groups under study. Another reason 
for its inclusion was to provide a second measure of 
social perception. For this purpose the test was re- 
administered with new instructions asking the subjects 
to guess or predict the items in which their names were 
likely to have been mentioned by others as well as the 
names of those others who, they thought, had mentioned 
their names on each item. At the same time the subjects 
were asked to decide which items described them best, In 
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this manner, the Guess Who Test provided: 
I. A picture of the subjects as seen by their peers; 
II. Their self-concepts; 
III. Their perception of the way others saw them. 
In a sense, all these are a type of social perception. 
But, in the stricter and more common definition of the 
term, only the third process, i. e. predicting the evalua- 
tive judgements directed towards one by his group members, 
can be regarded as a measure of social perception. Pro- 
cesses involved in and restrictions imposed upon the act 
of perception or judgement in this situation are quite 
similar to those of perceiving one's sociometric status. 
This similarity makes the comparison of the two kinds of 
perception both possible and interesting in its own right; 
we shall discuss this point in alater chapter. 
The Guess Who Test consisted of 20 items. Three of 
these items (Numbers 1,3 and 17) enquired about the 
academic achievements of the subjects in Sport, English 
and Mathematics - subjects directly involved in the 
choice situation facing the groups. The remaining 17 
items were adopted from such sources as Gordon's personal 
profiles (Abdel-Rahman, 1963), Davies' Test of Confidence 
(Davies, 19L&), and Eysenck & Eysenck's (1963b) Extraversion- 
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Neuroticism items. The selection of these items 
was deliberately biased towards Extraversion and Neuro- 
ticism dimensions. Thus, questions numbers 2 (to take 
life easily), L (to be very fond of people) and to some 
extent 10 ( to have a very good sense of humour) are 
obviously representative of Extraversion, and questions 
numbers 12 (to be shy) and 14 (tobe uninterested in being 
with other people) speak unmistakeably of introversion. 
In the same manner, questions 5 (to be offended easily), 
9 (to be ill-tempered and quarrelsome) and 11 (to worry 
a lot about one's failures) can easily be interpreted as 
Neuroticism or emotional unstability, while questions 6 
(to be sincere and reliable) and 8 (to be co-operative and 
friendly) can be as easily interpreted as the positive 
pole of the Neuroticism. Questions 7 (selfishness) and - 
perhaps - 13 (to be bossy and domineering) represent the 
opposite of 6 and 8 and can be fitted into other traits 
of the Neurotic dimension. Item 20 (to be sure of one's 
ability) and its opposite items 16 (to have a very low 
opinion of oneself) and 19 (to get stuck frequently and 
grow disheartened) are taken from Davies' study of con- 
fidence (Davies, 1944) and are purported to measure confi- 
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dence and diffidence respectively. They also can be 
Pitted into Eysenck's two dimensional scheme. Items 
15 (to have a strong influence on others) and 18 (to 
take the lead in group activities) can be interpreted 
as measures of Extraversion. In short, the whole 20- 
item test can be fitted into the two-dimensional diagram 





































Fig. 1. Diagram showing approximate position of various traits in two-dimensional factor 
space. Also shown are the four classical 'temperaments' or 'humours', corresponding to the 
four quadrants. 




THE SUBJECTS OP STUDY 
The data were collected in two stages. - First the 
tests were given to 'a group of 84 girls and 61 boys corn- 
Prising the population of five classes in a county secon- 
dary school in Surrey. The age range was, approximately, 
Brit. J. Psyohol. (1963), 54,1, PP- 51-62 
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from 12 to 14 years but the majority of subjects were 
between 13 and 14 years. The five classes represented five 
different ability groups. The school records ppovided 
the necessary information concerning the abilities of the 
subjects. The study took place ih one day-In June 1963. 
The same test material - with minor revision - was 
administered to another group of school children in a 
county secondary school in Leyton. It was given to 
three classes of children between the ages of 13 years 
and 14 years four months. There were altogether forty- 
five girls and forty-seven boys. However, on the day 
of testing seven girls and three boys were absent and 
this reduced the number of subjects to 9L. Here again 
the four classes represented four ability groups and 
the I. Q. s of subjects could be obtained from their school 
records. The main difference between this study and 
the first one was that here we were allowed to inquire 
into the negative feelings of the subjects as well as 
their positive choices. Also the number of choices and 
rejections allowed was five instead of the four in the 
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SECOND STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
The second part of this study is concerned with an investi- 
gation of social perception in a group of more mature training 
college students. Although the subjects and measures employed 
are basically different from those of the first part, the purpose, 
rationale and general guiding lines of the study remain the same. 
As before, social perception is defined as the ability to predict 
the probable responses of others to certain aspects of their en- 
vironment. Obviously, both the kinds of responses to be predic- 
ted, and the kind of stimulus-situations evoking them can vary 
enormously. The same is true of the type of organism whose be- 
haviour is to be predicted. All these three variables need 
further clarification and delineation. So also does the variable 
of the predicties, i. e., the sample of individuals whose social 
perceptiveness is under study. 
On the response side, we are primarily concerned with the 
verbal or symbolic responses. As will be seen later on in con- 
nection with the description of our tests, the responses in ques- 
tion are mainly of a symbolic nature involving no more than the 
underlining of an alternative response-category, distributing a 
set of numbers in a pre-determined way and putting down one of the 
three mathematical symbols. All these symbolic responses have 
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been defined in the instructions preceding each test and are 
governed by these instructions. Whether these symbolic responses 
can be relied upon to represent anything in the realm of real be- 
haviour is of little significance from our point of view. Let 
the students of behaviour worry over the possible correspondence 
or lack of correspondence between the movements of the large and 
small muscles. As far as this study is concerned, we are quite 
happy 'with the small muscles, both in our predictors and those 
those behaviour is to be predicted. This is not meant to be 
taken as a sign of our "unscientific disregard" of the objective 
aspects of human behaviour. Par from it. Ours is only a 
humble confession that, under the circumstances, we were in no 
position to go beyond a sample of the verbal responses of a cer- 
tain group of people and equally verbal predictions of the same 
by another group. 
On the side of the response-evoking stimulus situation, 
again we must admit that our stimuli were no more than verbal 
statements, propositions and questions. Again the thorny ques- 
tion of the correspondence between these verbal utterances and 
actual behaviour must be left to the original designers of these 
inventories. In the later sections of the chapter we shall have 
an occasion to present some evidence bearing on the validity of 
our situational stimuli. It begs no question that the possible 
-156- 
range of verbal stimulus situations is practically unlimited and 
some sort of choice or selection is called for. The choice of 
the stimulus situations employed in this study was prompted by a 
number of considerations. In the first place it was thought ne- 
cessary that the sample of questions chosen should represent as 
wide a range of behaviour as practically manageable. In the 
second place, the verbal stimulus situations presented should be 
known to and bear a certain degree of significance for the res- 
ponding individuals in order to evoke genuinely reliable respon- 
ses. Many attitude scales have suffered from the fact that they 
have tried to measure things which did not exist for the indivi- 
duals concerned. In the third place, it was considered important 
that the situational stimuli should be known to have a psycholo- 
gically respectable parentage, should enjoy a certain degree of 
stability and bear some statistically proven relationship to 
objective behaviour and the activities of the large muscles. 
These conditions seemed to be satisfied by the Inventory of 
Social Attitudes developed by Eysenck, the Study of Values, Bri- 
tish version, designed by Richardson, and Eysenck's shorter form 
of the Maudsley Personality Inventory. These measures will be 
described in detail below. Having chosen our media of response 
and prediction, it remained to be decided whose response must be 
predicted. As was indicated in the first chapter, studies of 
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social perception have employed as "predictees" from life-long 
spouses (ITotcutt & Silva, 1952) to complete strangers known only 
through filmed interviews (Cline, 1955)- There is every reason 
to believe that the two tasks differ in the kind of demand they 
make on the individual predictor. There is a large gap between 
the information available and the extent to which one has to - in 
Bruner's (1956) words - "go beyond what is given". The sheer 
gap between the volume of "input" and "output" involved renders 
any preconceived notion of generality of the performance under 
these extreme conditions untenable. 
Guided by the findings of other studies - as reviewed in 
the first chapter - we decided to make a distinction between two 
categories of predictees, that is, others in general and specific 
others. The first category is employed to depict the predictors' 
degree of awareness of the probable responses of the majority of 
their cultural group to a given situation. In other words, it 
represents the dominant response tendencies of the majority of a 
cultural group in the face of a given situation. The category 
was further classified into the two main sub-groups formed by the 
male and the female members of the society. The aim was to find 
out whether people showed the same degree of acumen in predicting 
the verbal behaviour of the opposite-sex group members as they 
demonstrated in predicting the responses of their ovzn sex. 
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The second task - making predictions for specific others - 
was regarded as a gauge of the predictors' ability to perceive the 
probable deviation of a given individual from the prevalent group 
norm. The logic of scientific enquiry would demand that a sta- 
tistically selected sample of "specific others" be used for all 
predictions. But this logical requirement could not be met and 
had to be sacrificed for the practical exigencies of the experi- 
mental condition. The time available for giving the tests was 
simply too short to afford such logical luxuries. So it was de- 
cided to cut the number of the specific others to two, selecting 
them in such a way as to allow for the degree of acquaintance'to 
affect the outcome of prediction in a roughly controlled way. 
Thus each subject was required to choose two others from among 
those taking part in the study: one whom he knew well and one 
whom he did not know well. In this manner, it seemed possible 
to make allowance for the interplay of acquaintance and social 
perception. The degree of acquaintance, however, eras left unde- 
cided depending on the subjective interpretation of the predictor. 
The area of choice was restricted to the group taking part in the 
study so that the predictions made for each individual could be 
compared against his own responses to the same situations. 
In short, then, the experiment consisted of giving the sub- 
jects a batch of paper and pencil tests covering various aspects 
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of human personality, and asking them to answer the tests: 
1. From their own point of view; 
2. From the point of view of the majority of men in their age 
group and with the same sub-cultural and educational back- 
ground; 
3. From the point of view of the majority of women in their age 
group and with the same educational background; 
4. From the standpoint of a groupuate well-known to them, and 
5. From the viewpoint of a groupmate not well-known to them. 
The consideration of the number of different times each 
test had to be taken made it imperative that the length of the 
tests used should be kept down to a minimum. 
The tests used are as follows: 
1. I19VEITTORY OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES 
Designed by Eysenck (1947), the Inventory consists of 40 
items purporting to measure the two basic attitudinal factors of 
Radicalism and Tender-mindedness. The method used in its con- 
struction "took account of previous work, both factorial and non- 
factorial, to discover in its broadest outline the total universe 
of social attitude questions as defined by social psychologists, 
sociologists, and statisticians active in this field. From a 
total of some 500 items, all those were selected which had been 
shorn to have high saturations on any factor isolated by any 
method whatever. When pruned of duplications, it was found that 
these items did not suffice to make up the minimum number 
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considered requisite for a thoroughgoing study, and others were 
added by random selection until forty items altogether had been 
chosen. These items, their wording changed appropriately to 
suit English conditions where necessary, were then put together 
in the form of a test, and given to various pre-testing groups 
who were encouraged to make comments and criticisms. Several 
changes were made in the wording of some of the items to meet the 
more general criticisms, but on the whole it was found that there 
was little agreement between critics as to which were the least 
satisfactory items. It is believed that the method of construc- 
tion makes it likely that most of the areas subsumed under the 
heading 'social attitudes' are represented to some extent in the 
questionnaire; suggestions for further items were solicited from 
social and political experts, but without unearthing any items 
not covered in some form or other in our preliminary list from 
which the actual test-items were drawn. Thus the claim may per- 
haps be made that the method of item selection presents an approxi- 
mation to a combined stratified (choice by factor-loadings) and 
random (remaining items) method of sampling. " (Eysenck, 1947,51-52) 
The questionnaire thus constructed was given to a large 
sample of varying age, sex, educational and socio-economic back- 
ground. Of these, those of 750 middle-class subjects were chosen 
in such a way that 250 were supporters of the Conservative party, 
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250 supporters of the Liberal party, and 250 supporters of the 
Labour or Socialist party. Tetrachoric correlations were cal- 
culated between each of the 40 items and all the others, giving a 
total of 780 correlations. A factorial analysis was carried out 
on the resulting correlation matrix, using Burt's Summation Iethod. 
Two bipolar, general factors were extracted first; the second fac- 
tor residual matrix was then analysed by means of Burt's Group 
Factor Method, making use of sub-matrices which showed significant 
intercorrelations. It was found that the first factor contri- 
buted 18% to the varia: ice, the second factor 8%, while the two 
group factors contributed 2% each. Altogether, the communality 
accounts for 30% of the variance. 
The items which defined the first factor were clearly 
grouped into two opposinG sets. On the one hand, there was a 
belief that private property should be abolished, that the death 
penalty ought to go, that Sunday observance is old-fashioned, that 
Jews are valuable citizens, that the divorce laws ought to be al- 
tered, that we should give up part of our sovereignty, that we 
should abolish abortion laws, that we should cure criminals rather 
than punish them, that laws favour the rich, that companionate 
marriage should be allowed, and that patriotism is a force that 
works against the peace. On the other hand, we have a belief 
that nationalization is inefficient, that compulsory religious 
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education is desirable, that the Japanese are cruel by nature, 
that we should go back to religion, that Jews are too powerful in 
this country, that flogging should be retained as a deterrent, 
that war is inherent in human nature, that conscientious objectors 
are traitors, that birth control should be made illegal, and that 
coloured peoples are inferior. Eysenck called this bipolar di- 
mension the dimension of Radicalism vs. Conservatism and found 
that items highly saturated on this factor differentiated between 
the members of the Socialist and Conservative parties. 
The second factor was also a bipolar factor, one pole being 
characterized by a belief that we must go back to religion, that 
birth control should be illegal, that the double standard of mo- 
rality is bad, that religious education should be made compulsory, 
that our troubles have moral causes, that we should give up our 
sovereignty, abolish the death penalty, and attempt to cure crimi- 
nals rather than punish them. The opposing set of beliefs ap- 
proves of companionate marriage, wants to alter divorce, licensing, 
and abortion laws, considers the Japanese cruel by nature, the 
Jews too powerful, war inherent in human nature, Sunday observance 
old-fashioned, compulsory sterilization desirable, women and co- 
loured peoples inferior, and conscientious objectors traitors to 
their country. To this bipolar factor Eysenck has given the name 
Tender-minded vs. Tough-minded, in the sense originally proposed 
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by William James. The tender-minded set of opinions appears to 
be dominated by ethical, moralistic, super-ego, altruistic values, 
while tough-minded set of opinions is dominated by realistic, 
egotistic, and worldly values. 
The two dimensions were found to be somewhat negatively 
correlated, r being -. 12 ± . 03 
(N = 750). While there was a 
clear differentiation between the three political parties with 
respect to their Radicalism (R) scores, the Conservatives and 
Socialists being at opposite extremes of the dimension with 
Liberals in the middle, there was no significant difference be- 
tween the three political parties with respect to the tender- 
mindedness (T) factor. 
Of the 40 items forming the Inventory, 14 items have been 
scaled for measuring R and 14 others for measuring the T factor 
respectively. The possible range of scores on each dimension is 
from 0 to 14. The Reliability of the R scale was . 81, that of 
the T scale was . 64, their respective validities being . 90 and . 
80. 
Since its appearance, the scale has been given to numerous groups 
in Britain, America, Germany and Sweden, with results very similar 
to those found in Eysenck's original study, showing the generality 
of the two basic attitudinal factors regardless of the cultural 
settings involved. The invariance of factors under change of 
items has been demonstrated by Z; elvin (1955) who, using 38 new 
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items as well as scores on the original R and T scales, reproduced 
the same factorial structure as Eysenck had found. 
Since its development, the inventory has been used very 
widely by Eysenck and his students. Eysenck (1954,1960) has 
given a thorough survey of these studies, and has made a daring 
attempt to build a general theory of political behaviour, linking 
it to his hierarchical view of personality organization based on 
the Pavlovian principles of Conditioning. The theory is too well 
known to require any detailed discussion here and Eysenck's own 
marks are easily available. For critical evaluations of this 
theory, Christie (1956) and Rokeach (1956) rust be consulted. 
The use of this scale in this study was prompted by several 
considerations. In the first place, it provided a well-tried, 
faotor-analystically defined measure of some very significant 
aspects of social attitudes. In the second place, the underlying 
attitudinal dimensions seemed to be among the most basic and im- 
portant dimensions ever put forward, with supposedly decisive con- 
sequences for the social behaviour of the individual. Moreover, 
the importance of attitudes in judging or perceiving people has 
been emphasized by several writers. To Oldfield (1943) "it is 
chiefly the attitudes displayed by the candidate that form the 
basis of the interviewer's judgment". The same point has recently 
been stressed by Newcomb (1956). It is a safe surmise to say that 
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much of the predictions or judgements made in the course of 
practical encounter with others is in respect of their attitudes 
or behaviour potentialities as they relate to certain outstanding 
aspects of one's psychological life-space. The Inventory of 
Social Attitudes seems to cover a large area of the common life- 
spaces obtaining in this country. 
2. TEST OP VALUES 
The second measure employed was Richardson's British version 
of the famous Allport-Vernon Study of Values. The original test 
is an attempt to quantify Eduard Spranger's six-fold classifica- 
tion of man's dominant values. Richardson's is an attempt to 
make the test more suitable for use with the British subjects by 
rephrasing certain items and/or replacing them by new ones. 
Spranger (1923) believed that man's dominant value orienta- 
tions can be classified into six basic types. He contended that 
every actual person can be regarded as approaching (but not fit- 
ting perfectly within) one or more of these value directions. 
The six types are: 
1. The theoretical type, whose dominant interest is the dis- 
covery of truth. Since the interests of the theoretical man are 
empirical, critical and rational, he is necessarily an intellec-- 
tualist, frequently a scientist or philosopher. His chief aim 
in life is to order and to systematize his knowledge. 
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2. The economic type, whose main characteristic is an 
interest in the practical utility of things. This type is 
thoroughly practical and conforms well to the prevailing con- 
ception of the average American businessman. 
3. The aesthetic type, who sees his highest value in form 
and harmony. Each single experience is judged from the stand- 
point of grace, symmetry, or fitness. An aesthetic man need not 
be a creative artist; nor need he be effete; he is aesthetic if 
he but finds his chief interest in the artistic episodes of life. 
4. The social type. The highest value for this ideal type 
is love of people. The social man prizes other persons as ends, 
and is therefore himself kind, sympathetic, and unselfish. 
5. The political type is interested primarily in power. 
His activities are not necessarily within the narrow field of 
politics; but whatever his vocation, he betrays himself as a man 
of power. 
6. The religious type. The highest value for this type 
may be called unity. He is mystical and seeks to comprehend the 
cosmos as a whole, to relate himself to its embracing totality. 
It must be noted that Spranger does not believe that there 
are six main types of people. The typology is one of pure values, 
not of actual persons. The six types are more ideal than real. 
They only provide us with a measure of the extent to which given 
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individuals can be said to have organized their lives by one or 
more of these values. Spranger's classification suffers from 
the fact that it fails to embrace the whole range of man's domi- 
nant values. 'T'his is particularly true of the sensual aspects 
of man's orientations. Despite these shortcomings, the typology 
has proved very valuable in guiding psychological investigation 
of values (Dukes, 1955)" 
Richardson's version of the Study of values - like the ori- 
ginal version - consists of two parts. In the first part, there 
are 30 statements or questions, each with two alternative respon- 
sea* The subject is required to give the two alternatives dif- 
ferent weights according to his preference. Each value type is 
represented by 10 items. The second part consists of 15 state- 
meats each followed by four alternative responses and the subject 
is required to show his preferences for each of these alternatives 
by giving them a score of 0,1,2, or 3. Again there are 10 
statements or items for each of the six value types. 
Reliability of the test: Richardson has provided some data 
bearing on the reliability of the test by estimating reliability 
coefficients from the biserial correlations between the scores of 
an individual on each value type and his responses to the indivi- 
dual items defining that type. Bhatnagar (1964) has provided 
further evidence of the split-half reliability of the test both 
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with the British and Indian students. These reliability coeffi- 
cients are presented below. The last row of the table shows the 
inter-item reliability of the original test as reported in the 
manual of the Allport, Vernon and Lindzey (1960). All in all, 
the test appears to enjoy satisfactorily high degrees of reliabi- 
litt'. 
Aes. Eco. Pol. Rel. Soc. 
Richardson's Study (N - 256) . 84 . 83 . 82 . 95 . 79 
Bhatnagar's British (N= 75) -89 . 84 . 80 . 81 . 72 
Study (Indian (N -150) . 85. . 87 . 92 . 74 . 63 




. 77 . 90 . 
82 






Validity - The original version of the test is known to enjoy a 
high degree of "construct validity". It has proven successful 
in differentiating between the occupants of various occupations. 
(Dukes, 1955; Allport, Vernon & Lindzey 1960. ) Richardson gave 
a written description of the Spranger types to her subjects and 
asked then to make self-assessments in terms of these descriptions. 
The self-ratings were then compared with either the scores of the 
subjects or the mean scores of their groups on the test. There 
was a very high degree of agreement between the two. Thus she 
concluded that the British version of the Test of Values was also 
measuring something very similar to the Spranger values. This 
finding has been corroborated by E1-Meligi (1963). Further 
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support is lent by the finding that both the relative prominence 
of the various values in the samples so far tested and the dif- 
ferences between the scores in regard to certain values are in 
complete agreement with the published evidence gathered through 
the use of Allport-Vernon's original version. The following 
table summarizes the means of certain British samples on various 
values as studied by Richardson, E1-11sligi and Bhatnagar. The 
Studies: Bý 
British 
EL4 LIGI RICHARDSON 
Values: M. S. D. M. Means of 
rating 
Total Men Women 
Theoretical 34.53 7.74 31.5 3.1 32.39 33.32 31.45 
Aesthetic 30.01 7.32 27.2 3.2 26.11 23.78 28.45 
Social 41.53 5.68 41.7 1.8 40.02 39.44 40.60 
Political 23.32 6.39 21.1 5.2 24.55 26.78 22.33 






Means of different British 
on Richardson's Test of 
differences observed between the means of 
2b. t3 25. ät$ 31.79 
28.49 30.89 26.09 
400 200 200 
samples 
Values. 
certain groups must be 
due to the different compositions of the groups involved as re- 
gards sex, age and social and economic background. All these 
factors are known to influence the value orientations of an indi- 
vidual. 
The inclusion of the test in this study was prompted by the 
same general considerations discussed in connection with the 
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previous measure. Although the test is not factorially designed, 
the theoretical orientation underlying its construction seems sound 
enough to satisfy our above-mentioned conditions. l, 'oreover, an 
investigation of the relationship between personality dimensions 
measured by this test and the empathic ability is of interest in 
its own right. For considerations of time, however, we had to 
confine ourselves to the second part of the test only. 
3. MMLUDSLEY PERSONALITY INVENTORY (Shorter Version) 
We have discussed the relationship between the personality 
dimensions of Extraversion and Neuroticism and social perception in 
connection with the description of the Junior Maudsley Personality 
Inventory used with our sample of children. The only thing that 
remains to be discussed here is the test used for measuring these 
dimensions in our adult sample. 
The test used is the shorter version of Eysenck'a M. P. I. 
(Eysenck, 1959). Although M. P. I. itself is much shorter than most 
other questionnaires, nevertheless for certain purposes even 48 
questions may be too many to ask. In cognizance of this fact, 
Eysenck (1958) has prepared a shorter form consisting of the first 
12 items of the M. P. I. Six of these represent the dimension of 
Extraversion and Introversion and six others represent the dimension 
of Ileuroticism vs. Stability. The two scales have been constructed 
on the basis of a factor analysis of the responses of 1600 British 
subjects taking part in a market research programme. Each item could 
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be responded to either by underlining "Yes" or "No" or putting a 
question mark. Only the affirmative responses were scored in the 
defined direction. Thus the E and N scores could vary only from 0 
to 6. In actual fact, the mean E was found to be 1.96 and the mean 
11 was . 15. The correlation between the two scales was found to be 
-. 05 and none of the E or N items had loadings on the other factor 
as large as . 10. The corrected split-half reliabilities were . 79 
for N and. . 71 for E. 
Recently, Eysenck (1959) has proposed to change the scoring 
method of the test by giving 2 scores to each positive answer and 
1 score to each undetermined response (7). Using this scoring 
method the means of the E and N scales for the quota sample of 
1600 were found to be 7.96 ± 2.97 and 6.15 ± 3.33 respectively. 
Split-half reliabilities on a new quota sample of 2000 men and 
women were found to be . 
80 and . 72 for the N and E scales respec- 
tively. The correlations between the long and the short bi. P. I. 
scales are reported to be . 86 and . 87 for IT and E respectively. 
Some evidence regarding the diagnostic efficiency of the 
test has been provided by Eysenck (1958). Thus women appear to 
score roughly ä S. D. higher than men on U, that is, they are less 
stable, whereas on E, the men have a score about 
116 S. D. higher 
than the women, that is, they are more extraverted. Class and 
age differences are also significant for N, the lower class and 
younger age groups being slightly more unstable emotionally by 
1/3 
S. D. and 1/5 S. D. respectively. As a further indication of the 
validity of the measure, it is reported that both scales of the 
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test differentiated between the two groups of drinkers and non- 
drinkers included in the sample. While non-drinkers appeared to 
be slightly more unstable than drinkers, the drinkers' mean E- 
score (2.48) was about '/ S. D. larger than the mean E-soore of 
the non-drinkers (1.55;. These findings, in addition to the 
wealth of experimental data collected in connection with the com- 
plete form of the test, justifies the use of this short persona- 
lity inventory for research purposes like ours. 
Items of the shorter form of the X. P. I. differ from the 
items of our other two measures in one important respect. Their 
contents are more personal in nature than the items contained in 
the other two tests of attitudes and values. In other words, 
their degree of prevalence among the members of a cultural group 
- their social desirability - is much harder to ascertain. Thus 
they are hoped to provide a check on the generality of predicting 
ability over various questions or statements regardless of their 
degree of prevalence and social desirability. 
One more point seems to be in order before we end the des- 
cription of our measuring instruments. This is the question of 
independence or dependence of our three tests and their under]ying 
dimensions of personality. Eysenok (1954) has given a survey of 
the literature bearing on this question. His main aim was to 
link the findings on the test of values with his theory of basic 
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social attitudes and fit them both into his hierarchical scheme 
of personality organization. A large-scale factorial study by 
George (1954) seems to bear out this conclusion. His findings 
are summarized in the following quotation: "It will be seen that 
the Radical-Conservative axis and the Tough-minded-Tender-minded 
axis are uniquely located in terms of the E-scale and the T-scale 
respectively. The value scores are located in the appropriate 
quadrants; the economic and political values in the tough-minded 
Conservative quadrant, the theoretical value in the tough-minded 
Radical quadrant, the social value in the tender-minded Radical 
quadrant, and the religious value in the tender-minded Conserva- 
tive quadrant. " (Eysenck, 1954,178. ) 
2UBJE CTS OF THE STUDY 
The study was carried out in two different training colleges 
in England. The first was a newly-established day-training col- 
lege catering for students of an older age level than those of 
ordinary colleges. It is a mixed college with a preponderance of 
female students. The second college is an old denominational 
boarding college which has recently been turned into a co- 
educational college. 
In the first college, 57 individuals, comprising the members 
of 6 tutorial groups in education, took part in the study. 
There were 20 males and 37 females. The age range for the male 
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group was between 19 and 45 years with a mean of 28 years and a 
median of 26. The female group ranged all the way from 18 to 50 
years, the mean age being 31.6 years and with a median age of 31. 
They were all first-year students. They had already been briefed 
about the nature and purpose of the study and received the first 
part of the test-administration with apparent enthusiasm. The 
tests were given in two separate sessions. In the first session 
the subjects were asked to fill the tests first from their own 
point of view and then from the point of view of the majority of 
male and female students of a cultural and educational background 
similar to theirs. In the second session, held about one week 
later, they were asked to fill the same test material from the 
point of view of two specific individuals in their group: one 
whom they knew very well and one whom they did not know well. 
Only 40 of the original group did complete the second part of the 
study. Twelve of them were men and 28 women. During the second 
session, some groups also filled in a 5-point rating scale asses- 
sing their group-mates in terms of sociability, intelligence, 
warmth, popularity, and leadership. The result of this rating- 
scale czii be used to throw some light on the relationship be- 
tween the ability to judge or rate others and the ability to pre- 
dict the responses of others. It can also be used as a further 
check on the personality correlates of the ability under study. 
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In the second college, forty-nine people volunteered to take 
part in the study. Of these, 27 were women and 22 men. The age 
range for the women was from 18 to 21, the mean 'being 19.8 years. 
For men, the age range was between 19 and 29 years with a mean of 
22 years. Thus the second sample provided a much more homoge- 
neous group. Testing took place in one session. As in the 
first group about one-third of the sample had not completed the 
part of the test relating to the prediction of the responses of 
specific others, it was decided to redress the balance in 
this 
group by asking them all to fill that part of the test first 
and 
the part relating to the measurement of the sensitivity to the 
generalized other, i. e., the part requiring the prediction of the 
responses of men and women in general, later. Because of time 
shortage, however, only 27 subjects were able to complete 
both 
parts of the test and the remaining 22 subjects were asked 
to fill 
in the rating scale mentioned above. 
The 49 subjects of the second college belonged to different 
years and different subject groups, the majority of them being 
second-year students. Zoost of them seemed quite interested and 
gell founded in psychology and approached the study enthusiasti- 
cally. Quite a number of them made their participation in test- 
ing conditional upon the results being made available to them. 
The following table summarizes the composition of this group in 
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terms of college year, major subject, and educational group. 
The group was asked to give additional information regarding the 
size of their family and their birth status. This information 
will be used to see whether the high correlation between these 
variables and the ability to judge others (Taft, 1956) is also 
true of the ability to predict others' behaviour. 
YEAR FIRST SECOND THIRD TOTAL 
SUBJECT OF STUDY s 
AST 22 
DIVINITY 33 
ENGLISH 2 10 7 19 
GEOGRAPHY 381 12 
MATHTäATICS 1 3 1 5 
POTTERY 2 2 
WOODWORK & WEAVING 2 2 
SCIENCE 3 1 4 
TOTAL 6 29 14 49 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE SECOND SAMPLE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS 
ACCORDING T9 THE SUBJECT OF STUDY AND YEAR. 
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CHAP'T'ER IV: ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST STUDY 
1. AN OVER VIEW OF TEE SOCIOI? ETRIC STRUCTURE OF TEE GROUPS INVOLVED 
This section is devoted to a brief description of the socio- 
metric sub-structure revealed by the sociometric test. The study 
of this sub-structure seems desirable on two main grounds. On 
the one hand, there appears to be a very close relationship betveen 
the actual sociometric structure of the group and its representa- 
tional picture as depicted by the perceptual or guessing section 
of our test. On the other hand, the question of the reliability 
and validity of our measures of social efficiency-i. e., leader- 
ship, popularity, etc., - can only be settled by looking into the 
network of interpersonal relations brought to the fore by the 
sociometric test. 
A. INTER-SEX CHOICES 
Looking at the sociomatrices of our eight groups, the most 
striking phenomenon is the very small amount of choices exchanged 
IV 
between boys and girls. Tables]. shows the percentages of inter- 
sex choices on the first four criteria 
(i. e. working together in 
English and Maths classes, spending one's free time with, and 
liking most) for boys and girls of the eight groups separately. 
IV 
As is seen in Table,, l, the average proportion of inter-sex choices 
for the whole sample does not exceed 9.5 per cent of the number of 
choices made. This proportion varies all the way from 0% 
(group 
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VII, criteria 1 and 3) to 26.66% (group v girls, criterion 4). 
On the whole there are more girls' choices going to boys (it 
10.4%) than the boys' choices going to girls (11 - 8.55%). This 
is particularly apparent in the first and last criteria of choice 
where the mean percentages of girls' choices going to boys are 
12.8% and 13.2% as compared with the boys' means of 8.6% and 9% 
respectively. Nevertheless, none of these reach the level ex- 
pected on pure chance basis (about 45%). This is fell in line 
with the findings of other workers in this field (e. g. Bronfen- 
brenner, 1944-1945) and is indicative of the general tendency to 
withdraw from the opposite sex so characteristic of puberty (cf. 
Hurlock, 1959)" 
This same trend is also observed in connection with the 
perceptual aspect of the sociometric test. Here, the proportion 
of the inter-sex guesses is even smaller. As Table 
2 
shows, the 
total average of guesses going to the opposite sex is just under 
5% of all the guesses made. This is about one-half the proportion 
of choices actually exchanged between boys and girls. As the 
average percentage of the congruent guesses, i. e. guesses going 
with choices, for the whole sample is about 77%, it can be de- 
duced that a further factor such as self-consciousness or modesty 
may have been responsible for lowering the proportion of inter-sex 
guesses. It is interesting to note that in contrast to the 
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Criteria :IL121314 Mean 
Boys Girls 'Boys Girls 'Boys Girls-Boys Girls ' 
Group: 1 4.3 15 4.1 8.3 11.9 6.6 2.4 16.9 8.7 
II 8.3 13.9 8.3 6.9 6.2 6.9 14.6 11.1 9.5 
III 20.8 23.5 16.7 10.3 14.8 4.7 11.1 8.8 13.8 



















vii 0 0 0 5 0 0 507 3.3 1.7 
VIII 8.3 2.1 8.3 2 3.7 8 8.8 1101 6.5 
Mean: 8.6 12.8 9.3 8.5 7.3 7.1 9 13.2 9.5 
N 
TABZE 1 s 
Percentage of Inter-sei Choices on Criteria 1-4 for Boys 
and Girls separately. 
Criteria s1234 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boy s Girls Boys Girls 
Groups VI 21.2 54.9 7.6 53 13 29.1 21.7 63 33 
VII 17 .7 63.7 14.6 57.7 16.4 60.8 36.5 66 42 
VIII 49.1 80.4 52.7 68 53.4 56.2 50.9 60.9 59 
Moans 29.3 66.4 25 59.6 27.6 48.7 36.4 63 44.6 
N 
TABLT'1 s Percentage of Inter-sex rejections on Criteria 1-4 for 
Boys and Girls of the last three groups separately. 
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proportion of inter-sex choices, the proportion of girls' guesses 
going to boys (4.6%; is smaller than the proportion of boys' 
guesses going to girls (5.1%). This may be due to the cultural 
premium put on modes V in bringing up girls. 
B. IlSTEB-SEX REJECTIONS 
Considering the sociomatrices of the negative versions of 
the first four criteria responded to by groups VI to VIII, the 
proportion of inter-sex rejections is seen to be significantly 
higher than that of inter-sex choices, the mean being 44.6% 
IV 
(Table,, 3). Using Bronfenbrenner's (1944, formula, the percentage 
of boys' rejections going to girls on pure chance basis is found 
to be 47%, that of girls' rejections due to go to boys being 53%. 
The obtained values of these are 29.8% and 59.5% respectively. 
Thus there is a strong tendency among the boys and girls of our 
study to afford their negative feelings to their opposite-sex 
classmates than the same-sex ones. The tendency is much stronger 
for girls than boys. This finding is also in accord with those 
of other workers in the field of child development and sociometry. 
Girls' excessive rejection of boys at this level of development has 
been attributed to their accelerated maturity - both social and 
emotional - which makes much of their opposite-sex coevals' conduct 
seem childish and repugnant (Gesel & Ilg, 1957). 
The proportion of inter-sex guesses of rejection is virtually 
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1$213$4 Criteria 0 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Group s10 5 0 3.5 0 3.5 0 6 2.25 
II 6.8 4.1 4.5 1.4 4.5 4.3 9.1 1.4 405 
III 10.6 1.6 5 3.5 9 3.6 11.4 5026 6.24 
IV 2.17 4.2 8.5 2.8 2.7 3.2 5.9 5.7 4.25 
Y 6.8 4.8 7.7 3.6 705 8.6 2.6 10.1 6.5 
VI 5.8 6.34 4.8 6.6 4.8 7.3 6.1 11.2 6.6 
vii 0 0 0 0 0 4.3 3.6 0 1 
VIII 10.9 10.2 1001 4.3 1.8 8.3 11.3 2 7.1 
Mean : 5.4 4.6 5 3.2 3.8 5.4 6.2 5.2 4.8 
TABLE 8 71 : Percentage of Inter-sex Guesses on the four criteria 
of Choice for boys and girls separately. 
Criteria :11 2'3'4 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Group; VII 28.1 59.6 25 70 24.6 71 29.4 70 47.2 
VI 20 35.1 23 50 2201 26.3 23.4 39.3 30 
VIII 0009 72 43.1 72 44.1 55.1 59.2 74 56.6 
Mean 27.3 55.6 30.4 64 30.2 50,8 37.3T 61.1 44.6 
TABLE 4s percentage of Inter-sex Guesses on the four criteria of 
Rejeotion for boys and girls of Groups VI VIII, 
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Criteria :'1'2'3i41 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Group :10503.5 0 3.5 062.25 
II 698 4.1 495 1.4 4.5 4.3 9.1 1.4 4.5 
III 10.6 1.6 5 3.5 9 306 11.4 5.26 6.24 
IV 2.17 4.2 8.5 2.8 2.7 3.2 5.9 5.7 4.25 
V 6.8 4.8 7.7 3.6 7.5 8.6 2.6 10401 6.5 
VI 5.8 6.34 4.8 6.6 4.8 7.3 6.1 11.2 6.6 
VII 0 0 0 0 0 4.3 3.6 0 1 
VIII 10.9 10.2 1001 4.3 1.8 8.3 11.3 2 701 
Mean t 5.4 4.6 5 3.2 3.8 5.4 662 5.2 4.8 
TABLE :4: Percentage of Inter-sex Guesses on the four oriteria 
of Choice for boys and girls separately. 
Criteria :121314 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Group; VII 28.1 59.6 25 70 24.6 71 2904 70 4702 
VI 20 35.1 23 50 22.1 2603 23.4 39.3 30 
VIII ý$09 72 43.1 72 44.1 55,1 59.2 74 56.6 
Mean 27.3 5506 30.4 64 30.2 5008 37o3T 61.1 4406 
TABLE 4: Percentage of Inter-se= Guesses on the four criteria of 
Rejection for boys and girls of Groups vi -viii, 
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the same as the proportion of inter-sex rejections (Table 4 ). 
There is a slight increase in the mean percentage of boys' guesses 
going to girls (31.3% as compared to 29.8% of the actual rejections) 
and a slight decrease in the proportion of the girls' negative 
guesses going to boys (57.8% as compared to 59.5% of the actual 
rejections). Though these variations are too small to be signi- 
ficant, they may nevertheless be suggestive of some degree of 
awareness on the part of the subjects. 
The interpretation of these findings is far from simple. It 
should be realized that the proportion of inter-sex rejections, 
although very high, does not depart significantly from chance ex- 
pectancy in either direction. In other words, the sociometric 
structure revealed by the negative aspects of our criteria could 
equally easily be obtained by a random distribution of rejections. 
This suspicion is further supported by a comparison of the amount 
of mutual choices and rejections as summarized in Tables 7 and 8. 
C. MUTUALITY OF CHOICES AND REJECTIONS 
While the percentage of mutual choices is always significant]y 
larger than its chance equivalent, the proportions of mutual re- 
jections fail to reach such a level of significance. Mean per- 
centage of mutual choices for all eight groups on all four criteria 
is 51.7%. The same for the last three groups, VI-VIII, amounts to 
59.2 whereas their mean proportion of mutual rejections is only 
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the same as the proportion of inter-sex rejections (Table 4 ). 
There is a slight increase in the mean percentage of boys' guesses 
going to girls (31.3% as compared to 29.8% of the actual rejections) 
and a slight decrease in the proportion of the girls' negative 
guesses going to boys (57.8% as compared to 59.5% of the actual 
rejections). Though these variations are too small to be signi- 
ficant, they may nevertheless be suggestive of some degree of 
awareness on the part of the subjects. 
The interpretation of these findings is far from simple. It 
should be realized that the proportion of inter-sex rejections, 
although very high, does not depart significantly from chance ex- 
pectancy in either direction. In other words, the sociometric 
structure revealed by the negative aspects of our criteria could. 
equally easily be obtained by a random distribution of rejections. 
This suspicion is further supported by a comparison of the amount 
of mutual choices and rejections as summarized in Tables 7 and 8. 
C. MUTUALITY OF CHOICES AND REJECTIONS 
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s N. E. S All statements regarding the statistical significance 
of the sociometric statistics in the following pages 
are based on the chance model prepared by Tagiuri, 
Bruner & Kogan, 1955, and the nomograph derived from 
it, For a fuller description of this, see Pp. 201 -205- 
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Criteria s' 1'2314 ! Mean 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 































V 43 39 31.8 34.4 37.5 39 34 45 38 
vi 64.4 40 54 40.5 59.5 37 47 24.7 46 
VII 71.4 60 63.7 53.4 66.7 44.9 63 59 60.3 
viel 65 85 61.7 86 52.7 74 68.4 77.9 71.35 
MEAN : 55 53.6 46 50 53.2 50.7 52.8 52.4 51.7. 
I 
Table 71 Pe*oentages of Mutual Choices on the first four Criteria, 
I- IVY for the whole sample. 
Criteria :S 1 1 2 t 3 + 4 'Mean 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Groups: VI 27,3 15.5 36.7 12 36.2 3.42 30 3.5 20.6 
VII 43.5 6.8 29 8.9 42.6 7.8 28.6 9 22 
VIII 35.6 21.6 18 22 2993 22.9 22.6 8.7 22.6 
MST : 35.4 14.6 28 14.3 36.4 11.4 27 7.1 21.7 
w 
Table 8: Per Cents of Mutual Rej"otions on Criteria I- IV for 
Groups VI - VIII. 
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21.7%. There is no difference between boys and girls in terms of 
the mean percentage of mutual choices, both being 51.7%. But boys' 
mean percentage of mutual rejections, 31.7%, is significantly lar- 
ger than the girls', 11.8%. One reason for this difference in the 
amount of mutual rejections may be looked for in girls' tendency to 
afford a disproportionate amount of their rejections to boys which, 
along with the boys' tendency to reject more of their own sex than 
the opposite sex, results in their not being reciprocated. The 
immediate implication of this observation is that the subjects of 
this study cannot be said to have the same degree of mutual aware- 
ness of each others' negative feelings as they have of each others' 
positive attractions. The consequences of this for the accuracy 
of sociomettric perception will be further discussed in the next 
chapter. 
By far the largest proportion of reciprocal choices is pro- 
duced by the criterion of friendship, the grand mean of which is 
60% (of. Table 
9). 
D. OICERALITY OF CHOICE STATUS OVER DIFFERENT CRITERIA 
The consistency of sociometric status over different cri- 
teria of choice and/or rejection has often been used as an index 
of the reliability of the sociometric test (Mouton, b'ruchter & 
Blake, 1956a). In our study this aspect is even more cogent be- 
cause of its probable impact on the generality of the sociometric 
- ißt - 
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Criteria s Friendship Similarity Leadership Popularity Unpopularity 
Groupstl Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
I 61.3 69.5 38.8 45.6 27.7 15.3 41.8 16.6 6 - 
II 56.2 73.6 57.8 72.6 25 26.4 25 5.7 - - 
III 50 67.7 56 45.7 20 1101 16.6 9.4 - - 
IV 46.7 56.6 35 46 22.7 28.2 19.1 1297 - - 
v 31.8 62.3 16.2 545 10.4 31.1 20.9 21,7 - - 
vi 66.7 47.3 -- 14 29.6 19 13.5 8.9 11.1 
vii 76.3 50 -- 42 3303 34 25 11.7 17.8 
VIII 71.4 76 -- 50 70 68.9 28 35.7 8 
Mean = 57.5 62.3 40.8 53 26.5 30.6 30.7 16.6 18.7 13.3 
60 47 28.5 23,6 16 
w 
Tab1e., 9 S Per Cents of Mutual Choices on the Criteria of Friendship, 
Similarity, Leadership., Popularity and Unpopularity. 
r 
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perception as such. This generality has been investigated from 
two different angles: generality in terms of the total number of 
choices received and generality in terms of the different choosers. 
The first can be expressed by running correlation coefficients 
among the number of choices received by an individual on different 
criteria of choice. The second can be shown by calculating the 
proportion of different choosers on each criterion. 
Below are the Phi coefficients of correlation between the 
four choice statuses as attained by the subjects of this study. 
With an Na 259, all these correlations are significant at . 01 
Choice Status on Criteria: I II III IV 
Choice I- "485 "531 "541 (. 69) ("74) (. 75) 
Status II 452 ( ) (. 69) 
on III - . 566 ("78) 
Criteria: IV - 
level and much beyond. As is well known, Phi is always an under- 
estimation of Pearson's r and so the relatively small correlations 
obtained should not be taken '. lightly. As an indication of the 
real sizes of these correlations, tetraohoric equivalent of each 
Phi is given in parenthesis below it. Tetrachoric r is usually an 
over-estimation of the product moment r and thus the real values 
of these correlations must be taken to be somewhere between the 
two values obtained. 
As is seen from the above table, choice status enjoys a high 
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degree of generality over different criteria. The highest degree 
of correlation is found between criterion III (to spend one's free 
time with) and criterion IV (to like most), and the lowest amount 
of correlation is between criterion II (to work with in a maths 
class) and criterion III. It seems that the more task-oriented 
and sociotelic a criterion the smaller the overlapping between it 
and other criteria. This is well in accord with the common-sense 
expectation. 
The same degree of consistency is observed in the case of 
the rejection statuses of the last three groups over the four 
different criteria. The mean Phi correlations for the three 
Rejection Status on Criteria: I II III IV 
Rejection I- . 65 . 71 . 
61 
Status II - . 64 "59 
on III - . 62 
Criteria: IV - 
groups are shown above. Compared against the correlations be- 
tween the choice statuses of the whole sample these values of phi 
seem to be larger. But this is apparently due to the relatively 
low correlations produced by some of the first five groups for 
which rejection scores are not available. The mean phi correla- 
tions between the four choice statuses of the last three groups 
are presented below. As it appears, if anything, choice statuses 
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of these groups show more consistency than their rejection sta- 
tuses. The differences, however, are too slight and inconsistent 
to be of any particular significance. 
Criteria: I II III IV 
I- . 71 . 70 . 68 
II - . 58 . 76 Criteria: 
III - . 67 
IV - 
L an Phi Correlations between the Choice statuses of the last 
three groups on criteria I-IV. 
E. TEE CONGRUENCE BETWEEN CHOICES AND GUESSES 
There appears to be a strong tendency among our subjects to 
guess those others as choosing them whom they have chosen them- 
selves. The tendency has been observed by others as well. 
Tagiuri, Blake & Bruner (1953) have called the phenomenon percep- 
tual congruency. The tendency seems to be quite spontaneous and 
conscious. Indeed one of the children in this study protested 
that there was no need to ask them to guess those who might have 
chosen them because they would guess the same people as they had 
chosen themselves. 
IV 
Tab1e, 5 summarizes the percentage of congruent guesses for 
the eight groups of this study. As it appears, the percentages 
of congruent guesses vary all the way from 51% (boys of group V 
- 88t - 
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Criteria of 
Choice :11121314 'Mean 
-Boys Girls-Boys Girls Boys Girls" Boys Girls" 
Groups I1 77 76 79 79 85 82 73 80 78.75 
II 84 72 89 72 86 84 89 80 82,25 
III 80 56 75 61 82 73 79 74 71.5 
IV 72 77 64 73 84 70 88 75 74.75 
v 75 61 51 62 85 69 71 59 65.75 
VI 73 63 70 67 81 74 76 72 71.75 
VII 95 80 86 75 97 65 94 81 85.50 
VIII 71 88 78 98 85 94 87 82 84.75 
MEAN 78 72 74 73 86 76 82 75 76087 
iv Tab1eý5 s Percents of Congruent Guesses on the four criteria of 
Choice, for Groups I- VIII. 
Criteria of 
Rejection: t1"2314 'Mean 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Groups: VI 48 50 52 59 50 53 66 37 51,75 
VII 74 51 59 62 79 69 80 72 68.25 
VIII 63 58 69 62 78 65 72 42 64.25 
MEAN : 62 53 60 61 69 62 73 50 61.41 
IV 
; ableý6 s Peroentagea of Congruent Guessew on the four Criteria of 
Rejection, for Groups VI " VIII. 
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on criterion II) to 98% (girls of group VIII on criterion II). 
The grand mean of all eight groups on all four criteria of choice 
is 77%. In other words, of every four guesses made over three 
guesses are afforded those who have been chosen by the subject. 
Boys tend to be more congruent than girls, their mean percentages 
being 80% and 74% respectively. Out of 32 cases, boys fare bet- 
ter than girls in 25 cases and girls fare higher than boys only 
in 7 cases. There is also some tendency for the more psychetelic 
criteria to produce higher proportions of congruent guesses. In 
this respect, criterion III, to spend one's free time with, comes 
first; then comes criterion IV, to like most, followed by crite- 
rion I, to werk with in an English class, and last comes criterion 
II, to work with in a Maths class. 
Coiling to the proportion of congruency in guessing others' 
negative responses, Table 
IV6 
, we find the amount of congruency 
varying all the way from 37% (girls of group VI on criterion IV) 
to 80 (boys of group VII on criterion IV), the grand average for 
boys and girls over all criteria being 610%. This is significant- 
ly smaller than the proportion of congruent guesses on the crite- 
ria of choice. Almost in every case, the proportion of congruent 
guesses of rejection is 20% less than the proportion of the con- 
gruent guesses of choice. Here again, the boys average somewhat 
higher than the girls, 65.7% as compared to 56.7%. The tendency 
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for the proportion of congruency to decrease from more psyche- 
telic to sociotelio criteria is also true of the guesses of one's 
rejection status. The only exception is that here the criterion 
of working together in a maths class produced more congruent 
guesses than the criterion of working together in an English class. 
The main reason for the difference in the proportion of con- 
gruency between the positive and negative guesses and choices 
seems to ie in the fact that the subjects tend to attribute more 
rejections to the highly chosen individuals - whose rejection 
status is low - than to the highly rejected ones. In other 
words, our subjects appear to expect more rejections from the 
over-chosen members of their groups than the under-chosen ones. 
This is no doubt partly due to their realistic awareness of the 
situation and partly due to their self-enhancing perceptual de- 
fences. In any case, the tendency is bound to prejudice the 
accuracy of their perception. This will be dealt with in zi.: 
laxer section, 
F. SOCIOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF LEADERSHIP AND POPULARITY 
In our description of the measures used to gauge the dimen- 
sions of leadership and popularity, we presented some evidence 
bearing on the argument that these two dimensions are different 
from the social status as measured by an ordinary sociometric 
question. The discussion here is hoped to highlight their 
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differences in terms of the sociometric properties described 
above, that is the proportion of inter-sex choices and mutuality. 
TabletYlO shows the percentage of inter-sex choices on the 
criteria of leadership, popularity, friendship and similarity. ,A 
comparison of this table with table 
s1 
reveals that while the per- 
centage of inter-sex exchanges on the criteria of friendship and 
similarity are smaller than those on criteria I-IV, the proportion 
of inter-sex choices on the criteria of leadership and popularity, 
17.7% and 21.6% respectively, are much higher than those on cri- 
teria I to IV. On both these criteria, girls have chosen more 
boys than boys have chosen girls. This is in contrast to the 
criteria of friendship and similarity where boys have chosen more 
girls than girls have chosen boys. Interestingly enough, girls 
have also chosen more boys (34%) than boys have chosen girls (25%) 
on the criterion of "least popular". Nevertheless, this percen- 
tage is much less than - just above half - the average proportion 
of girls' negative choices going to boys on the criteria I-IV (i. e. 
W 
59.5%, Table3 ). These observations are suggestive that choices 
on the criteria of leadership, most popular and least popular, are 
not made on the same emotional grounds or assumed characteristics 
as those made on the first four criteria as well as the criteria 
of friendship and similarity. 
Regarding the proportion of mutual choices, the criteria of 
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Criteria S Friendship Similarity Leadership Popularity Unpopularity 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
GROUPS: 1 2.3 5 8.3 7 11.1 36 6.9 45 -- 
II 10.4 6.9 8.8 2.4 18.3 12.6 20.8 30 -- 
III 906.5 1.4 25 34.7 27 25 
Iv 6.7 6.2 0 6.1 18.2 18.8 25.5 36.6 
V 11.4 3.2 5.4 5.4 12.5 22.9 13.9 26.7 
vi 3.6 3.9 - as 1707 1997 2091 20.1 11.9 33.3 
vii 00- - 8.8 15 3.8 17.8 37 34.8 
VIII 12.5 4- - 6.9 2 6.6 20 26.8 344 
MEAN =73.7 5.8 4.5 14.8 20.6 15.6 27.6 25.2 34 
5.33 4.5 17.7 21.6 29,6 
IV Table10 s Per Cents of Inter-Sex Choices Exchanged on the Criteria 
of Leadership, Popularity, Unpopularity, Friendship and 
Similarity. 
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leadership and popularity produce much less mutuality than any of 
the other criteria, I-IV, friendship or similarity The mean per- 
centage of reciprocal choices on the criteria of leadership, most 
popular and least popular being 28.5%, 23.6% and 16% respectively, 
they are significantly smaller than the smallest percentage of re- 
ciprocity produced by the criterion of similarity (47ö). Even 
the proportion of mutuality on the criterion "least popular" is 
smaller than its equivalents on the negative versions of criteria 
I-IV. These findings seem to support the above conclusion that 
our subjects really did differentiate between their choices on 
the ordinary sociometric criteria and the criteria of leadership 
and popularity, and that the simple method employed in this study 
to measure these two aspects of group structure is justified. 
iV 
s See Table 9. 
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2. ACCURACY OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It will be remembered from the tiii d chapter that our first 
measure of social perception proper was the amount of accuracy in 
predicting one's standing in the hierarchy of one's group as de- 
fined by the number of choices and (rejections) afforded one by 
other members of the group. A subject's accuracy score was de- 
termined by the number of people correctly guessed by him as 
choosing or rejecting him on a given criterion. This score was 
simply, calculated by comparing a person's guesses with the actual 
choices he received and giving one mark for each correct guess. 
As the number of guesses allowed was fixed at 4 (for the 
five groups of the first study) or 5 (for the three groups of the 
second study) the accuracy score could vary only from zero to 
four or five. As a consequence of this restriction, the accuracy 
score of an individual could not keep pace with his actual choice 
(or rejection', ' score. While the former could move only between 
o and d (the number of guesses allowed), the latter could - po- 
tentially at least - take any value from 0 to N-1, that is, the 
number of the group less one. Thus, those who had been chosen 
by many people were not required to guess all their choosers and 
could not score more than those who had been chosen only by 4 or 
5 people. On the other hand, as a person's accuracy was left at 
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the mercy of other people's choices, those who were unfortunate 
enough not to be chosen by anybody could score only zero. Hence 
the distribution curve of the accuracy scores was bound to be 
rectilinear only to a certain point determined by the size of d, 
the number of choices and guesses allowed on each criterion. As 
the number of choices received departed from zero, the actual 
feasibility of accuracy increased, reaching its maximum when the 
number of choices received reached d. A person who had received 
no choices could have no accurate guesses, hence his accuracy 
score would be zero; a person who received one choice could make 
one and only one accurate guess out of his four or five guesses 
and an individual who gained two choices was able to make but two 
accurate guesses and so on up to the point where the number of 
choices received equalled the number of guesses allowed. From 
this point on, the number of accurate guesses possible was the 
same for all subject: concerned, whether they obtained d, d+1, 
d+2 or ... 
((N - 1) .,, the 
largest amount of choice possible. 
It should be noted that we are discussing the physical possibility 
or the feasibility of the occurrence of various values of accu- 
racy and not their probability of occurrence. This is quite a 
different matter which will be considered in connection with the 
relationship between choice status and accuracy. FigureWigives 
a clear view of the ceiling of possibility imposed. upon accuracy 
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score by the number of choices received and guesses allowed. 







Another consequence of this arbitrarily fixed number of 
forced guesses allowed was that it made no allowance for those 
individuals who, being aware of their unhappy position in the 
group, would venture no guesses. Indeed, there were quite a 
few people of this type among our groups who, despite our in- 
structions, refused to mare any guesses. We were gell aware 
of these restrictions in the design of our questionnaire. 
nevertheless, a number of considerations forced us to adopt it 
in spite of all these foreseeable limitations. 
In the first place, we, like many other people, but contrary 
to Moreno's instructions, had limited the number of choices on 
SOCIOMETRIC CHOICE STATUS N-1 
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each criterion so as to make the handling of the results statis- 
tically manageable. There is some evidence that an unlimited 
number of choices not only does not increase the total amount of 
information obtained but tends, on average, to produce somewhat 
less than that gained by such a generous fixed - and forced - 
number of choices as allowed in this study (Evans, 1962). More- 
over, as the perceptual or guessing aspect of our study seemed 
even remoter and less motivating than the ordinary choosing pro- 
cess, it was thought that leaving the number of guesses unfixed 
would greatly reduce the amount of information to be obtained. 
That this suspicion was not unfounded is borne out by our results: 
in almost every case the number of guesses made is less than the 
number of choices exchanged. This is even truer in the case of 
guessing negative feelings or rejections. Needless to say all 
these shortcomings and limitations in measuring accuracy of per- 
ception applied equally to the perception of negative feelings or 
rejections. Throughout this chapter the term 'choice' will be 
used to imply both positive choice and rejection. In the same 
manner, we shall speak of positive and negative guesses and accu- 
racies. By positive guesses we shall mean the guesses concern- 
ing one's choice status and by negative guesses we shall refer to 
the guesses concerning one's rejection status in his group. BY 
positive and negative accuracies we shall imply the degree of 
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correspondence between these two types of guesses and their 
choice counterparts respectively. 
B. ACCURACY IN GUESSING OTHERS' POSITIVE RESPONSES 
1V 
Table. 11 summarizes the percentage of accurate guesses made 
out of the total number of guesses attempted for each of our 
groups on the four criteria of choice. These criteria were: 
I. To work with in a group in an English class. 
II. To work with in a group in a Mathematics class. 
III. To spend one's free time with, and 
IV. To like most. 
Under each criterion, the percentages of accuracy for boys and 
girls are given separately. It will be remembered that the 
negative aspects of these criteria were answered by only three 
of our groups. The percentages of accuracy on these negative 
lV 
capects are given in Table 2. 
A perusal of Table 11 will reveal that there is a good deal 
of variation in the percentage of accuracy over criteria and from 
group to group. For the eight groups together, the mean value 
of accuracy in guessing one's choice status over four different 
criteria is found to be 57.3% with a standard deviation of 
8.87%. 
The mean percentages for individual groups range all the way from 
45.5% (group V) to 72.7% (group VIII). The first question to be 
considered here is whether the observed percentage of accuracy 
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CRITERIA sII II I III I IV I MEAN 
SEX BOYS GIRLS BOYS GIRLS BOYS GIRLS BOYS GIRLS 
GROUP :I 73 48 51.5 49 54.5 58 51.5 59 55.6 
iI 61 62.5 61 67 68 64 66 69.5 65 
III 42.5 50 40 49 52 48 54.5 56 49 
IV 54 50 42. 47 59.5 52 68 55 53.4 
V 43 47 28 51 42.5 55 50 47.5 45.5 
VI 59 44 56 47 60 48.5 60 39.5 52 
VII 76.5 61 73 57 68 56.5 70 64 66 
VIII 53 84 64 91 63 83 70 74 73 
MEAN = 58 56 52 57 58.5 58 61 58 57 
TABLESIVU : Percentages of accurate guesses of choices on the 
four criteria of choice for the boys and girls of 
of the eight groups separately. 
CRITERIA :I' II III ' IV MEAN 
SEX BOYS GIRLS BOYS GIRLS BOYS GIRLS BOYS GIRLS 
GROUPS VI 27 21 32o5 13 30 12 83 4 21 
VII 46 15 34 15 43 9 2505 9 244,5 
VIII 34 30 29 24 29 245 24 30 29 
LEAN s 35 22 32 17 34 15 27 14 25 
TABLE W12 : Percentages of accurate guesses on the four criteria 
of rejedtion for the boys and girls of groups VI VIII. 
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can be expected to result from mere chance guessing or whether it 
denotes a real ability significantly beyond chance expectancy. 
This question was first raised in connection with the socio- 
metric test itself. Were the responses made on a sociometric 
test given off-hand and haphazaxdly and did the structure revealed 
signify nothing but the random occurrence of certain accidental 
patterns, or was it really indicative of a psychologically mean- 
ingful operation? It was to answer this question that Moreno & 
Jennings (1938) carried out their experimental study on the stat- 
istics of social configurations. In this study they matched 
their findings on a sociometric test against the chance expectan- 
cies derived from a Monte Carlo model as well as a mathematical 
probability model provided by Lazarsfeld. Bronfenbranner's 
(1944-1945) study was another attempt to furnish the sociometric 
technique with a probabilistic frame of reference with mathe- 
matically defined formulae for any and every possible form of 
sociometric structure. Since the appearance of Tagiuri's work 
on relational analysis in 1952, the need for another probabilis- 
tic model capable of providing the various chance expectancies of 
diadic interaction situations has risen again. Earlier workers 
in this field had recourse to empirical roulette-type chance 
models (e. g. Tagiuri, 1952). In 1955, Tagiuri, Bruner and Kogan 
worked out a special chance model with a simple nomograph which 
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is designed to provide the chance expectancy of any dyadic re- 
lationship. 
To the designers of this model, a d4ad is the "form of re- 
lationship that exists between a pair of group members in terms 
of whether they like each other and perceive each other as liking 
in return". The chance model chosen corresponds to the case 
where the subjects are regarded as automatic robots allowing 
their selections at random. The main underlying assumptions are 
that the different choices and guesses made by any individual are 
independent-of each other; that the choices and guesses of any 
individual are independent of those made by any other individual; 
and that no subject may choose or guess the same person more than 
once. If the choices and guesses making up a dyad be thought of 
as bonds, it can be seen that djtads can have 0,1,2,3 or 4 such 
bonds joining their members. The general formula employed to 
generate the chance expectancy of a dyad form when choices and 
guesses are both fixed to a value d is: 
Ea IS Id - 1)(P(Ci)P(Gi)P(Cj)P(Gj)) where 
2 
N= the number of subjects in the group; 
P(Ci) a the probability of subject i (Si) choosing or omitting 
subject j 5j), these probabilities being d/(N - 1) and 
N-1- d/(N - 1) respectively; 
P(Gi) a the probability of Si guessing or not guessing Sj, these 
probabilities being d/N -1 and N-1- d/T- l; 
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P(Cj) and P(Gj) are the probabilities of Sj choosing or omitting 
and guessing or not guessing Si, these probabilities being 
d/N-1 and N- 1- d%N- 1 respectively. 
The variance of E is : VE = E1 -A `N T1-1) 
In the case in v'hich choices and guesses are both fixed to a 
value d. there can be only five different values of E, the chance 
expectancy of the diad, and these values are a function of the 
number of bonds in the dyad which can range only from 0 to 4. It 
is apparent from the formula of E that the expected frequency of 
a certain dial with a given number of bonds is a function of d 
and N, that is the number of choices and guesses allowed and the 
number of subjects in the group. Indeed, under the conditions 
specified above, it is the ratio of d to N-1 that entirely de- 
termines the chance of obtaining dads with 0,1,2,3, and 4 
bonds. This property of E as a function of 
d1 
when the num- 
ber of bonds is specified permits the construction of a nomograph 
that can be applied to any value of d/N -1 and thus obviates the 
necessity of using the above formula for finding E. This nomo- 
graph consists of five curves, corresponding to the five classes 
of dyads with 0,1,2,3, and 4 bonds. The ordinate of the no- 
mograph gives the percentages of all possible dyadic relations 
corresponding to the ratio d/fT- 1 represented on the abscissa. 
To obtain the chance expectancies of any single gad one must 
first decide how many bonds the dyad has. The percentage value 
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of this number of bonds can be read from its appropriate curve in 
the nomograph, entering the graph at the d/N -1 point. This 
value must be divided bye 1,2, "3k, orr 6 "depending upon the number 
of bonds and the symmetricality or asymmetricality of the djrad. 
In terms of diadic relations - as defined above - accuracy 
of guessing is achieved in the following cases: 
1. When A chooses B and B guesses A. 
2. When B chooses A and A guesses B. 
3. When A chooses and guesses B and B guesses A. 
4. When B chooses and guesses A and A guesses B. 
5. When A chooses and guesses B and B chooses A. 
6. 'When B chooses and guesses A and A chooses B. 
7. When A and B both choose and guess each other. 
Thus the amount of accurate guessing expected on chance grounds 
alone equals the sum of the chance expectancies of the occurrence 
of these 2,3, and 4"bond relations in a group. However, as 
there are four other types of tiro-bond relations which do not re- 
sult in accuracy, the expectancies of two-bond relations must be 
multiplied in 2/6 to give the exact value of accuracy ensuing 
from two-bond relations. 
For our first five groups the size of N ranged from 32 to 35 
and d, the number of choices and guesses allowed, was 4. The 
values of d/N -1 were 4/32 -1 - . 129,4/32 -1 a . 129,4/35 -1 
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. 118,4/34_i - . 121 and 4/35- 1c . 118 for groups I, II, III, 
IV and V respectively. Entering the nomograph with . 129 - the 
highest value of d/'N -1 in our study - we find the percentage of 
all two-bond relations (out of N(N -1)/2 possible dyadic relations) 
to be about 8%. Since there are six types of two-bond djtads and 
only two of them (numbers 1 and 2 above) lead to accurate gues- 
sing this percentage must be multiplied by 2/6 to give the chance 
expectancy of the tiro-bond dads resulting in accuracy. This 
leaves us with about 3%. To this we must add about 2% of accu- 
racy expected on the basis of three-bond relations. The chance 
expectancy of a four-bond relation is almost nil for our value of 
d/N -1. Thus for our largest value of d/N -1 when da4 the 
chance expectancy of accuracy generating dyadic relations does 
not exceed five per cent of the value of N(N -1)/2, the number of 
all djmdic relations. As the percentages of accurate guesses in 
w 
Table,, II are based on the number of guesses made and not on the 
value of N(N -1)/2, this value of E must be converted into a per- 
centage of N(d) - the total number of guesses possible - to make 
it comparable to the values of our table. This done, it appears 
that only 25 out of the whole 128 possible guesses (- 32 a 4) by 
the subjects of groups I and II can be expected by chance to enter 
into djradic relations resulting in accurate guessing. This 
amounts to just under 20% of their guesses and falls significantly 
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(at 
. 01 level and much beyond) short of our lowest observed per- 
centage (48%) for these two groups. In all other cases but one 
(group V, criterion II, boys) our observed percentages are at 
least twice that expected on pure chance basis and are highly 
significant. The chance expectancy of this single case is found 
to be 17% and although our observed value (28%) is 11% greater, 
the X2 (= 3.4) does not reach the . 05 level of significance and 
falls somewhere between . 10. and . 05. But the combined percen- 
tagen of accuracy for boys and girls of the group on this crite- 
rion (= 41%) is highly significant (P< . 01) 
In the case of the last three groups (i. e. groups VI, VII 
and VIII), where five choices and guesses were allowed, the ratio 
d/N -1 was 5/37 -1 = . 14,5/30 -1- . 17 and 5/25 -1= . 21 respec- 
tively. The chance expectancies of accurate guesses for these 
values of d/N -1 are found to be 17%, 18%'a and 19% respectively. 
%V 
Going back to Table ,, 11, we 
find that in all three groups observed, 
percentages of accuracy exceed twice their expected values. Even 
the smallest percentages, that is 39.5 of group VI girls on cri- 
terion IV, is larger than its chance expectancy at beyond . 01 
level (%2 larger than 20). The mean accuracy for these three 
groups was 63.3%. 
There thus remains no doubt that our eight groups have made 
their guesses significantly better than that might have been 
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expected on pure chance basis. Out of 64 cases of guessing one's 
positive choice status in the group, 63 cases differ from their 
chance expectancies at . 01 level and beyond and only one case 
falls slightly short of . 05 level. In general an average of 
five or six of every ten guesses are correct. This is more sig- 
nificant in view of the difficulties besetting the outcome of 
guessing. As was stated above, the accuracy of an individual 
depends on the responses of other individuals. If some of these 
others happen to be absent or for one reason or another abstain 
from choosing, the accuracy of the other individuals will suffer. 
For example, the low percentage of accuracy observed in group V 
can be accounted for by the simple fact that about one fifth of 
the members of this group were absent on the day of testing. 
There is also the possibility that some subjects may wilfully p]Ay 
tricks with their choices and so vitiate the predictions of others. 
Table. 11 gives the percentage of accuracy attained by each 
group on each criterion and for boys and girls separately. The 
highest percentage of accuracy (i. e. 91.3%) is achieved by the 
girls of group VIII on the criterion of working together in a 
group in 4 Maths class. The lowest percentage of accuracy 
(28.2%) is that of boys of group V on the same criterion as above. 
These two extremes of accuracy suffice to indicate the range 
within which the accuracy scores varied.. The variance was even 
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greater for individual cases where the amount of accuracy ranged 
all the way from zero (no accurate guessing) to 4 or 5- one 
hundred per cent accuracy. 
Part of the increased accuracy of the last three groups (VI, 
VII, and VIII) is due to the increased probability of accuracy 
contingent upon the increased value of d. But the amount of in- 
crease in their average percentage of accuracy is much greater 
than what might be expected by chance alone. Moreover, no in- 
crease is seen in the case of group VI, the mean percentage of 
accuracy for which (51.8%) is even smaller than that of the ürst 
five groups (53.7%). The main reason for the increased accuracy 
of the last two groups (VII, VIII) must be sought in the socio- 
metric structure of these groups. 
C. ACCURACY IN GUESSING OTHERS' NEGATIVE RESPONSES 
Considering the predictions of ones rejection status in the 
group as determined by the other group members' negative respon- 
ses (TableI. 12;, we find the mean percentage of accuracy for the 
three groups VI - VIII to be 24.8%. This is less than half the 
mean percentage of accuracy attained in guessing one's choice 
status. Of twelve cases recorded in Table 12, only two cases of 
boys' predictions (group VII, criteria I and III) exceed their 
chance expectancies at . 01 level or beyond. The rest of these 
percentages fall short of . 05 level of significance. This is 
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well in line with the findings of other studies. Tagiuri (19581 
summarizing the findings of his studies, concludes: 
"In nearly every group, identification of those who choose us 
is more accurate than chance. For rejections, however, accuracy 
significantly exceeds expected values when data from all groups 
are combined, but one cannot count on the difference reaching 
significance in specific groups. " (P"325) 
This last conclusion does not agree with our findings. As 
is seen from Table 12, some of the boys' groups reach significant 
levels of accuracy, but the combined percentages of all groups - 
boys and girls - fall much below the level of significance. 
The failure of the perception of the negative feelings of 
others to correspond with the objective phenomenon presents a 
somewhat conflicting situation. In the first place one would 
expect that concern over rejection - or 'affiliative anxiety', as 
Tagiuri, Blake and Bruner (1953) have called it - would lead to 
accuracy in spotting others' negative feelings. From what we 
know of the operation of anxiety as a drive, we should expect a 
high degree of accurate guessing in the face of the negative res- 
ponses of others. If others' negative feelings toward ourselves 
are of any significance to us - and we have a good deal of evidence 
to believe that they are - the threatening situation presented by 
such negative feelings should make us more sensitive and responsive 
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to them and as such should enhance our degree and accuracy of 
awareness of such feelings on the part of our associates. Evi- 
dence from the general field of social perception - i. e., the 
social determination of perception - supports this expectation. 
For instance, Bruner (1950), reviewing the work done by himself 
and his collaborators, concludes that "... under the pressure of 
threatening stimuli, the organism shifts from defensive avoidance 
of stimuli and becomes vigilant and perceptually selective toward 
that which threatens". (Bruner, 1950, p. 122) 
The failure of our subjects to bear out this expectancy can 
be explained on several grounds. On the one hand, it can be as- 
sumed that one's underlying negative interpersonal feelings are 
too subtle and intricate to be observed as easily as the cues 
underlying positive interpersonal feelings. This assumption is 
lent support by the almost universal tendency in human societies 
to put a premium on the successful concealment of negative feel- 
ings in the interests of harmonious interpersonal relations. Be- 
cause of their disruptive effects on the peaceful course of socLal 
life and because of the danger of open conflict and aggression 
contingent upon them, negative feelings are generally discouraged 
by human sz)cieties and their expression usually entails one form 
or other of social censure. Throughout the process of sociali- 
ration, concealment of these socially undesirable feelings becomes 
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a virtue in itself aim highly rewarding ý both socially and per- 
sonally - to the individual. Hence the difficulty in discerning 
and predicting negative feelings. 
On the other hand, it is well in line with the known . facts 
of general psychology, that the perception of these negative as- 
pects of others' behaviour may be actively resisted ad/or distor- 
ted by the operation of the so-called "perceptual-defence" 
mechanism (Brown, 1961). If an individual finds it difficult to 
perceive a word which is contrary to his established values and 
gets around, it by unconsciously distorting his sense-data (Post- 
man, Bruner and UcGinnies, 1948), it is no wonder that he should 
use the same mechanism against the perception of such disturbing 
stimuli as the negative feelings of others towards himself. After 
all, one's value system is but one part of one's self-system. 
Obviously, the effect of this subjective tendency on the part of 
the perceiver can be greatly enhanced by the operation of the 
aforementioned tendency to conceal one's negative feelings on the 
part of the object of perception. The perceiver is further han- 
dicapped by the fact that it is usually personally disquieting and 
socially undesirable to attribute negative feelings to one's fel- 
low human creatures. "Thou shalt not impute negative feelings 
to thy fellow human beings", because this will reinforce your al- 
ready suspected negative feelings - and reactions - towards them 
and may result in open hostility and aggression. 
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These three factors together can account for the failure of 
most people to predict others' negative feelings accurately. 
Above and beyond these more obvious explanations, the fact should 
not be overlooked that negative feelings may not be as genuine 
and naturally human as positive affective feelings. If influen- 
ces like man's prolonged period of childhood and his relative 
weakness to withstand the hazards of wild life alone have made it 
imperative for him to throw his lot in with other people and, in 
due course, end up with an irresistibly strong "instinct of herd", 
or - in more modern jargon - an "affiliative need 
(n Affiliation)', 
(I. irray, 1938), there is no ground to believe that his social- 
biological development should have produced a comparable anti- 
social instinct of hate or isolation. Thus to put choice against 
rejection or affective feelings against negative feelings seems 
to be more of a linguistic confusion than a psychological reality. 
if I prefer to spend my weekend with friend A, it does not neces- 
sarily mean that I do not like friends B, C, D, etc., except in 
those rare cases when I may have h@, d a recent quarrel with them. 
The fact is that I do not like to spend my weekend alone (if only 
because the honourable sociometrist has asked me not to do so). 
1, Ty whole life and upbringing make me crave for the company of 
somebody, and friend A, because of some illusions on my part as to 
his potential capabilities as a weekend companion, tops my list of 
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desired companions. This being so, it is no wonder if I find 
myself at a loss when faced with the irresistible question "'Whom 
would you least like to spend your weekend with? " -a genuine 
case of Krech's (1951`, "measuring what is not there". If find- 
ing out my own response is so difficult than guessing other 
people's responses - and these towards my own long-cherished self 
- should prove doubly difficult. 
This quality of the negative choice-guess process gives their 
distribution an outstandingly distinctive character which can ac- 
count for the larger part of the observed lack of accuracy. Com- 
pared with the distribution of positive choices, the distribution 
of negative choice scores is marked by three distinctive charac- 
teristics; these are: 1) The percentages of inter-sex rejections 
are much higher than those of inter-sex choices; 
2) The percentages of mutual rejections 
are significantly less than those of mutual choices; 
and 3) The number of "isolates" and "under- 
rejected" - if the terminology of choices can be applied to re- 
jections - are much in excess of the number of under-chosen or 
isolates. This leads to a more skewed distribution curve and a 
much lower median. As a logical consequence of this situation, a 
small proportion of subjects receive the larger part of the total 
amount of negative choices exchanged and the rest who receive 
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much less than the number of guesses allowed (five in this study) 
are physically bound to be wrong in over half their guesses. On 
the other hand, the restriction placed on the number of guesses 
prevents the over-rejected members from making more guesses and 
thus contributing to the total amount of accuracy. But, it must 
be admitted, few of our over-rejected subjects make all their al- 
lotted guesses accurately. This lends further support to our 
above contention that negative choices are made more or less on a 
chance basis. This point is further supported by the fact that 
both the amount of inter-sex rejections and the amount of mutual 
rejections, although significantly different from their choice 
counterparts, do not deviate from their chance expectancies at 
any level of significance. Thus the failure of our subjects to 
predict others' negative responses accurately, can be as much 
blamed on their subjective and unconscious distortion of the 
reality as on the objective phenomenological characteristics of 
the field of negative feelings itself. 
D. SEX DIFFERENCES IN THE ACCURACY OF PERCEIVING ONE'S 
POSITIVE AND IJEGATIVE CHOICE STATUS 
Table 
vll 
shows some difference between the mean percentages 
of accuracy of girls and boys over individual criteria. But there 
appears to be no consistent trend and the mean percentages of the 
two sexes over all groups and all criteria are virtually the same 
(57.4% for boys and 57.3% for girls;. Taking into account only 
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the number of cases regardless of the size of difference, it is 
also found that out of the 32 cases, girls surpass boys in 16 
cases and boys surpass girls in 16 cases. Thus our study does 
not lend any support to women's proverbial superiority in social 
perception. 
In the case of perceiving others' negative responses, the 
girls' percentages of accuracy lag much behind those of the boys 
(Table 12). The combined mean percentages of accuracy for boys 
of the three groups is 32% whereas that of girls is only 17%. In 
all three groups and over all four criteria, the girls' percent- 
age of accurate guesses are smaller than those of the boys. This 
finding runs counter to the established view regarding girls' su- 
perior ability in perceiving others in general (Allport, 1937, 
1961) and in perceiving their sociometric status (Ausubel and 
Schiff, 1955)" A plausible explanation for this negative result 
seems to be provided by the amount of rejections exchanged betveen 
wY 
boys and girls (See Table, 32). As is seen in Table 
va, 
the per- 
centage of girls' rejections going to boys is over twice that of 
boys' rejections going to girls. In view of the close relation- 
ship between choosing-rejecting others and guessing them as choos- 
ing or rejecting oneself, the percentage of girls' negative 
guesses going to boys is also much larger than that of boys. The 
mean percentage of girls' rejections going to boys is 59.5% and 
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the mean percentage of boys' rejections going to girls is 29.8%. 
The perceptual equivalents of these values are 57.8% and 31.3% 
respectively. This means that over half the rejections of girls 
going to boys cannot be reciprocated and their corresponding 
guesses are physically bound to be wrong. Moreover, for reasons 
discussed earlier, the amount of mutual rejections does not ex- 
ceed its chance expectancy and thus puts a severe restriction on 
the degree of accuracy to be expected. This is more severe in the 
case of girls' mutual rejections which form only 12% of their to- 
tal rejections and fall much behind that of boys (31.7%). 
Some studies have found differences between boys and girls 
in predicting the responses of their own sexes and their opposite 
sexes (Ausubel and Schiff, 1955; Bronfenbrenner, Harding and 
Gallway, 1958). The very low amount of inter-sex choices and 
guesses and the more or less haphazard way in which inter-sex 
rejections and guesses of rejections are allocated have made our 
technique insensitive to such subtle differences as the sex of 
the perceived and the perceiver. Almost 98% of the accuracy in 
guessing one's choice status is accounted for by the same-sex 
choices and guesses. This is not surprising in view of the fact 
that the mean percentage of inter-sex choices was only 9.5% and 
that of inter-sex guesses just under 5%. Turning to the predic- 
tion of one's rejection status, it is found that an average of 
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about 35% of the accuracy is accounted for by the accuracy in 
predicting inter-sex rejections. Calculated for girls and boys 
separately., this value is found to be 48-5% (for girls) and 220 
iv (for boys). However, as Table1* indicates, this percentage 
varies greatly from one group to the other and in each group from 
one criterion to the next. These findings are more suggestive 
of the sociometric structure of the inter-sex rejections than any 
differential ability. 
E. INTER-CRITERION DIF'F'ERENCES IN ACCURACY 
IV %V 
As Tablesýll and^12 show, there is a good deal of variation 
in the percentage of accurate guessing over our four criteria of 
choice and rejection. To make these differences more apparent, 
we have summarized the mean percentages of the whole group over 
\V 
different criteria in Table^13. The table consists of three 
separate sections. The first section from the top represents 
the average percentages of accuracy in guessing one's choice sta- 
tus for the last three groups of our study and the bottom section 
gives the an percentage of accuracy of the last three groups in 
guessing their rejection status. The table indicates a tendency 
for the percentage of accuracy to increase from criterion II to 
criterion IV. This tendency is quite apparent and regular in 
the case of the first five groups. The more task-, oriented the 
criterion of choice, the smaller the percentage of accurate 
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FýYý= 55 45 55.5 53 53 
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sý I3 0 Ii 0 B ß B 0 
CROUP v2 15 13 5 33 0 0 14 0 10 
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guessings and vice versa. Thus, for the boys and girls of the 
whole study, the smallest percentage of accuracy (54.6%) is achie- 
ved on criterion II, "to work together in a mathematics class"; 
the next smallest percentage (56.8%) is on criterion I, "to work 
with in an English class"; the next smallest percentage (58-3%) 
is on criterion III, "to spend one's free time with", and the 
largest percentage of accuracy (59.5%) is achieved on criterion 
IV, "to like most". This pattern is also true of the boys and 
the combined boys and girls of the first five groups. The mean 
percentages of the girls of these groups on criterion I is smal- 
ler than their percentage of accuracy on criterion II but the re- 
maining two criteria follow the pattern. The agreement between 
boys and girls of the eight groups on this point is indicated by 
a Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (TI) of . 7. For the first 
five groups alone, the value of Vt is . 9. However, none of these 
two values of TN reach any significance level because of the small 
number of ranks involved (Siegel, 1956). The differences be- 
tween the percentages of accuracy on different criteria are also 
too small to be significant at any level. 
Turning to the percentages of accuracy in predicting one's 
I 
rejection status (Tablev12 and Table. 13, bottom section) we find 
the reverse of the above tendency. Here the amount of accuracy 
decreases from criterion I to IV. The trend is more regular and 
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prominent in the case of girls. The agreement between boys and 
girls is represented by a Kendal Coefficient of Concordance of 
. 915 which is insignificant because of the small number of ranks 
involved. Here again the amount of difference is too small to 
be significant. Nevertheless, the observed trend suggests that 
our subjects find it easier to predict their rejection status on 
the so-called socio-telic criteria than on psyche-telic criteria. 
As a tentative explanation for this contradictory trend, it 
may be stipulated that negative choices and guesses, being less 
genuine and less deep rooted, are more affected by task-relevant 
considerations, hence the observed tendency of the task-orientated 
criteria to produce more accurate predictions. Besides, it is 
possible that subjective processes which vitiate the outcome of 
guessing one's rejection status are more likely to operate in 
such general and ego-involving criteria as liking and disliking 
than in more specific and task-oriented criteria of working to- 
gether. On the other hand, the highly significant correlations 
found between one's choice status on various criteria (Mouton, 
Blake and Fruchter, 1956b) indicates that people tend to choose 
others far more for their general appeal than for such reasons as 
may be implied by the given criterion of choice 
(Riecken and 
Homans, 1954)" But when asked to guess those who may have chosen 
them they tend to pay more attention to the requirements of the 
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individual criteria of choice. This tendency is bound to lead 
to some degree of discrepancy between one's choices and guesses 
on such specific criteria and consequently result in lowered ao- 
curacy. But no such discrepancy should occur between one's 
choices and guesses on psychetelic criteria of a general affec- 
tive nature. 
F. TYPES OF ACCURACY 
In the last caection, it was demonstrated that a very close 
relationship existed between the processes of choosing-rejecting 
and their perceptual counterparts. Most of the guesses went to 
the same people whom the subject had chosen or rejected on the 
given criteria. Following Tagiuri, Blake and Bruner (1953), we 
called this tendency perceptual affective congruency or simply 
congruency. There it was also suggested that congruency, along 
with the other general tendency of reciprocal choice or rejection, 
accounted for the lion's share of our observed accuracy. Indeed, 
whenever there is mutuality of choice or rejection and congruency, 
accuracy is inevitable. If subject A chooses subject B and gues- 
ses that he will in turn be chosen by subject B, and subject B in 
fact chooses him, subject A's guess cannot be but accurate. 
Table 1.5 presents the percentage of congruent and non- 
congruent accurate guesses for our eight groups. The accuracies 
of negative guesses (rejections) are given separately in the bottom 
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Criteria 
of Choice 
I III I IV 
Type of 
Accuracy Con . Noncon. Co ru. ng Nonoon. Con 8ru" Noncom. Cosigru. Noncon. - 
Sex B G B G B G B G B G B G B G B G 
OUP: I 86 96 14 3 76 86 23 14 94 97 5 3 76 90 3 10 ' 
II 93 82 7 18 93 83 11 7 17 90 87 10 13 96' 86 3 14 
III 90 77 10 22 75 61 25 39 87 89 13 12 87 84 12 16 
IV 84 91 16 8 75 82 25 18 91 87 9 13 96 86 4 14 
V 89 76 10 24 64 57 36 43 88 72 12 28 79 75 21 25 
VI 92 77 8 23 78 68 21 31 92 67 8 33 79 61 20 39 
VII 96 93 4 6 89 76 11 24 97 61 2 38 97 93 2 7 
VIII 93 100 7 0 92 100 8 0 82 100 18 0 
195 
94 5 6 
SumYIIII%8 90 87 9 13 80 77 20 23 90 82 10 18 88 81 12 19 
VffSCTIONS 
VI 60 40 40 60 60 56 40 44 77 14 22 86 76 0 24 100 
VII 81 57 19 43 53 57 47 43 85 100 15 0 92 75 8 25 
VIII 65 67 35 33 82 67 18 33 88 67 12 33 
162 
27 38 73 
OF 
ý-"VT-VTTT 
69 54 31 45 65 60 35 40 83 60 16 40 76 34 23 66 
WY 
TABLE 15= PER CENT OF CONGRUENT AND NONCONGRUENT ACCURATE GUESSES ON 
DIFFERENT CRITERIA OF CHOICE AND REJECTION. 
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part of the table. A perusal of this table reveals that a very 
large proportion of observed accuracy in guessing one's choice 
status is accompanied by congruency. This proportion varies all 
the way from 100% (group VIII girls on criteria I, II and III) to 
57.14% (group V girls on criterion II). The mean congruent accu- 
racy over all groups and criteria is found to be 87.2% for boys 
and 80.8% for girls. Percentages of non-congruent accurate 
guesses are seen to vary from 0 to 42.8% with a mean of 12.7% for 
boys and 19.1% for girls. Thus there seems to be a slight ten- 
dency for boys to achieve more congruent accuracies than girls. 
But the difference between the two sexes is not large enough to 
be significant at any accepted level. 
Turning to the accuracy in guessing one's rejection status, 
it is found that the percentage of congruent accuracy varies all 
the way from 100% (group VII girls on criterion III) to zero per 
cent (group VI girls on criterion IV). The mean of the boys' 
congruent accuracies is 73.4% and that of the girls is 52% and 
the difference is significant at above . 05 level. The same is 
true of the difference between the boys' mean percentage of non- 
congruent accuracies (26.5%) and the girls' mean percentage of 
non-congruent accuracies (48%). In both cases of positive and 
negative accuracies, girls' percentages of congruent and non- 
congruent accuracies reflect a much larger variance than those 
of boys. 
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The division of accuracy into two types of congruent and 
non-congruent is proposed to further illuminate the interaction 
between the different processes involved and should not be taken 
very seriously. There is no reason to believe that the two 
kinds of accuracy differ from each other in any meaningful respect. 
In terms of the diadic analysis discussed in connection with our 
chance-expectancy model, congruent accuracy is a product of three 
and four bond diadic relations whereas non-congruent accuracy can 
result only of asymmetrical two-bond relations. The over-chance 
occurrence of congruent accuracy in our study is another sign that 
our subjects did really differ from robots in allocating their 
choices and guesses. The reverse is true of the accuracy in 
guessing one's rejection status where neither the proportion of 
congruent guesses nor the percentage of accurate guesses reach a 
significant level. That congruency by itself does not lead to 
accuracy is well demonstrated by the fact that in every case the 
number of congruent guesses is larger than the number of accurate 
congruency. Thus congruency As a perceptual tendency or set con- 
tributes both to accuracy and non-accuracy of perception. The 
decisive factor seems to lie in the dynamic structure of the so- 
ciometric situation in which choosing and guessing are carried 
out. Both processes, however, are heavily influenced by the 
choosers' expectations, projections and other autistic processes. 
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G. GENERALITY OF ACCURACY OVER DIFFERENT CRITERIA 
Do people exhibit the same degree of accuracy in predicting 
their choice and rejection status regardless of the criterion of 
choice or rejection employed? To answer this question phi co- 
efficients of correlation were calculated between the accuracy 
scores of each individual on the four criteria of choice and re- 
jection. These coefficients are summarized in Table 
vl6. 
It is 
seen there that about 30 of the 48 correlation coefficients be- 
tween the four accuracy scores of our eight groups are significant 
at . 01 level and above; of the remaining 18 coefficients, 11 are 
significant between . 05 and . 01 and only 7 fail to reach an ac- 
cepted level of significance. On the other hand, out of the 18 
coefficients of correlation between the accuracy scores of our 
last three groups in predicting their rejection status, only 4 
are significant at . 01 level and 4 others at . 05 level. Thus, 
over 85% of our observed correlations between positive accuracy 
scores are significant at . 05 level and much beyond, whereas only 
about 44% of the negative accuracy scores show such significant 
correlations. The sizes of the correlations are also very con- 
siderable and suggestive of some difference between the two kinds 
of positive and negative accuracy scores. In the case of posi- 
tive accuracy scores, the median is above . 52, whereas the median 
of negative accuracy correlations falls just under . 37. Consi- 
dering the nature of the phil which is an underestimate of the 
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Criteria of Choice and Rejection. 
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- 227 - 
Pearson product moment correlation coefficient, the sizes of the 
observed correlations - particularly those between positive accu- 
racy scores - are very notable indeed. 
The interpretation of these correlations is not as simple as 
it might seem at first. Some people have taken these correla- 
tions as indicative of a general ability. In view of the high 
correlations found between the subjects' choice status over dif- 
ferent criteria and the relationship between choice status and 
accuracy of guessing, these correlations can easily be explained 
in terms of the sociometric structure of the group and the gene- 
ral response sets operative in the process of choosing and gues- 
sing. As evidence in support of this interpretation it should 
be noted that there was only a slight negative correlation be- 
tween the two kinds of accuracy. These correlations, however, 
were too small to be of any significance. They ranged all the 
way from . 007 to -. 38 with a median of about -. 
20. This is not 
surprising in view of the slightly negative relationship between 
positive and negative choice status and the restrictions placed 
on accuracy by our design of experiment. Because of the gene- 
rally observed tendency for over-chosen individuals to be under- 
rejected and vice versa, and the high relationship, both physical 
and probabilistic, between choice or rejection status and accu- 
racy, a negative relationship between the two kinds of accuracy 
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scores'is inevitable. What prevents this negative correlation 
from becoming large enough to be significant is the formerly ob- 
served sociometrio effect of increased inter-sex rejections which 
by distributing the negative choices at random among the members 
of the opposite sex tends to lower the negative correlation be- 
tween choice and rejection status. 
H. SOCIAL PERCEPTION IN TERIM OF PREDICTING OTHERS' RESPONSES 
ON THE GUESS WHO TEST 
As was stated in the previous chapter, the Guess 'Who Test was 
readministered with new instructions asking the subjects to guess 
on which items their names had been mentioned by their classmates 
as well as those who had mentioned them on each item. In this 
manner, two measures of social perception were obtained, one based 
on the subjects' awareness of how - in terms of the G. W. T. - their 
classmates viewed them and the other based on their awareness of 
the way specific individuals among their classmates saw them. 
Lt the outset, it should be admitted that our measures of 
social perception were very crude and subject to many restrictions. 
In the first place, they were beset by all the difficulties dis- 
cussed in connection with the sociometric perception per se. But 
the subjects were left free as to the number of items on which 
they would make a guess as well as the number of people they would 
guess. However, the upper limit of this number was set at 5. 
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This arrangement was regarded as necessary to avoid collecting 
arbitrary responses. But it created its own problem by reducing 
the number of guesses or losing information which might have been 
obtained by a fixed number of choices. The most damaging effect 
from the point of view of the accuracy of guessing resulted from 
the unexpected fact that a considerable number of pupils were ab- 
sent on the day of testing and this resulted in a large amount of 
guesses being discarded because their accuracy or lack of accuracy 
could not be decided. Another vitiating influence arose from 
the inherent nature of the G. W. T. It is easy to understand that 
what the subjects were required to do was to nominate a number - 
ranging from 1/5 to 1/7 - of their group members they regarded as 
most outstanding on the given description. The emerging distri- 
bution curve was thus bound to be highly skewed. On such a 
skewed distribution, the chance - both probabilistic and physical 
- of over-chosen individuals 
being accurate is increased at the 
expense of the under-chosen subjects. A logical consequence of 
this situation is that we should not expect to find generality of 
accuracy over different items of the test. Nor should we expect 
a comparable accuracy score for individual subjects on every item 
as they are not regpired to make guesses on every item. The only 
comparable value is the mean percentage of accurate guessing over 
all items. But this total percentage of accuracy cannot be 
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regarded as entirely comparable because of the differences between 
different items as to the facility or difficulty of guessing. 
Table. 17 (part C) summarizes the amount of accurate guessing 
on each item as a percentage of the total number of guesses at- 
tempted. It is clear from the table that the percentage of ac- 
curacy varies greatly from one item to the next, ranging all the 
way from 64.5% (group VIII9 item 4) to zero per cent (group VI, 
item 14). The amount of accuracy tends to be greater on some 
items for all three groups and smaller on others. If the per- 
centage of accuracy on each item is pooled for the three groups 
and rank ordered and the percentage of each individual group on 
each item is also ranked, very high and significant correlations 
are found between the ranks of each item in terms of the percent- 
age of accuracy obtained on it. The rank correlation coefficients 
obtained are . 88, . 
87 and . 86 between the pooled percentage of 
accuracy of the three groups and those of groups VII, VI and VIII 
respectively. All these coefficients are significant beyond . 01 
level and can be interpreted as indicative of a genuine trend for 
the items of our Guess 'Who Test. 
Not only the percentage of accuracy but also the frequency 
of guesses attempted on each item appears to be higher for some 
items and lower for others. Men the frequency of guesses made 
on each item by the members of the three groups were pooled and 
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TABLE\17 s DISTRIBUTION OF SELF-RATINGS, GUESSES AND THE 
PERCENTAGES OF ACCURACY OVER THE 20 ITEMS OF THE GUESS WHO TEST. 
I 
T FREQUENCY OF / FREQUENCY OF PERCENTAGE OF 
E SELF-RATINGS (A) `ý/ GUESSES ACCURACY (C- 
M 
S GROUPS $ GROUPS t GROUPS t 
vi VIII VIII VI VII VIII vi VII VIII 
1 8 7 5 9 13 11 u 62 46 
2 9 6 5 12 12 13 28 99 . 53 
3 11 8 8 11 13 14 42 38 39 
4 15 12 12 18 15 16 47 43 65 
5 2 9 6 2 8 14 26 57 . 
6 18 12 10 17 14 16 433 44 64 
7 2 0 6. 1 6 8 7 7 10 
8 19 11 15 13 17 
, 
12 58 
9 0 2 4 2 5 10 10 14 28 
10 15 16 6 11 14 14 11 49 46 
11 6 6 8 5 8 11 .0 
. 
32 52 
12 7 11 4 1 10 10 4 19 27 
13 1 1 1 3 8 10 24 19 16 
14 2 2 2 0 4 5 0 8 6 
15 4 3 3 7 10 9 17 36 16 
16 4 4 4 3 7 9 33 11 
. 
36 
17 6 6 3 7 12 11 
. 
16 25 15 
18 5 4 4 4 6 8 19 28 11 
19 2 5 5 3 7 11 20 29 28 
20 8 6 7 10 8 9 23 10 19 
Mean 7.2 6.5 5.2 7 9.6 11.3 25.5 30 34 
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the items ranked according to the frequency of guesses, it ap- 
peared that there was a close relationship between the ranks of 
different items in this pooled rank-order and their ranks in each 
of the three groups. This relationship is indicated by a mean 
rank correlation coefficient of . 91 which is significant beyond 
any recognised limit of confidence. For groups VI, VII and VIII 
separately the correlation coefficients are found to be . 93, "95 
and . 
86 respectively. Thus there is no doubt that our three 
groups acted in a highly consistent manner in allocating their 
guesses among various items. More interesting is the close re- 
lationship found between the frequency of guessing on each item 
and the percentage of accuracy attained. If the items are ranked 
according to the frequency of guesses made and the percentages of 
accuracy attained on them by the three groups of our study and 
the two ranks correlated, a rank correlation coefficient of . 81 
is obtained. This rho is significant beyond . 01 level. 
As a tentative explanation for this consistent trend among 
the different items of our Guess VIho Test, it was postulated that 
the content of items should have something to do with the observed 
differences. Following Edcrards' (1953,1957) demonstrations that 
people tend to subscribe socially desirable items of a question- 
naire more often than those with a socially undesirable flavour, 
it was assumed that: 
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1. The twenty items of the Guess Who Test should vary according 
to their frequency of employment for self-rating; 
2. There should be some degree of relationship between the vari- 
ance of these items according to their social desirabBi. ty 
and their frequency of occurrence and degree of accuracy in 
predicting others' responses. 
An analysis of the data seems to confirm both these assump- 
tions. In the first place, the three groups showed a high de- 
gree of consistency in their frequency of self-rating on different 
items. The rank correlations between the pooled frequencies of 
all three groups and each of the groups VI, VII and VIII are found 
to be . 92, "94 and . 
87 respectively. These correlations which 
are highly significant leave no doubt on the fact that our three 
groups show a striking tendency to favour some items over others 
in making self-ratings. While forty people have mentioned item 
six (i. e. someone you can rely on, who is very sincere and keeps 
his or her word) as best describing them, only two subjects have 
chosen item seven (i. e., someone who does not care much about 
other people and is concerned only with his or her own interests). 
The frequencies of self-ratings on various items are given in 
Table 15, part A. A study of the actual wording of these items 
reveals that while most of the items over-chosen or under-chosen 
for self-rating confirm our interpretation in terns of social de- 
sirability, the placement of a few items presents some difficulty. 
If we choose the mean frequency of all items, 19, as a standard 
- 234 - 
of classification into the over-chosen or under-chosen categories, 
it is observed that ten items fall above this mean and ten others 
below it. The first four items (i. e., items 6, reliability, 4, 
sociability, 8, co-operativeness, and 10, sense of humour) and 
the four last items (i. e., items 7, selfishness, 13, bossiness, 
14, lack of sociability, and 9, ill-temperedness) are well in line 
with our interpretation. But the classification of items 15 
(social influence) and 18 (leadership) and to some extent 17 
(achievement in Maths) as socially undesirable, and the classifi- 
cation of items 12 (shyness) and 11 (anxiety over one's mistakes) 
as socially desirable does not agree with the apparent common- 
sense implications of their contents. This is also true of the 
relatively low rank afforded item 2 (to take life easily). These 
somewhat unexpected results may be explained by the assumption 
that the interpretation of the children of our study may not have 
been the same as our common-sense understanding. "It is only 
too obvious When talking to two persons who undertake to rate 
others that their conception of terms such as suggestibility, 
sense of humour, persistence, and so forth, varies widely and 
that on occasions Quite contradictory meanings are associated 
with the same trait name" (Eysenck, 1960, p. 167). If this ob- 
servation be true of trained adult raters, it must be equally 
true of our young inexperienced subjects. There is still another 
- 235 - 
possibility - particularly in the case of stach obviously mis- 
placed items as items 15 and 18 (indicating influence and leader- 
ship) that another factor of modesty may have been in operation. 
This possibility is supported by the observation that when, in the 
context of our leadership question, subjects were asked whether 
they thought to have been nominated as a leader by their friends, 
only about 16% of them answered "yes". 
Notwithstanding these contradictory exceptions, the rank 
orderings of our items in terms of social desirability - as de- 
fined above - correlates very highly with their rank ordering 
according to the percentage of accuracy (rho - . 64, p <. 01). If 
the items are divided into two groups according to their percent- 
age of accuracy, it is observed that only two items, 12 and 20, 
of the ten items overchosen for self-rating are under average in 
accuracy and only one of the items above average in the percent- 
age of accuracy (item 5) falls below average in self-rating. 
There remains no doubt that the amount of accuracy on each item 
is highly related to its social desirability. There is also a 
very close relationship between an item's social desirability and 
its frequency of employment for guessing others' responses. This 
relationship is represented by a rank correlation coefficient of 
. 85 which is significant much 
beyond . 01 level. 
These findings are more or less in accord with our findings 
in connection with the sociometric perception proper. The same 
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processes and factors that operated to diminish the percentage of 
accuracy in guessing one's rejection status may also be respon- 
sible for the low degree of accuracy attained in predicting others' 
undesirable responses. It was seen above that while over 57% of 
positive guesses were accurate, only 25% of the negative guesses 
were so. In the case of the Guess Who Test items, the mean per- 
centage of accuracy for the ten items with above average social 
desirability is found to be 38% while its equivalent value for 
the ten socially undesirable items is only 21%. The mean accu- 
racies of the five most desirable and five least desirable items 
show even more difference (45% and 14.6% respectively;. While 
the difference between the means of the two groups of ten desi- 
rable and ten undesirable items is significant at . 05 level 
(t 
2.12, df - 18), the difference between the means of the five most 
desirable and five least desirable items is significant at much 
beyond O1 level of confidence (t a 7.5, df a 8). 
The question of the chance expectancy of the observed accu- 
racy of guessing on the Guess Who Test can be approached in the 
same wa1y as described earlier in connection with the chance ex- 
pectancies of the sociometric perception proper. The formulae 
and nomograph discussed there are easily applicable to the Guess 
Who Test and the percentages of chance accuracies of 17%, 18% 
and 19% found for groups VI, VII, and VIII respectively are 
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equally true of their guesses on each item of the G. W. T. Ai. x2 
test showed that eight of the percentages of accuracy achieved by 
groups VI and VII and ten of the percentages of accuracy attained 
by group VIII are significantly larger than their chance equi- 
valents at . 01 level and much beyond. These are designated by 
underlining in Table'1!. Only two of the differences fall at 
. 05 level of significance 
(Group VII, item 8; Group VIII, item 
16}. All these items are above average in social desirability. 
The mean percentages of accuracy over all twenty items are 
found to be 29%, 33%, and 375 for the three groups respectively. 
These values are larger than their chance expectancies at . 01 
level of significance. Thus, although guesses made on over half 
the individual items fail to exceed their chance expectancies, 
the proportion of accurate guesses for all twenty items are found 
to be larger than their chance expectancies for all three groups. 
This proportion, however, is not very large, On average every 
third guess is found to be accurate. In view of the difficulties 
involved, this amount of accurate guessing is very satisfactory 
and suggestive of some genuine ability. 
This is more significant in view of the finding that such 
situational factors as mutuality and congruency of choice vnhich 
could account for the bulk of accuracy in guessing one's socio- 
metric status play much less important parts in the accuracy of 
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Guess Who Test predictions. There is a tendency for the reci- 
procity of attributions to vary with the social desirability of 
an item as defined above. For less desirable items, i. e. items 
falling below average in the frequency of self-ratings, the pro- 
portion of reciprocated attributions hardly reaches its chance 
level of expectancy. For more desirable items this value is 
higher, but seldom does it exceed the proportion of mutuality 
observed above in connection with sociometric rejections. This 
observation is also true of the congruency between choices and 
guesses on the G. F. T. 
Although the inclusion of the self-rating and guessing ver- 
sions of the Guess Who Test in the same format provided a strong 
basis for the first task to influence the second, it is observed 
that in about one fifth of the cases self-ratings are not folloved 
by guessing on the same item, and a much larger proportion of 
guesses were not accompanied by self-ratings at all. This can 
be taken as evidence that our subjects did make a distinction be- 
tween their own self images and their images as perceived by 
others. This is also indicated by the observation that in many 
cases a subject's self-rating did not coincide with the ratings 
made by his peers. 
From the point of view of the processes involved, the Guess 
Who Test can be said to occupy a position midway between an 
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ordinaryyrating scale and a sociometric test. To the extent that 
it requires the subjects to describe their peers in terms of cer- 
tain trait names or behaviour sketches it is a rating scale de- 
signed to differentiate the top (and/or bottom) extremes of the 
population on the given traits. But the way in which the questIons 
are put, and the fact that the individuals are left free to choose 
their subjects of rating on each item make the test resemble an 
ordinary sociometric questionnaire. The degree of resemblance, how- 
ever, is highly dependent on the content of the individual item concerned. 
In the same manner, our aecond measure of social perception 
falls somewhere between the notion of empathy as developed by 
Dymond and others and the notion of sociometric perception or 
sociempathy as developed by Tagiuri, lusubel and others. It is a 
measure of empathy, because it demands that the subjects should put 
themselves into the shoes of others and predict how these others 
would see and describe them. It is a measure of sociempathy in the 
sense that it requires that the subjects should nominate those who 
are likely to have chosen them on each item. No wonder then that 
our two measures of social perception should be correlated. This 
correlation is represented by phi coefficients of . 28, . 58, and 
. 32 for groups VI, 
VII, and VIII respectively. Of these only . 5B 
is significant and the rest fall somewhere between the . 10 and . 20 
levels of significance. 
The failure of these correlations to reach an accepted level 
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of significance can partly be accounted for by the fact that a 
considerable number of subjects were absent on the day the Guess 
Who Test was administered. This not only diminished the amount 
of accuracy by the amount of accuracy due to the absent subjects 
but it also nullified all guesses which went to them. Another 
vitiating factor may have been the relatively long time that had 
lapsed between the administration of the Sociometrio test and the 
G. W. T. As was stated in the second chapter, the G. W. T. was given 
about four months after the original sociometric test. It is 
quite conceivable that the sociometric structures of the groups 
under study may have undergone some change during this period. In 
virtue of the close relationship between the perceptual and actual 
facets of the sociometric situation and the fact that accuracy is 
strongly affected by this situation as well as the technique em- 
ployed to explore it, no doubt this change should be reflected 
in 
the results of our Guess Who Test and decrease the degree of re- 
lationship between the two tests. As an example of this change, 
it is interesting to note that the correlation between the sub- 
jects' status on the criterion of "Best Friend" included in 
both 
versions of the test showed a great, deal of change over this 
interval. Indeed, the phi correlations between the two measures 
of friendship were only . 33, . 32 and . 04 for the three groups VI- 
VIII. Of these only . 33 is significant at . 05 level. 
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3. CORHEI. AP S OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION IN CHILDREN- 
A. SOCIAL PERCEPTION A'v'D PERSONALITY 
The average Extraversion score, as measured by the J. M. P. I., 
for the whole sample of 220 is found to be 12.59 with an S. D. of 
3.08. This is somewhat higher than the mean reported by Ferneaux 
& Gibson fo their standardization group as well as those reported 
by Callard & Goodfellow (1962) and Costello & Brachman (1962). 
The standard deviation of E scores for our group, however, is 
smaller than all those found in former studies, with the possible 
exception of that found by Callard & Goodfellow for their Compre- 
hensive School sample (S. D. 2.99). The differences are too small 
to be significant and may be attributed to the more homogeneous 
nature of our sample in terms of age and I. Q. range. 
The mean of the neuroticism scores for the whole sample, 
7.53 3.19, is also higher than those reported in previous 
studies. It is, however, nearer to the mean value of N as found 
by Furneaux & Gibson than any other group's reported so far, these 
all being smaller than that found by Ferneaux & Gibson. The 
nearest mean N to our group's, and to that of the original stan- 
dardization group's, is that reported by Callard & Goodfellow for 
their Secondary Modern school samples, these being 7.03 and 7.04 
respectively. The following table 
(Tablev18) summarizes the 
findings of various studies using the J. 11. P. I. The results of 
our own sbhidy are given at the bottom of the table. 
BOYS 
EXTRLV. NEUROTICISffi E. 
Fneauz & Gibson 12.39 7.35 
(N = 156 ) 3.46 3.54 
Callard & Goodfellow 
Rural Gramm. School 11.9 5.99 
3.34 3.48 
Rural Sec. Modern 11.85 7.03 
3.13 2.98 
Comprehensive 11.62 6.68 
2.99 3.27 
Urban Gramm School 12.11 6.42 
3.26 3.47 
Sec. Modern 1??. 07 7.04 
'il 3.27 
Costello & Brachman 















MEANS OF VARIOUS SALES ON THE EXTRAVERSION AND 
NMOTICISM SCALES OF THE J. M. P. I. 
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Calculated for boys and girls separately, the mean values 
of E are found to be 12.58 and 12.60 respectively. The superio- 
rity of boys over girls in terms of extraversion is very slight 
indeed, much less than that found by Costello & Brachman. The 
corresponding values of N are 8.35 for girls and 6.56 for boys. 
The difference between the two groups here is statistically sig- 
nificant and in line with the findings of other studies using 
J. ZS. P. I. or the original M. P. I. (Eysenck, 1959). Studies using 
other measures of neuroticism or emotional instability have also 
found girls worse off than boys. 
Considering the various sub-groups (classes) of the study 
separately, we find a considerable degree of variation both in E 
and N over different groups. Table, 19 represents the means of 
our eight groups separately. As is seen from this table, the 
mean of E varies all the way from 11.17 (girls of group VII) to 
14.21 (girls of group II). In the same way the mean of N varies 
from 5.29 for the boys of group VI to 9.7 for the girls of group 
VIII. On the whole, the last three groups, representing a secon- 
dary modern school of East London, score somewhat lower than the 
first five groups, representing a county secondary school in 
Surrey. The differences, larger in the case of N scale, fall 
short of significance. It is also interesting to note that while 
on the dimension of extraversion only in two out of eight cases 
- 2-43 - 
an ýý Mj lrJlRM 
-&w taw olluz t 
V. M. A. "I N V-110 E ?ý:: t I? hfl L MIT II 
(Fz3) 12.77 8.88 13.50 . 
6975 13.06 6.03 
(i. 25) 14.21 6.35 - 11.09 6.63 12.04 7.03 
11I0029) 13.11 7.41 13.25 7.00 13.17 7.24 
IV on v) 32# 35 7.82 12.50 5.66 12.41 6.93 
13.00 8 . 63 12.50 7.17 12.73 0.03 
Z- V 12.06 7.62 
1 3.11 * 3.21 
VI (r32) 11.7 055-. 23 12.52 5.29 12.15 6.06 
vIi(z25) 11.16 9.25 11.61 7.46 11.40 3.32 
v1II(iýý 2) 1240 9.70. 13.50 7"00 12.81 8.22 
VI wsYx 12.12 7.37 
J3.32 ;; 3.17 
1-4111 12.6 34.35 12.53 6665 12059 7.53 
220 _ 3.0& d 3419 
TAýLLäý; 1ýLýti: APt3 Op VARIGU3 oltCU`P3 GIT LX AVCtt: a1 U A1iZ) Iýý, U ; ý: IQ1 . 
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girls score higher than boys, in all eight groups involved their 
mean IT scores are larger than those of the boys. For the 141 
individuals of the first five groups, E and I7 dimensions produce 
a product-moment correlation coefficient of -. 096. This may be 
taken as a proof of the factorial independence of the two scales 
of the J. M. P. I. 
Coming to the correlation between Extraversion and Accuracy 
of social perception, we find it varying from group to group and 
from one criterion of choice to another within each group. Almost 
all these correlations, however, fail to reach any accepted level 
of significance. The general expectation is to find extraversion 
somewhat negatively correlated to accuracy of social perception. 
But the particular design of experiment adopted for gauging social 
perception made the realization of this expectation difficult. As 
-will be remembered, accuracy of perception was scored by the num- 
ber of choices accurately guessed. Thus those who had received 
no choices - the underchosen - could not be accurate in their 
guesses and those who were highly chosen had a much higher chance 
of being accurate in their guesses. On the other hand the bulk 
of evidence indicates that sociometric choice status is positively 
related to Extraversion. The relationship, however, is not very 
high. Mann (1959) has found that eleven of the twelve trends 
emerging from independent studies of the relationship between E 
- 245 - 
and sociometric choice status ON popularity are in the positive 
direction. In this study, the relationship between extraversion 
and sociometric choice status, pooled over all four criteria and 
for all eight groups together, is represented by a Phi-correlation 
of . 197 
± 
. 067. The corresponding value of Phi for Extraversion 
and the accuracy of social perception is . 117 
± 
. 068. The neu- 
roticism scale was negatively correlated to both sociometric 
choice status and the accuracy of social perception, the values 
of Phi being -. 039 and -. 072 respectively. None of these values, 
however, can be regarded as statistically significant. The ob- 
served low negative correlation between sociometric choice status 
and neuroticism is in accord with the findings of an extensive 
study by Thorpe (1955) using a similarly derived measure of neu- 
roticism. 
Y7hen the top and bottom 25p of each group in terms of the 
Extraversion is considered separately, it is seen that the two 
groups differ more or less significantly on all other criteria of 
%V 
group relations included in this study. Figure'II summarizes 
these differences very clearly. Thus the top 25% on Extraversion 
are also top on the number of choices they received on the four 
criteria of choice, on the criteria of popularity, leadership and 
friendship. On all these criteria they also score higher than 
the middle 50% in terms of Extraversion. They are also higher 
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on the accuracy of their social perception. On the other hand, 
the bottom 25% score higher than the other two groups in terms of 
Neuroticism and unpopularity -a criterion used with the last 
three groups only. These findings, though not always significant, 
are in the expected direction and can be taken as indicative of 
the validity of the J. JZ. P. I. 
Some further evidence is provided by the results of the 
Guess Who Test given to the last three groups. As will be re- 
membered, some items of this test were particularly chosen to bear 
on the dimensions of Extraversion and Neuroticism. Prima facie, 
items 2,4, and 10 are related to Extraversion and items 12 and 
14 are concerned with introversion. Comparing the top and bottom 
25% and the middle 50% of the group in terms of their Extraversion 
scores, we find the mean of the top 25% to be 3.45,3.7 and 3.95 
on items 2,4, and 10 of the Guess Who Test respectively. The 
corresponding means of the bottom 25% are 1.76,2.1 and 1, those 
of the middle 50% being 2.45,2.82, and 2.25. In other words, 
those scoring high on the dimension of Extraversion are also rated 
higher on the traits of easy-going (2), sociable (4) and the 
sense of humour (10) and vice versa. The scores of the three E- 
groups on the various items of the G. W. T. are shown in Fig 
3. 
As 
is seen from this figure, on most traits, the top 25% score higher 
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between the two extreme groups, however, is almost always larger 
than that between either of them and the middle 50%. In a few 
cases where the observed trend does not agree with the a priori 
expectation (e. g., items 16 and 19), the explanation must be 
sought in some sort of "halo" effect. 
B. SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE 
For the first five groups, 11+ intelligence test results were 
available. The five groups are arranged according to their I. Qs. 
Thus the mean I. Q. score for group I is 118.15 whereas that for 
group v is 94.51. Comparing the mean accuracies of the five 
groups (Table 11), it is found that those high in I. Q. tend to be 
higher in their accuracy of sociometric perception as well. The 
trend is indicated by a rank correlation coefficient of . 80 be- 
tween the rank statuses of the five groups on I. Q. and the accu- 
racy of social perception respectively. This value of R is sig- 
nificant at . 06 level of significance 
(one-tailed test of signifi- 
cance) (Edwards, 1954). Correlations between intelligence and 
social perception for individual groups varied all the way from 
. 37 
(group II) to -. 01 (group V). None of these correlations 
reach any recognized level of significance. Again, in view of 
the close relationship between choice status and accuracy of per- 
ception, this finding is not unexpected. Numerous studies have 
found a tendency for over-chosen individuals to be more intelligent. 
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The tendency, however, is not very impressive. Mann's (1959) 
review of literature puts the median correlation between intelli- 
gence and choice status close to . 10. Among studies directly 
concerned with sociometric perception, Trent (1957) has reported a 
non-significant correlation between intelligence and sociempatby. 
C. SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND SOCIAL STATUS 
Some of the evidence bearing on the relationship between 
social perception and the social status of the perceiver in the 
group was discussed in the previous chapter. In this study three 
different measures of social status were employed. These were 
sociometric choice status as defined by the number of votes re-. 
ceived on the four criteria of choice, popularity, as determined 
by the number of choices received on the criterion of "most popu- 
lar", and leadership as defined by the number of choices received 
on the criterion of leadership. The rationale for treating these 
three aspects of social status separately has already been discus- 
sed in connection with the measures used for assessing them. 
The following table summarizes the relationship obtaining 
between the accuracy of social perception, pooled over all four 
criteria, and the three indices of social status, for the eight 
groups of this study separately. 
As it appears from the table, social perception as measured 
by one's awareness of his choice status in the group is highly 
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Groups: Choice Status Leadership Popularity 
I Phi - "73 . 072 . 067 
Accuracy of II . 33 . 41 . 17 
Sociometric III . 42 . 29 . 05 
Perception, IV . 24 -. 04 . 03 
pooled over V . 71 . 40 . 52 
All four VI . 77 "45 . 35 
Criteria VII . 68 . 01 . 39 
VIII . 82 . 18 . 73 man= 
related to one's actual status in the groip. In other words, 
those members who are chosen by a large number of their group- 
mates are better aware of their position in the group than those 
who are not highly chosen. However, there is some difference 
between various groups as to this relationship, and the Phi cox- 
relation varies all the way from . 82 
(group VIII)to . 24 
(Troup 
IV). The majority of the correlations are highly significant. 
Part of the relationship, no doubt, is due to the particular de- 
sign of experiment adopted for measuring social perception. As 
will be remembered, social perception was scored in terms of the 
number of accurate guesses made, the accuracy of a guess depending 
on choices made by others. Thus, those who received no choices 
were bound to have no accurate guesses. On the other hand those 
who received many choices were not only physically able to make 
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accurate guesses but also were probabilistically in a much better 
position. In terms of symbols, if the proportion of choices re- 
ceived by a subject be shown by C/d(N-1), where d(N-1) represents 
the total number of choices made by the group, and the number of 
guesses made by him be shown by g/(N-1)d, it is obvious that when 
the acckr ac-y o4 
C/d(N l) is zero,. g is also physically bound to be zero. As C 
departs from zero the probability of g being correct increases, 
reaching to the maximum degree of probability when C reaches N-l. 
In such a hypothetical case the probability of g's accuracy is 
equal to one. In view of this complication, the observed high 
correlations must be interpreted very cautiously. 
If the relationship between choice status and the accuracy 
of perception is a genuine relationship, it must be also present 
in other measures of social perception. To test this possibility, 
Phi correlations were calculated between the summed choice status 
of the last three groups and their accuracy of perception on the 
Guess Who Test. The Phi values obtained are . 15, . 10, and . 10 
for groups VI, VII, and VIII respectively. None of the correla- 
tions obtained are of any significance to deserve further discus- 
sion. In this connection, it should be noted that, despite the 
three-month interval between the administration of the sociometric 
test and that of the Guess Who Test, and despite the fact that the 
latter test contained many opposite items, nevertheless, the number 
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of total votes received on the second showed a significantly 
positive correlation with the choice status on the first test. 
The values of Phi for the three groups were . 33, . 73, and . 51 
respectively. 
Of the eight correlations between leadership and accuracy 
of social perception only two reach the . 05 level of significance 
and but one is significant at . 01 level. Three of the remaining 
correlations are of a zero order and one of them is in the oppo- 
site direction. Thus our findings only partly bear out the 
findings of such studies as Chowdhry and Newcomb (1952) regarding 
the high social sensitivity of group leaders. The general trend, 
however, agrees with that found by other studies. Mann (1959 ), 
reviewing the results of 15 independent studies yielding 101 cor- 
relations between leadership and the ability to predict various 
aspects of the opinions of other group members, found that in 74% 
of the cases leaders were found to be more accurate. But only 
15 of these correlations were significant, whereas only one out 
of the 26 negative correlations was statistically significant. 
Despite the criticism made by Campbell (1955) regarding the arti- 
factual nature of the correlation between leadership status and 
social perception as defined by the leader's ability to predict 
his own status, it would appear that most researches have obtained 
positive results with impressive consistency. Part of the low 
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correlation found in this study may be attributed to the relative- 
ly low correlation between leadership and sociometrio choice sta- 
tus. For the whole sample of eight groups the Phi correlations 
between leadership and the sooiometric choice status on criteria 
1,2,3 and 4 were . 341, . 403, . 241, and . 219 respectively. 
Although, with an N of 259, all these correlations are highly 
significant, they are not high enough to upset or exploit the 
very high relationship between choice status and accuracy of per- 
ception discussed above. The observed relationship between 
leadership and the four criteria of choice is quite in accord with 
the findings of Gibb (1950) and lends further support to our ar- 
gument respecting the desirability of differentiating between 
sociometric choice status and leadership. 
Of the eight correlations between popularity and accuracy 
of social perception, two are significant at . 01 level and one at 
. 05 and one 
(. 35) just under . 05. The rest are not significant. 
The complicating factors noted above in connection with leader- 
ship and social perception are also true of the relationship be- 
tween popularity and social perception. Reviewing the table of 
correlations, no significant trend or tendency is observed to 
obtain from one variable to the next. 
To sum up, although there is evidence of some positive cor- 
relation between social perception and social status as represented 
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by sociometric choice status, leadership, and popularity, yet the 
relationship between these variables is so complicated by the 
special design of experiment employed that little firm conclusion 
can be derived from these correlations. In this connection, 
perhaps it is self-satisfying to remember that almost all other 
studies of the relationship between social perception and achieve- 
ment in group activities are subject to similar criticisms, un- 
certainties and puzzling methodological complications (of. Gage, 
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CHAPTER V: Analysis of Results of the Second. Study. 
1. A review of the results of the test battery: - 
A. Age Differences: Figure -V% shows the means of the 
first and second group on the various tests included in 
be 
the battery. As will remembered, the first group - 57 
students of a day training college - consisted of much 
older members than the second group. As is apparent from 
Fig. .. V, the two groups differ on several of the dimensions 
studied. The younger group is much higher on the dimension 
of Neuroticism, Radicalism and ExtrAversion, whereas they 
score slightly lower on the measure of tender-mindedness. 
Compared against the means of Eysenck's (1959) standard- 
ization group, our groups as a whole score slightly lower 
on both Neuroticism and Extraversion. Considering the two 
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( (N;; 49) 
7.96±2.97 6.1513.33 
7.4 ±2.86 5.9 f 3.42 
6.7 ±3.01 5.2 ±2.75 
7.9 ± 2.54 8.7 ± 2.87 
than Eysenck's sample both on Extraversion and Neuroticism, 























FIGURE V1 : MEANS 0F THE TWO GROUPS ON VARIOUS VARIABLES, 
SEPARATELY CALCULATED FOR MEN AND WOMEN. 
GROUP I: MEN - WOMEN------ 
GROUP II: MEN"-------0 WOMEN o... ".......... -0 
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sample on E but scores much higher on Neuroticism. This 
is in accord with Eysenck's own findings that younger 
age groups score about 
1/5 S. D. higher on Neuroticism. 
Considering the means of the two groups on the 
inventory of social attitudes, we find the means of our 
whole group on Radicalism and Tender-mindedness, 6.8 and 
7.9 respectively, in complete agreement with those 
reported by Eysenck (1947) for his sample of 750, these 
being 6.8 and 7.8 respectively. Considering the two 
groups of this study separately, we find the older-age 
group, group 1, lower on Radicalism than both our younger 
age group and Eysenck's sample, but very slightly higher 
on tendermindedness. Again the observed difference is in 
the expected direction; -older people and women have 
been found to be less Radical and more tender-minded than 
the younger and the male population. 
Regarding the means of siX value dimensions, 
there appears to be a consistent tendency for our sample 
to favour certain values over others. It will be remembered 
that we had employed the second part of Richardson's test. 
On this part each of the sin value areas are represented by 
10 items and possible range of each value is from 0 to 30. 
If all six value dimensions - or, in more exact terms, the 
verbal statements representing each value - were of equal 
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attraction for the subjects concerned, then the mean score 
on each value would be 15. As figure '. _Vi shows, 
the means 
of the six values vary all the way from 9.9 (political 
value of the first group) to 23 (social value of the 
second group). There is complete agreement between the 
two groups as to the relative importance of the si* values, 
They are also in complete agreement with Richardson's 
original group (N - 400) in terms of their relative 
standing on various value dimensions. This may be taken 
as an indication of the reliability of the second part 
of the test as compared against its complete version. 
Regardless of this over-all agreement, the two 
groups of this study demonstrate some differences in their 
mean scores on various value dimensions. Thus the 
younger age group appears to be somewhat higher on 
Political and Social value and slightly higher on the 
Aesthetic value, whereas the older group scores much 
higher on the economic value. In view of these differences 
it seemed necessary to treat the two groups separately. 
B. Sex Differences: Table VI summarizes the means and 
standard deviations of the two groups for men and women 
separately. The same data are pictorially represented an 
Fig. : 1V2.. As is expected, men tend to score higher on 
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1 1 tt 1 / tt t 1 
Eat. Neu. Rad. Tend. Aes. V Eoo. V Po1. V Rel. V Soo. V The. V 
Mean 7.65 5.7 6.3 7 11.8 15.3 10.45 13.7 21.5 17.25 
44140UP M. 
S. D. 2.97 3.34 3.21 2.66 4.8 4 3.7 8.67 2.24 3.37 
Mean 6.27 5 
_ 
6.4 8.65 11.2 14 9.6 15.8 22.3 17.1 
W. 
S. D. 2.93 2.42 2.89 2.33 4.32 4.83 3.73 8.35 3.71 3.65 
Mean 8 8.8 7.96 7 12 13.8 11.9 13.3 21.9 17 
19" ýý 
S. D. 2.7 2.4 2.72 2.83 4.83 3.1 4.72 9.4 3"77 85 3" 
- .. n- n n +. - ,.. - ,-- ,, A fA , '7 A Mean (. y b. / b. o 0 .4 ll. j lU"( lU. j 10.4 ýG'f 
1ý. G 
Wo 
S. D. 2.41 3.2 2.35 2.57 4.47 2.88 3.64 9.14 3.27 3.3 
OL Mean 7.4 5.9 6.8 7.9 11.5 13.4 10.4 15 22.5 17.1 
S. D. 
TABLE V1 s MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS ON THE 































FIG. N2 MEANS OF THE TWO GROUPS OF THE SECOND STUDY ON THE TEN 
PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY. 
GROUP I ýN 57) _-"-"-"-"-"-"-"- 
THE WHOLE SAMPLE N 106): 
GROUP II (N 49) s- -- --- -- 
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EXtraversion. However, only the difference between the 
men and women of the first group on this variable 
approaches the . 05 level of significance (t - 1.68 
df = 55). On Neuroticism, women have scored lower than 
men in both groups. The difference, although statis- 
tically insignificant, is contrary to expectation and the 
findings of other studies, This may be due to the 
influence of the age variable in the case of the first 
group, but is hard to explain in the case of the second 
group. Eysenck (1959) has found women scoring about 
1/3 
S. D. higher than men on the whole version of the M. P. I. 
and about -fr S. D. on the short version (Eysenck, 1958). 
On Radicalism, women have scored slightly 
higher than men in the first group and considerably - 
although not significantly - lower in the secoxnd group. 
In both groups, women excel. in tender-mindedness, the 
difference being significant somewhere between . 05 and 
. 01 level (t = 2.61 and 2.2 with df of 55 and 47 for 
groups I and II respectively). 
On Aesthetic value, women score lower thanmen 
in both groups. The difference, though too small to be 
significant, is interesting in that it is both against 
the common sense expectation and the findings of other 
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studies using Allpoxt-Vernon test (Dukes, 1955). 
Richardson herself has also found women higher on this 
value than men. The large size of the standard deviation 
is indicative of the great amount of variation among 
subjects in responding to the items keyed for this value. 
Going to the Economic value, we find the men 
of both groups significantly (at . 05 and beyond) higher 
than women. The first group has a higher mean than the 
second group and even the women of the first group appear 
to be slightly more economically oriented than the men of 
the second group. T ie same trend is observed with regard 
to the political value. Here, however, the younger 
group prove more politically oriented than the older 
group. On religious value, again women prove superior 
to men in both groups and the younger women prove to be 
more so. In other words, the younger the women the more 
religiously oriented they are and vice versa for the men. 
The same is more or less true of the social value which, 
it may be noticed, has produced the smallest amount of 
variance and the highest value of mean. On the 
theoretic=9.1 value, there is little difference between the 
means of the men and women of either group. The very 
slight superiority of men in the first group is balanced 
by a similarly slight superiority for women in the second 
group. 
- 265 - 
C. Inter-correlations between various measures: In the 
chapter describing our tests mention was made of the 
studies relating the ten dimensions of personality 
included in this study. Correlations were run between 
each of these dimensions using the scores of 67 
individuals representing both groups. The correlation 
matrix obtained is presented below. The first two 
variables are the sex and age variables respectively. 
The first represents the men only and should be inter- 
preted as such. With a degree of freedom equal to 67-2 
= 65, only values of r equal to . 24 and . 31 can be 
regarded as significant at . 05 and . 01]evels. 
(Two- 
tailed test of significance. If a one tailed test can 
be justified, the . 05 point of significance equals 
r=. 20). In interpreting the correlation matrix, it 
should be kept in mind that in view of the particular 
scoring key used in connection with the Values Test, 
some measure of artifactual correlation is unavoidable. 
Taking the significant values of r only, it appears that 
being a man is significantly related to the Economic value. 
Age is negatively correlated with Neuroticism and social 
value - younger subjects seem to be both more neurotic 
and more socially oriented, but less economically oriented. 
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Sex Age Entr. ' Neuro'Aesth Econ ' Pdl. Re1ig- Social. Theor Rad. Tend. 
11 -. 10 . 19 . 18 . 13 . 25 . 05 -. 
18 -. 10 . 02 . 20 -. 19 
2 1 -. 04 -. 51 -. 20_ . 24 -. 02 . 09 -. 35 . 
08 -. 09 . 19 
1 . 18 -. 06 . 36, . 11, -. 23 ' . 01' . . 
08 -. 16 -. 13 
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1. . 7-35- . 
08 -. 46 . 03 . 23 . 56 -. 44 
6 .,... , 1. <...,. o9; µ", ,. 
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62 -. 14 . 31 . 37 -. 31 
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1. ,. -. 19. "r -. 
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TABLE V2 s PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE TWELVE 
PERSONALITY VARIABLES 
, 
INCIUDEDIN THE STUDY. 
- 267 - 
The correlation between Etro. vergion and Neuroticism, 
although not significant, is much higher than that 
be 
reported by Eysenck. Extraverts appear to more 
Economically minded and less religious. Neuroticism 
seems to be positively correlated with Aesthetic value, 
social value and Radicalism, but negatively correlated 
with Religious value and Tendermindedness. Among the 
six values, it is found that Aesthetic value is negatively 
related to Economic and Religious values and to Tender- 
mindedness and positively correlated with the Theoretical 
value and Radicalism. Economic value also presents 
negative correlations with the religious and social values. 
Political value is negatively correlated with Re%igious 
value and Tendermindedness and positively with 
Theoretical value and Radicalism. On the other hand, 
religious value produced highly negative correlations with 
theoretical value and Radicalism and equally high positive 
correlations with Tendermindedness. This high correlation 
lends some support to the argument of those critics who 
have tried to identify Eysenck's T-dimension with the 
Religianism dimension found by Ferguson (Anastasi, 1958). 
Theoretical value is also highly and positively correlated 
with Radicalism and negatively with Tendermindedness. 
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The significantly negative correlation between Radicalism 
and Tendermindedness is however too large to justify 
the factorial independence of the two dimensions as 
claimed by Eysenck. 
2. Measures of Social Perception :- It will be 
remembered from the --third . chapter that our study con- 
sisted of asking the Ss to make predictions for two dif- 
ferent categories of others, namely, others in general 
and specific others. The first category was further 
divided into two types according to the sex of the"others 
in general", thus requiring predictions as to the probable 
responses of the majority of men and the majority of 
women to each of the items comprising the test battery. 
In a similar manner, the second task was subdivided into 
two, requiring the prediction of the responses of one 
specific individual who was well known to the predictOri., 
and another individual who was not so well-known. The 
rationale behind this subdivision of the field was dis- 
cussed earlier and need not delay us here. In the 
following pages each of these four types of social per- 
ception will be considered separately, emphasis being 
equally divided between a description of the phenomenal- 
ogical properties of the emerging picture and the accuracy 
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of the results of perception or prediction. 
A. Social percetion in terms of predicting the responses 
of the majority of men: The answer sheets filled for 
this purpose were scored in the same way as the answers of 
the subjects themselves, thus providing, for each 
individual, ten scores for the ten dimensions discussed 
above. Figures V3 - . V4 summarize the means of 
the 
predictions made for the majority of men for groups I and 
II separately. The numerical values of these are summar- 
ized in the following table (Table : _V3). 
In each case the 
actual means obtained by men of each group are plotted 
against the values as predicted by men and women of the 
same group. 
Looking at these figures, one cannot help being 
impressed by the amount of variation observed between the 
actual and predicted means. Equally impressive is the 
high degree of consistency demonstrated by men and women 
of the two groups in making their predictions on various 
dimensions. Thus, both men and. women grossly underestimate 
men's mean on certain dimensions and over-estimate it on 
certain other dimensions. There appears to be also a 
striking consistency between men and women of both groups 
in terms of the direction and volume of deviation from the 
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FIGURE V3 : MEANS OF MEN'S SCORES ON VARIOUS DIMENSIONS AND 
THEIR PREDICTED VALUES 
GROUP I: MEN'S ACTUAL MEINS: 
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FIGURE V4 : MEANS OF MEN'S SCORES ON VARIOUS DIMENSIONS AND 
THEIR PREDICTED VALUES. 
MEN'S ACTUAL MEANS 
GROUP II : AS PREDICTED BY MEN :- "- "........ 
AS PREDICTED BY WOMEN :...... -"""". "...... 
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el 
Variables - 
Group I, N"20 E N Aes Eco. Pol. Rel. Soc. The. Had. Tend. 
s predicted 
by Mean 9.2 3.6 10.1 20.5 15.2 7.3 18.3 18.5 8.4 6.05 
women s 
N=37) S. D. 2.04 3.2 4.11 3.48 4.66 4.78 4.1 3.32 2.18 2.54 
As predicted 
by Mean 8.8 4.1 11.2 18.3 12.4 9.8 19.9 18.4 7.5 6.16 
Men 
N,. 18) S. D. 2.2 3 2.9 4.35 3.6 4.7 4.6 3.15 2 2.17 
Menb own 
Mean 7.65 5.7 11.8 15.3 10.45 13.7 21.5 17.25 6.3 7 Scores 
N'20) S. D. 2.97 3.34 4.8 4 3.7 8.67 2.24 3.37 3.21 2.66 
Mean of I-IZ 
II 
a 7N 64 7-X 11.9 14.5 11.2 13.5 21.7 17.1 7.17 7 n G , 
Aß predicted 
by Mean 9.4 5.62 7.7 21.6 19.2 4.37 18.3 18.9 8.56 4.5 
women 
N16 S. D. 2.37 3.62 4.9 7.6 7.16 8.6 4.1 3.06 1.19 2.9, 
As predicted 
by Mean 9.09 7.18 12 17.7 15.5 7.7 2o. 5 16.5 8.26 6.55 
den' 
S. D. N: 11) 2.18 2.9 3.1 4.1 3.5 5.4 3.59 2.2 1.36 1.18 
Men, a own 
can score , 8 8.8 12 13.8 11.9 13.3 21.9 17 7.96 7 
N. 22) S. D. 2.7 2.4 4.83 3.1 4.72 9.4 3.77 3.85 2.72 2.83 
TABLE V3 s MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF MEN'S-SCORES AS 
PREDICTED BY OTHERS. 
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of deviation, there is almost a one-to-one agreement 
between men and women of the two groups. Thus, both men 
and women have underestimated men's standing ono the 
dimensions of Neuroticism, Tender-mindedness, Aesthetic 
value, Religious value and social value. In the same 
way, both groups have overestimated the standing of men 
on the dimensions of Radicalism, Extroversion, political 
Economic and Theoretical value. The only inconsistency is 
between the predictions of men and women of the second 
group on theoretical value where men have slightly under- 
estimated the mean standing of other men. 
To provide a numerical index of this consistency, 
it is possible to rank-order means of men on various 
variables as predicted by men and women of the two groups 
and to determine the degree of agreement between these 
means by Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance ,W 
Following table summarizes the result of such rank- 
ordering . The first four rows represent the ranked 





Neu. R. Bitt. Ten. Pol. Aes. Eoo. Rol, The. Soc. 1 $anked Means ass 
Predicted by Women 1 4 5 2 7 6 10 3 9 8 
Group I Men 1 3 4 2 7 6 8 5 9 10 
predicted by Women 3 5 6 2 9 4 10 1 8 7 
Group II Men 2 4 5 1 7 6 9 3 8 10 
Obtained by Men of 
Group I 1 2 4 3 5 6 8 7 9 10 
Obtained by Men 4 2 3 1 5 6 7 8 9 10 
of Grou II 
Obtained by Men of 3 2 4 1 5 6 8 7 9 10 
Grows I&II Together .n. P ". , 
Mean of Rows 1-41.75 451.75 7.5 505 902 3 8.5 8.75 
TABLE V4 t 
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positions of each variable as predicted by women and men 
of the two groups separately. The last row gives the 
means of these four rows. Rows 5,6 and 7 represent 
the rank ordering of the same data as provided by the 
original scores of men of the two groups separately as 
well as their combined means. It should be realized that 
because of different measures, with different means and 
standard deviations, employed in gauging the four 
personality dimensions and the six value orientations 
the rank orderings presented above are of no other signi- 
ficance than to illustrate the consistency between 
different groups as to the relative prominence or trend 
of the variables involved. 
By definition, the coefficient of concordance is 
W= Sum of squares between columns 
Total sum of squares. 
Now, it can be shown that in an m by n table of ranks - 
where m represents the number of judges and n the number 
of objects judged or ranked - the sum of squares between 
columns equals 
n(ZmX)2 
- mit (nf. l)2 Between 
m4 
and the total sum of squares is: Total m(n3-n) 
12 
Calculating for the data of Table .. 
V4, the total sum of 
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squares is found to be 330 and the sum of squares between 
columns equals 305.5. This gives a value of w= . 925 
which is significant at much beyond . 01 level. This 
amounts to an average rank correlation coefficient of .9 
which is also significant at much bond . 01 level. This 
is exactly equal to the rank correlation between the 
means of the men of the two groups. That is to say, 
the agreement among the predictions of the four groups 
of men and women as to the relative standing of men on 
our ten variables is as high as the agreement between the 
two groups of men actually involved in this investigation. 
However, when the pooled ranks of the predictions (row 8) 
are correlated with the pooled ranks of the two groups 
of men (row ýJ) the index of relationship comes down to 
. 785 which, although highly significant, is smaller than 
both the correlation between the ranked means of men and 
their predicted values. 
This high degree of consistency among different 
groups of predictors can be taken as an indication that 
these predictions are based on something more than 
haphazard allocation of responses. Further evidence comes 
from the fact that all over-estimations and under- 
estimations are in the right direction as indicated by 
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studies concerned with the standardization of the measures 
employed. The question arises whether the means of 
these predictions can be regarded as representing the 
same population as the means of our two reale samples. 
This can be approached by an ordinary normal test of the 
significance of the difference between the means of each 
sample and the means of the predictions.. As some of the 
variances are not homogeneous and the number of the 
predictors and predictee on whom the means are based are 
not the same, so t is calculated according to the 
following formula: 
N1 N2 
In the case of predictions made by men themselves - of the 
means of men - or, later on, by women themselves - as both 
means are produced by the same subjects and thus are 
likely to be correlated, the formula has to take account 
of this correlation. The following formula was used for 
this purpose: t= xl x2 
Sd/ VINT 
in which Sd represents the estimate of the population 
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standard deviation of the differences between paired 
observations and N stands for the number of such paired 
observations. For the first formula the value of t 
significant at . 05 
( tl) or . 01 
(t2) level is cbtermined 
by finding the corresponding value of the t for N1 and N2 
separately and combining them according to: 
t. 05_ 
(SE, 2) (tl) + (sE2)2(t2) 
` 
SE12 1- SE 22 
(Edwards, 1954,273-275). Using this formula, we find 
that differences between the means of men's original 
scores and women's predictions of the same are significant 
on the variables of E (t= 2.09), N (t = 2.28); Economic 
value (t - 5), Political value (t = 4.26), Religious 
value (t = 3.6), social value (t - 3.8) and Radicalism 
(t = 2.66) and insignificant on the variables of 
Aesthetic value, Theoretical value and Tendermindedness 
for the first group. 
For the secnnd group, the differences between 
the original means of men and their predictions by women 
are significant on the following variables: Neuroticism 
(t - 3.08), Aesthetic value (t - 2.69), Economic value 
(t - 3.9), Political value (t 3.63), Religious value 
(t - 3.04), social value (t - 2.77), Radicalism (t - 2.9) 
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and tender-mindedness (t= 8.4), Differences on the 
variables of Extroversion and the theoretical value fall 
short of significance at any established level. 
Coming to the differences between the men's 
original means and their own predictions of the same, 
following variables produce significant results for the 
first group and the rest fall short of any recognized 
level of statistical significance: Ex(t s 2.14, df - 17), 
N (t - 2.46), Econ. value (t - 3.9), Pol. value (t - 2.58), 
social value (t = 2.76) and Radicalism (t - 2.04). 
For the second group of men, the difference 
between the original and predicted means of the following 
variables are significsn t: Neuroticism (t - 2.44, df = 10) 
Economic value(t = 3.2), Political value (t = 3.5), 
Religious value (t = 2.55) and Social value (t - 2.3). 
The remaining differences are insignificant. 
The conclusion to be derived from these data is 
that while both men and women under study demonstrate an 
impressively consistent awareness as to the probable 
direction and relative prominence of the mean response of 
men in general, their predictions fail to coincide with 
the actual mean responses of such random sample of male 
population as our two groups may represent. Of course, 
the small size of our two samples and lack of ro pj: per 
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sampling techniques in their selection puts severe 
restrictions on the interpretation of these observations. 
Yet, within certain limits, this generalization seems 
to be tenable and well in line with general expectation 
as borne out by studies of social stereotypes and 
categorical thinking. As was earlier argued, the aim of 
such categories and stereotypes is to simplify the 
stimulus field facing the individual. Simplification 
usually means generalization and more or less over- 
simplification and does not necessarily bear any one-to- 
one relationship to the verities of the objective 
environment. In terms of our earlier argument, human 
minds seem to be quite capable in estimating the pro- 
babilistic texture of their environment but, to this end, 
they often have to make some sacrifices in terms of 
precision and exactitude. In our zeal to predict what 
goes with what, we tend to overlook the concomittant 
question of how far or to what extent. 
In support of the above contention, it is 
interesting to note that in both groups men's predictions 
of the responses of an average man of their own sub- 
cultural background shows the same kinds of significant 
differences with their own responses as women's predictions 
of the same and in the same direction. Still, a perusal 
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of figures . LV3 & rV4 shows that in both instances men's 
predictions are closer to their real means than women's 
predictions. This can be taken as an indication of men's 
superior empathic ability and as such will be discusse& 
later on. Another possible interpretation is that, 
men being better versed in the general preferences of 
their own sex, and possessing an ever-ready yardstick 
of their own selves, need less over-simplification than 
women. In other words, men seem to have based their 
predictions on somewhat different - and more or less lower- 
base lines than women- a base line nearer to their own 
responses. In this respect it is interesting to note 
that there appears to be some difference between the two 
groups of men in terms of the base lines or frames of 
reference adopted. Thus, for example, men of group I 
who average just under six on Neuroticism make predictions 
on the same dimension which average just over four. 
Whereas, men of group II who average just under nine on 
the same dimension predict the mean of other men in 
general to be just over, seven. In other words, those 
who are more neurotic themselves may tend to see their 
species as more neurotic than they actually are but less 
neurotic than themselves. 
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B. Prediction of Women's Responses: Table 'V5 summarizes 
the means of women on the ten variables as predicted by 
men and women and actually obtained by women themselves, 
for the two groups of this study separately. The same 
results are graphically presented in Figures . ': 
V5 - 1V6. 
A comparison of these two figures with figures .: V3 - IV4 
above reveals that both men and women tend to show less 
variation in predicting the stereotyped responses of 
women than they showed in predicting the responses of 
men. This is particularly true mit the case of the Group 
1. This observation can be accounted for in various ways. 
The most plausible explanation seems to lie in the fact 
that human societies, more or less universally, have 
placed more emphasis on the cultureal Terms of behaviour 
for women than for men. In almost all human communities 
women seem to be subjected to much stricter patterns of 
role-behaviour than men. Biological periodioities ands 
likelihoods have, no doubt, had something to do with 
this. Ailport's (1954b) ingroup-outgroup theory of 
have 
prejudice and stereo, _type 
formation 3nu. also^had something 
to do with this prejudiced position of our "better halves. " 
The preponderance of stereotype cliches and jokes con- 
cerning various aspects of women's conduct bears witness 
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Variables 
Group Is, N =37 
E N Aes. . Eco. Pol. Rel.. Soc. The. Rad. Tend. 
As predicted 
by Mean . 6.8 6.9 12.5 14.8 9.1 14.9 23.8 14.5 6.6 9.1 
Women, Na36 
S. D. 2.9 3.05 5.33 3.65 3.24 5.13 3.78 3.94 2.47 1.95 
As predicted 
by Mean 6.9 7.8 12.8 13.3 10.1 15.7 22.4 15.7 6.4 8.94 
MenjN"19 
S. D. 2,94 3.34 3.90 3.32 3.95 4.91 3.5 3.09 2.22 2.62 
Women's own 
Mean 6.27 5 11.2 14 9.6 15.8 22.3 17.1 6.4 8.65 
scores 
(19= 37) S. D. 2.93 2.42 4.32 4.83 3.73 8.35 3.71 3.65 2.89 2.33 
Mean of I-II 




5.56 9.9 13.7 12.1 8.65 15.9 25.8 13.8 6.25 8.75 
. Women, S. D. 3.7 2.2 3.7 3.13 3.5 4.56 3.06 3.56 1.87 1.5 
As predicted 
by Mean 5.36 9.46 14.6 12.9 9.9 18.5 21.8 12.3 5 8.36 
Men, N=11 
S. D. 3.18 3 4.36 4.1 3.18 4.6 3.46 5.27 2.36 1.2V 
Women's own 
Mean 7.9 8.7 11.3 10.7 10.3 16.4 24 17.2 6.8 8.4 scores 
N=27 S. D. 2.41 3.2 4.47 2.88 3.64 9.14 3.27 3.3 2.35 2.57 
TAFLE V5 $ MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF WOES ORIGINAL AND 
























FIGURE V5 : MEANS OF WOMEN'S SCORES ON VARIOUS DIMENSIONS AND 
THEIR PREDICTED VALUES. 
WOMEN'S ACTUAL MEANS: 
GROUP I: AS PREDICTED BY MEN: . ý. ý. ý.. ý. ý, ý,.,. AS PREDICTED BY WOMEN: .................... 











































aý [E Gam. [ÖME lei 
FIGURE V6 s MEANS OF WOMEN'S SCORES ON VARIOUS DIMENSIONS AND 
THEIR PREDICTED VALUES. 
GROUP II : WOMEN'S ACTUAL MEANS 
WOMEN'S MEANS AS PREDICTED BY MEN: 
WOMEN'S MEANS AS PREDICTED BY WOMEN: ............... 
- 28,6- 
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to this hypothesis. But the apparent closeness between 
the original and predicted scores should not be allowed 
to hide the fact that the amount of agreement in terms of 
the direction of deviations between different groups of 
predictors in predicting women's responses is in fact 
much less than that observed in connection with the 
prediction of men's responses. While in the case of men 
only one pair of predictors differed in the sign of 
deviation, i. e. men of group II underestimated men's 
standing on the theoretical value while all other three 
groups had overestimated it, in women's case five out of 
the twenty pairs of predictions made by men and women 
of the two groups point in opposite directions. In other 
words, while men of group I overestimate women's position 
on Economic value and underestimate it on the Political 
value, women do the reverse. In the same manner, men 
have overestimated women's position on the religious 
value and underestimated it on social value and tender- 
mindedness, whereas women predictors have done the opposite. 
Comparing the two groups together, it is observed that 
both men and women of group I have overestimated women's 
scores on the dimension of extraversion but both women 
and men of group II have underestimated it, doing so, 
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interestingly enough, despite their own very high 
position on the same dimension. 
Nevertheless, there is a very high degree of 
consistency between the four groups of predictions in 
terms of the relative prominence of different measures. 
This consistency is reflected in a Kendall Coefficient 
of . 948 which is very highly significant. The rank 
correlation coefficient equivalent of this agreement for 
the groups of original scores amounts to . 99 which is 
also highly significant. 
Considering the volume of differences between 
the actual and predicted values of various measures, it 
is found that, for group I. only the difference between 
the predictions made by men and the actual scores of women 
on Neuroticism is significant. (t - 2.24). For the 
second group, significant differences between men's 
predictions and women's actual responses are found on 
Extraversion (t = 2.4) and the theoretical value (t = 2.86) 
at between . 05 and . 01 level and on Radicalism, Aesthetic 
and social values between .1 and . 05 level of significance 
(t being 2.07,2.11 and 1.86 respectively). For women 
of group I differences between actual and predicted means 
(i. e. predicted by women) are more or less significant on 
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Neuroticiim (t - 4.2 ), Aesthetic (t 
(t - 3.75) and the Theoretical value 
women of group II the differences be 
predicted values of Extraversion (t 
Political (t=3.6), Aesthetic (t = 
(t = 2.84) and Theoretical value (t 
garded as significant. 
- 2.1. df - 36), Social 
(t - 10.7) and for 
tween actual and 
=3.4df-15), 
4.2), Economic 
= 3.47) can be re- 
A further point of interest that emerges from 
figures IV5 and IV6 is that in six out of ten cases in 
group I and in three cases in group II men's predictions 
for women are closer to women's actual means than women's 
own predictions. This is in contrast to the finding 
with respect to the predictions of men's responses 
where in all cases men's predictions were closer to their 
actual scores than women's predictions. 
The ckifference between the two sexes in this 
respect can be tested by Fisher's Exact Probability Test 
(Siegel, 1956,96 -104), If we represent mean pre- 
dictions nearer to the actual means by a plus sign and 
those further away from the actual means by a minus sign 
and put the number of plus and minus signs obtained by 
men and women in a2x2 contingency table we obtain the 
of 
following table for predictionsnmen's responses which is 
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10 B = 0 to 
C 0 D - 10 
%0 t0 Zo 
From Finney's table of critical v: -lues for Fisher's test 
(Table I in Siegel) we find the difference to be sig- 
nificant beyond , ny accepted level of significanee. For 
the difference between men and ioiilen in the case of pre- 






6 4 10 
4 6 10 




3 7 10 
7 3 10 
10 10 20 
Tone of the differences; sere, however, reach any level 
11 
of significance. 
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C. Predicting Specific others' responses - In this 
section of the test subjects were required to fill in 
the test battery from the point of view of two specific 
individuals in their imrlediate environment, one of 
whom they knew well and one whom they did not know well. 
In this w, _iy it was hoped to have ueasure of the 
influence of acaunint, snce on the Pccur. -cy of ý ocia. l 
perception. 
The first interesting point in analysing 
this tusrt of the-! data is the tendency for both men ; -+nd 
women to choose sore of their own sex for the category of 
"best-known other" and riore of the opposite sex for 
the category of the "least-known other". The folltwing 
table summarizes this tendency. 
Chosen lest Known Least Known 
Chooser iLen l. omen Iý_en . Voiýýen 
Totsi 
Men 8 43 9 24- 
Group I 
Women 3 23 14 12 52 
N'en 19 27 14 42 
Group II 
Women 5 22 16 11 54 
Total 1 35 1 51 1 40 1 46 1 172 
A X2 test for the whole sample shows that the trend in 
the case of the best-know,,. n o Cher is hi hly significant 
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(X 2= 39.2) whereas the trend on the criter1 i of 
least-known other (X2 - 6.08) is significant just over 
. 02 level. That is to say, there seems to be a sig- 
nificant tendency among both men and women to choose 
their best known friends from among their own-sex 
acquaintances. Another interesting observation is the 
relatively high proportion of mutual choices on the 
criterion of best known other. This amounts to 24 - . 63 
39 
in the first group and to 28 - . 58 in the second group. 4U 
In view of the fact that each subject was allowed only 
one choice, and, particularly in the case of group I, 
many choices could not be reciprocated because some of 
the choices went to subjects who were not present at the 
time of testing, this proportion is quite high and 
significantly higher than what whuld happen on pure 
chance level. The distribution of the number of choices 
is also indicative of a sociometric situation, with a 
considerable nupber of subjects receiving no mention 
and others being mentioned by 2 or three people. The 
proportion of reciprocal choices on the criterion of 
least-known other is zero in the first group and only 
6/48 Q . 125 in the second group. 
-292- 
In view of the above mentioned tendency to choose one's 
best. -known acquaintance from among his or her own sex 
and one's least-known object of prediction from among 
the members of the opposite sex, it is apparent that 
some allowance must be made for the factor of sex in 
interpreting the results. 
Table 1V6 summarizes the means of predictions 
made by the men and women of the two groups under study 
for the best-known and the least-known individual 
separately. The same data are graphically presented in 
figures : 
_V7 -L 
V109 Here the total mean of the group's 
actual scores is also plotted to make the comparison 
between actual and predicted responses readily possible. 
But, as the predictions are only for part of the group 
and the actual mean is based upon the group as a whole, 
the comparison between the two means must not be 
interpreted too freely. 
Considering Figure : ß_V7 and -.: 
V9 - the means of 
predictions for the beat known other - we find that men 
and women are ih agreement in overestimating the means 
of their "best-known others" on the variables of Radicalism 
Extraversion, political and economic value in Group I, and 
only on the Economic value in Group II; they agree in 
underestimating the position of their subjects on the 
tariables of Social value (Group I) and on Neuroticism, 
ANS ON t 
PREDICTED BY: 













MEN for the B. K. U. 7 7.6 10 18.3 10.2 11.3 20.4 . 9.8 6.9 7.1 
101 for the L. K. O. 5.8 5 12.2 13.5 6.9 19 18-71 17-1 5.8 9.4 
GROUP I 
WOMEN for the B. K. 0. 8 4.9 11.7 14.4 10.4 15 20.6 16.8 8.1 8.5 
WO MOT for the L. K. O. 7.6 4.4 13.7 15.7 13.9 10.2 18.8 17.4 8.2 7.9 
GROUP II: 
MEN for the B. K. O. 7.2 8.3 11.7 13-4 
110.6 
113-5 
21.4 15.4 7.5, 7e2 
EHEN for the L. K. O. 6.5 8.3 13.3 11.6 9.7 15.3 20.2 15.7 6 7.4 
WOMEN for the B. K. O. 7.4 8.5 11,4 13.8 10 16.3 21*9 16.5 7.3 8.5 
WOMEN for the L. K. O. 6.1 7.1 13 14.8 13.3 10.9 21.4 16.6 8 7.0 
TABLE V6 $ Means of pred. iotions for the Best Known (B. K. O) and Least- 
Knkwn Other (L. K. O. ). 
























V7 : PREDICTED MEANS OF THE BEST-KNOWN OTHER ON 
VARIOUS MEDIA OF PREDICTION. 
MEN'S PREDICTIONS-..... -... 
GROUP I: 14YpMER'S PREDICTIONS """""""""""""""" 
ACTUAL MEANS OF THE GROUP mmwý 

















FIGURE V 8: PREDICTED MEANS OF THE LEAST KNOWN OTHER. 
MEN'S PREDICTIONS "-"-"-" " 
GROUP I WOMEN'S PREDICTIONS ""-"""-"-"".. . 
ACTUAL MEANS OF THE GROUP 
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FIGURE V9 : MEANS OF THE PREDICTIONS FOR THE BEST-KNOWN OTHER. 
AS PREDICTED BY MEN : ý"-"-. -"-"- 
GROUP II : 
AS PREDICTED BY WOMEN:. -... - 
ACTUAL 
.. 
MEANS OF THE GROUP: 

















8 . ý. . iý 









2 cm p 
E-4 
5ý 
FIGURE V10 : PREDICTED MEANS OF THE LEAST-KNOWN OTHER. 
MEN'S PREDICTIONS -"-" -- -" - 
GROUP II s WOMEN'S PREDICTIONS """--"-" "- """"" 
ACTUAL MEANS OF THE GROUP 
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ý, 
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Extraversion, Political, Aesthetic, Theoretical and 
Opocial value in Group II. On other variables they 
disagree. Thus, while men of Group I see their best- 
known friends as more neurotic than their whole sample, 
wo 
women see them as less neurotic, while/men think of their 
best-known friends as above average on tendermindness 
and aesthetic value and as under-average on theoretical 
value, men see their friends as above avergge on 
theoretical vekie. Similarly, in Group II, men regard 
their best-known others"as under-average on religious 
value and tendermindedness, but women consider their 
"best-known others" to be above-average. On the rest of 
the variables men and women are in agreement as to the 
direction of the deviation of their estimates from the 
group mean. Almost all these over-estimations and under- 
estimations are in line with the expectation derived from 
a consideration of the sex of the majority of the others 
in question. That is to say, the same general tendency 
which was observed in connection with the prediction 
of the responses of others in general is also present 
here. But the predictions -Wade for the best-known other 
show little of the jagged graphs of the predictions made 
for others in general. Instead, both predictions made by 
men and women lie very close to each other and to the 
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actual mean of the respective group. The agreement 
is particularly striking in the case of Group II, Figure 
-V9 , where none of 
the differences between the two 
predicted means - with the possible exception of that 
on religious value - or the differences between either 
of them and the actual mean of the group are large enough 
to be significant. This is in glaring contrast to this 
group's predictions for others in general as depicted in 
Figs. -V4 and : _16. 
In the case of Group I. Fig. ÄV7, the 
line representing women's predictions lies very close to 
that representing the actual mean of the group, so that 
move of the differences between the two means can be 
suspected of being significant. Of the differences between 
the two predicted means, only those on Neuroticism and 
Economic, Religious and Theoretical value differ from 
the actual values by an amount approaching a significant 
level. Regarding the prediction of the least-known 
others' responses, Figs. s_V8 and ß_110, we are faced with 
a much more jagged graph and with much larger differences 
between the predictions of men and women. Again Group II 
presents a much smoother graph and much smaller 
differences both between the two classes of predictions 
and with the actual scores of the group. Here both men 
and women regard their least-known friend as under- 
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average on Neuroticism, Extraversion, Tendermindedness 
and Theoretical and Social values and above average 
on Aesthetic value. On the other hand, men think of 
their least-known friend as above average on Religious 
value and under-average on Radicalism, Political value 
and Economic value. Of the differences between the 
predictions of men and women only those on Religious, 
Political and Economic values and perhaps that on 
Radicalism, approach significance. In group I, men see 
their least-known frrends as under-average on Neuroticism, 
Radicalism, Extroversion, Political value, Economic value 
and social value, whereas women under-estimate their least 
known predictee on Neuroticism, Religious value and social 
value. In a similar manner, men think of their least- 
known colleagues as above average on tendermindedness, 
aesthetic value and religious value, while women regard 
them as above average nn radicalism, extroversion, political 
value, aesthetic value and economic value. Here the 
differences between the predictions of men and the actual 
means of the group on the variables of Religious value, 
Social value and possibly Political value are significant. 
For women, significant differences are obtained on 
Religious value, social value, political value and possibly 
on Radicalism and Aesthetic value. 
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To sum up this section, it appears that 
subjects show much more ability in predicting the 
responses of their well-known friends than of their 
less-known acquaintances. Moreover, they seem to deviate 
little from the mean of their group in predicting the 
responses of well-known others. In other words, while 
keeping in line with general expectation as to the 
prevalent response trend of each category, they resist 
being swayed away by such over-generalizations as were 
observed in the case of predicting the responses of 
others in general. This seems to be due to the fact that 
in predicting the responses of specific others subjects 
tend to base their guesses on the observation of 
individual cases rather than the subjective probability 
of the response concerned, hence the closer resemblance 
between the predicted and obtained means of the group. 
This is in complete agreement with the conceptual 
analysis presented earlier in this study. 
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ACCURACY OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION 
So far we have been dealing with the means 
of various groups over different kinds of predictions 
and have compared these means with the means of actual 
scores irrespective of individual differences. Now 
it is time to find out the degree of agreement between 
each individual prediction and its equivalent in terms 
of the actual responses of the category of others con- 
cerned. 
This is done through expressing each prediction 
as a deviation from the original scores. Such deviation 
scores have been found very useful in various kinds of 
psychological research involving the comparison of test 
scores or profiles of one person with that of another 
person. Cronbach and Gleser (1953) have discussed the 
theoretical foundations of D-score,, and have enumerated 
its advantages over similar indices of profile similarity. 
Considering only two persons, we have the set 
of X1 for person 1 and the set of X2 for person 2. With- 
out placing any restriction upon our data, we may regard 
the X1 and X2 as the coordinates of two points P1 and P2 
in a K-dimensional space. Now, the more similar the 
measures of two individuals the closer will their points 
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lie in the IC-dimensional space, and conversely, the 
further apart the points the more dissimilar are the 
corresponding measurements. In this case, as we are 
comparing an estimate of a score against its true value, 
the similarity between the two can be taken as an index 
of the accuracy of the estimated measure. Accordingly 
we define the accuracy of a prediction as the linear 
distance between the respective points of the actual 
measurement and the estimates. Technically speaking, 
if we represent the two variables by orthogonal axes, 
the distance D between any two points may be easily 
obtained by use of the generalized Pythagarean rule: 
D12 = '(x1 - x2)2. D2 can be used directly as a 
measure of similarity between the two scores or as an 
index of accuracy. In most cases, however, it is pre- 
ferable to obtain D, since the larger differencesbet- 
wean persons are much exaggerated in squaring. D is 
less skewed than D2 but is not normally distributed 
(Cronbach and Gleser , 1953,459). 
For the above reason we employed D rather than 
D2. Four sets of ten D scores were derived for each 
individual by comparing his predictions against the 
means of the men and women in his group and the actual 
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responses of the two specific individuals for whom he 
had made predictions. From the point of view of the 
accuracy of social perception the sign of D was irrele- 
vant, because it made little psychological sense 
whether one achieved a score above or below the criterion 
of accuracy. So the sign difference was disregarded. 
Obviously the larger the size of D the less the amount 
of accuracy. D is in fact a measure of inaccuracy 
rather than accuracy and should be interpreted as such. 
Having found the values of D for the four types 
of social perception the means of D-scores were cal- 
culated separately for each of the two groups involved 
as well as the men and women of each group separately. 
These values are presented in Table below. * 







jEES FOIL MEN 
AND WlW OF THE TAO STUDIES GROUPS SEPARiTELY. (Numbers 
in paranthesis represent the peroentage of error) 
ºr 
Est Reu Ra ' Ten Aes Ec ' Pol Rel Soc The Sum 
Men in 2 3 2-4- 2 2.1 4. " 3.2 5.5 3.6 3 31. 
'General 1( 2-5H 17) 1 1 11 18 12 10 
Women in 2.2 306 1.7 2.1 306 2.7 3.3 4.2 3.1 2.7 28, 
OF General 1 30 12 1 12 11 10 
GROUP I Best Known 3.2 4.8 2 .6 .8 .84 "9 3.6 3.4 43.2 
Other 2 26 1 1 1 0 12 11 
Least Known 3.4 2.9 4 .2 04- . 5.2 8 2.8 4.1 40 
Other 28 2 2 12 10 17) K 2 1 
Men in 2.21 3-4 2.6 2.1 3.5 5" 5.3 7.6 4.2 2.9 39 
General 18) J28) , 19) (1 12 1 18 2 10 
IOMEN Women in 2,3 3 1.7 1.6 3.2 3 3 4.4 3.5 3.8 29.3 
OF General 1 L? 
,q 
'12) 12 11 10 10 1 12 1 
GROUP I Best -Known 3.2 3 2.1 2.7 3.6 3.2 3.9 6.8 4.9 3.2 36.5 
Other 2M 2 1 12 11 1 2 16 11 
Least-Known 3.1 3.8 3 2.9 5.7 4" 5.6 7.6 5.6 3.8 45.4 
Other 26 32) L'21) 21 1 2 1 1 
Men in 2.2 2.9 1. 1.2 3.1 4" 3.5 5.4 306 202 29.5 
General 18 2 10 8 10 12 18 12 16 
Women in 3.2 3 2. 1. 4.4 4. 3.2 4.6 3.5 5.3 34.8 OF 
General 26 
.1 
2 51 1 7) 71 a L2 11 1 12 17) 1 
GROUP II Best Known 1.8 2.9 2. 2. 4.3 203 4.1 4.3 4. `2,8 3108 
Other 15A 24) 17) k19) 8 1 1 
Least Known '2. 3. 2. 2. 03 4.2 1 5 5 6 " 5" 3.4 41" 
Other 2 0 16 20 21) 1 4) 
& 
1 18 11 
Men in 2.4 3.6 1.2 2. ý 4, - 706 7.2 8.6 4.1 3 45.5 
General 20 30) 8 21 
. 
16 2 2 29) t1 10 
Women in 3.9 2.2 1. 10 3.7 3.1 3" 4" 6 3 6 3. 30*8 
wmtff General 1 18 1 11 12 10 12 1 10 12 
Best-Known 3.1 3.2 2o2 2.2 3.2 3. 3. 4.9 3.7 3 32" 
OF, ; Other 26) 127) 
16 11 12 12 16 12 
J10) 
GäoÜP II Least-Known 3 2.9 2.3 2 503 5 4.4 5.4 4.9 3" 39.0 
Other 25 24) 16) 
J14) 
18 17 18 1 13 
2.7 3.2 2.2 2o3 4 .1 40 9 4 3.4 3 .2 Mean of all 16 rows 23) (27) 16) 16) 13) 14) 14) 20) 13) 11) 
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The means and standard deviations of D-scores 
on different media of prediction and for different kinds 
of predictees for the group as a whole are given in the 
following table. 
Sß 
E N Ac Ec Po Re So Th Rad Ten Ten Ten 
omen i 
in generalSD 2.07 1.82 2.59 2.53 2.21 2.92 2.18 2.91 1.53 1.19 8.75 
en M'2.18 3.25 3.51 5.56 5.161 7.31 3.88 2.93 2.01 2.06,37.75 
in general SD'1.49 2.07 2.76 3.42'3.43 '', 3.32 2.51 ; 1.92 1.62 1.57 10.86 
Best known M! 2.88 3.13 3.81 3.69i3.70 
16,30 
4,10 3.21 2.12 2.57 35.51 
they SD, 2.19 2.41 2.64 2.64; 2.49 5.20 3.39 3.05 1.84 11.66 12.39 
2 2 ` 1 ' 7 ' 1 east M 3.09 3.35 5.0 4. 2 5.44 6.41 5.0613.89 12.76 41.9 2.75 
known SD ; 2.10 2.36 3.06 2.90; 3.45 5.45i3.40ý2.72 2.061.56 12.25 
other 
Table . V8: 
Means and S. Ds of D-scores on various media 
of prediction and for different types of others for the 
group as a whole. 
Now, because of the variation in the possible range of 
error in our three test forms the values of D given above 
are not directly comparable The whole range of our 
measure of E and N was 12 whereas each of our value- 
scales could vary from 0 to 30-Obviously a D-score of 
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say 2 derived from these two tests can not be regarded 
as equal. To make them comparable we must convert 
them into a ratio of the possible range of error or 
deviation existing for each test. The numbers in 
paranthesis under each D-score in Table V7 whow these 
ratios. V7 & V8 
Looking at TablesNtwo consistent trends emerge. 
In the first place it is easily seen that the sizes and 
ratios of deviation scores vary from one medium of pre- 
diction to the other. In other words, subjects do not 
show the same proportion of error in making predictions 
on all of the ten media of judgement involved. In the 
second place the sizes of D scores seem to vary with the 
kind of predictee concerned. 
Judging by the last row of Table .. _V7, which 
gives the mean of D-scores over all ten variables, it 
seems that the four groups of men and women studied here 
have produced the smallest amount of error in predicting 
the responses of others in the area covered by our 
theoretical value scale. Conversely, they have shown 
the largest amount of error in making predictions in the 
response-area covered by our Neuroticism scale. Similar- 
ly, predictions in the area of social value have pro- 
duced the second smallest ratio of D-score and those in 
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the area of Extraversion have resulted in the second 
largest ratio of error. Aesthetic value comes third 
in terms of the size of D and is followed by the Eoo- 
nomic value, Political value, Radicalism, Tendermindedness 
and the Relighus value. 
This trend is also more or less true of the 
relative positions of the ten variables in each of the 
16 rows of Table V7 . To gain a quantitative index of 
this trend, it is possible to rank the values of D- 
scores in each row (See Table V9 ) according to their 
sizes and to express the degree of agreement between 
different rows by a Rank Correlation Coefficient. A 
more efficient and time saving device, however, is 
Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance. Calculated 
separately for the four groups of predictors, the values 
of W, Coefficient of Concordance, vary all the way from 
. 53 
(P< 
. 05) men of group II, to . 76 women of group II. 
All these values of IV are significant at . 05 level and 
beyond. Thus within our four sub-groups, the ten 
dimensions of prediction tend to produce consistently 
high or low measures of error. For the group as a whole, 
V9 
i. e. for the 16 rows of Table the value of Coefficient 
of Concordance is found to be . 85 (P(, O1) which bespeaks 
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a very high degree of consistency indeed. 
All in all, then, our three different media 
of prediction tend to occupy highly consistent positions 
in terms of the accuracy of predictions attempted on 
them. First comes the values test, closely followed 
by the Inventory of Social Attitudes and, not so closely, 
by the short Personality Questionnaire. The finding 
is well in line with the conceptual analysis presented 
in Chapter II. Values are basically products of social 
life and heavily dependent upon the cultural climate in 
which the individual finds himself. A great deal of 
formal and informal education consists of no more than the 
persistent inculcation of the basic values of the cul- 
tural group concerned. No wonder, then, that every 
individual should possess a clear picture of the re- 
lative prevalence of the value dimensions covered by 
the Test of Values. The only unexpected finding is 
the high value of D-scores observed in predicting the 
Religious Value. In terms of crude D-score this value 
has tended to produce the largest in almost every case. 
In other words, subjects have persistently tended to 
commit more error in predicting others' responses on 
this dimension than any other dimension. The main 
reason for this seems to lie in the large variance of 
- w «_... ý.. -310 
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TABLEJ9y{, 4ank-orderingsy9f thepredioted, meansaccording to their 
relative sizes. 
MEDIA OF PREDICTION ; It aI I ITEN; AES: ECOIPOL4EEL: SOC; THE: 
GROUP Is Men in General 7 10 85163942 
. MEN 
Women in General 9 10 5. 5,8 5.5 1.5 4 7 3 1.5 
Best-Known Other 8 10 5 7 3 6 4 9 2 1 
Least-Known Other 9 7 10 6 3 2 5 8 1 4 
WOMEN Men in General 6 10 8 4 2 7 5 9 3 1 
Women in General 9 10 6 5 3 1.5 1.5 8 4 7 
Best-Known Other 10 9 5 7 3 1 4 8 6 2 
Least-Knowrn Other 9_ 
10 
7 6 5 2 3 8 4 1 
GROUP II = 
ON Men in General 
8.5 10 2 1 3 6 4 8.5 5 7 
Women in General 10 9 7 1 5 4 2 6 3 8 
Best-Known Other 5.5 10 8 9 4 1 3 5.5 7 2 
Least-Known Other 9 10 3 7 8 2 4 6 5 1 
IwOM T Men in General 5 10 1 6 4 8 7 9 3 2 
Women in General 10 9 7 3 6 2 4 8 1 5 
Best-Known Othdºr 9 10 7 6 3 4 2 8 5 1 
Least Known Other 10 9 4 2 7 6 3 8 5 1 
TOTAL /16 9 10 6 7 3 4 5 8 2 1 
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of the religious value scores. It is apparent from 
the large size of the standard deviation going with 
the religious value - 8.52 for the whole group - that 
this particular dimension, or, in more precise terms, 
the verbal items representing this particular area, is 
not enjoying the same degree of group consensus as other 
value areas. The sheer size of its standard deviation 
is indicative how widely subjects differ in responding 
to verbal situations constituting this dimension. 
The reason for this perhaps is that these 
situations or items do not convey the same meanings - 
connotative or denotative - for different individuals. 
They are not of the same cognitive or emotional sign- 
ficance for different perceivers. Naturally this 
variation in interpretation cannot be expected to stop 
short at the personal level. Subjects are apt to show 
a similar amount of disagreement in interpreting these 
statements from the point of view of others as well. 
Hence the observed large variation in predicted values 
of the religious value and the greater amount of error 
in making predictions on it. The higher amount of 
accuracy in making predictions on the Inventory of 
Social Attitudes is also well in line with the general 
expectation. The whole process of socialization, we 
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are told by social psychologists, is no more than a 
process of forming proper attitudes - that is, functional 
states of readiness to respond in a consistent manner - 
in relation to the norms or values of ones reference 
group (Sherif and Sherif, 1956). In acquiring atti- 
tudes we do not only learn how to react towards certain 
stimulis or stimulus situations but we also learn what 
to expect of others of our own cultural group in the 
face of a similar situation. We also learn the fre- 
quency of occurence of each kind of response as well as 
the probability of social reward or punishment associated 
with each type of response. Putting this information 
together, then, it is quite easy to predict the most 
probable responses of each type of others to the verbal 
situations making the inventory of social attitudes. 
Yet the inventory has produced less accuracy 
than the values test. This is due to the fact that not 
all items of the inventory possess the same degree of 
objectivity or transparence. Some items are of doubt- 
ful social consensus, like the items making up the 
Religious Value. Others are of a more or less contro- 
versial character and subject to the censorship of the 
perceptual defence mechanisms - both on the part of the 
predictor-a and the original respondent. All these 
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influences work in the direction of diminishing the 
amount of accuracy. 
The amount of error associated with the short 
personality inventory is the largest of all. Items 
making up this inventory are more of a personal and 
subjective nature. The subjects seem to have had 
little chance of learning the relative prevalence of 
the behaviour sketches involved. The referrent of 
these sketches being the subjects' own selves, there 
appears to be little objective clues as to the pro- 
bability of these being socially rewarded. The only 
possible clue is the social desirability of each item 
and of late most test designers have intentionally tried 
to reduce such clues. In the present inventory, items 
belonging to the dimension of Extraversion are, prima 
facie, of greater social desirability and this dimension 
has produced a smaller amount of error as compared with 
the dimension of Neuroticism. 
Looking back at Table V7 another trend becomes 
apparent: the amount of error varies with the kind of 
predictee involved. The last column of Table V7 
summarizes this trend. The same data ara presented in 
the following table. By looking at this table it is 
possible to discern any consistent trend or tendency 
to be more or less accurate in terms of the referrent 










dien Women Best- Least 
in in known known 
General General other other 
2 4 
31.6 28.1 43.2 40 
39.4 3 29.3 1 36.5 2 45.4 4 
29.5 1 34.8 3 31.8 2 41.6 
4 
45.5 4 30.8 1 32.6 2 39 
3 
36.5 30.7-5 36 
141.5 
Table via = Sum of D. scores over the ten measures for 
each type of other. 
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of perception. 
Thus men of group I tend to score lowest in 
predicting the responses of women in general, that is, 
they show superior ability in this respect, and to score 
highest, that is to prove less able in predicting the 
responses of their best-known frlendZ Their ability 
to predict the responses of men in general and those 
of their least-known acquaintances come second and third 
respectively. This is both in contrast to common-sense 
expectation and to the behaviour of the other three groups. 
All the remaining three groups achieve the 
lowest mean D-score-and hence the highest accuracy score- 
in predicting the responses of their own-sex. -others- 
in-general, the second lowest mean error score in pre- 
dicting the responses of their best-known individual 
other and the third lowest D-score in forecasting the 
responses of the opposite-sex-others-in-general. The 
lowest amount of accuracy is demonstrated in the case of 
predicting the responses of the least known-other. 
The only exception in this general trend is 
observed in the case of the women of Group II who have 
fared better in predicting the responses of their least 
known other than their opposite-sex others-in-general. 
The agreement between the last three groups is represented 
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by a Coefficient of Concordance 'W= . 91 that is sign- 
ificant at . 05 level. Regarding the combined ranks 
of all four groups, the value ofW sinks to . 49 which 
is not significant because of the small number of ranks 
involved. 
Regarding the group as a whole predictions 
for the majority of women have resulted in the smallest 
value of D-scores (30.75). This is due to the pre- 
ponderence of women in the group as a whole. It may 
also be due to the tact, observed by Dymand (1950) that 
women in general are easier to empathize with. 
The significance of the differences between 
the D-scores for various types of predictees can be 
tested by a sign test. For this purpose the D-scores of 
each subject for the four kinds of predictees are com- 
pared against each other and the difference is repre- 
sented by a minus or plus sign according to the direction 
of difference from the first-chosen variable of each 
pair. Where the differences are 0 half of them are 
assigned a plus sign and half a minus gip. If there 
is no difference in the performance of the group under 
the two different conditions, then the probability that 
Xl > X2 will be equal to the probability that X2 ( X1, or i. 
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Thus, if this null hypothesis is true, we should expect 
the number of plus signs to be approximately equal to 
the number of minus signs for our pairs of observations. 
If we have too many plus or too many minus signs, we 
shall reject the null hypothesis. 
The null hypothesis may be evaluated in terms 
of the binomial distribution (P + Q)n, where P=Q=. 5, and 
n is equal to the number of pairs of observations. 
However, if there is at least 10 pairs of observations, 
we may make an approximate test by first finding the 
mean and standard deviation of the binomial distribution 
as given by the formulae M= NP and Q'= NP' respectively. 
Then the value of z can be obtained by the formula 
z=X-M where X is the observed frequency of plus or 
minus signs, whichever is the larger. The null hypo- 
thesis will be rejected at the 5 per cent level if the 
obtained value of z is equal to or greater than 1.96. 
The result of the test is summarised in the following 
table 
& In this table : Dw . D-scores in predicting the responses of 
women; Dm = D-scores in predicting the responses of men in 
general; Dbk = D-scores in predicting the responses of the 
best-known other, and D-lk D-scores in predicting the responses 
of the least known other. 
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I Dw- f Dw- l Dw- £ Dm- X Dm- 'E Dbk- , 1 Dm E Dbk f D1k Dbk I D1k f D1k 
L+ 15 11 10 16 15 12 
Group I 1- 41 30 31 24 j 25 28 
z= 3.48 2.59 2.881 1 1.28 2.16 
£+ 7 12 9 19 12 13 
Group II ; E- 19 14 18 7 14 36 
Z= 2.1 . 019 1.73 ý; 2.1 . 0191 3.29 
The £+ 21 23 19 35 27 25 
Whole 60 44 49 31 39 64 
Sample z= 5.64 ! 2.42 ! 3.63.24 ' 1.21 4.0 
It is apparent from this table that both groups 
have shown significantly higher sensitivity and hence 
lower D-scores in predicting the responses of women than 
the responses of men or the responses of the less known 
specific other. The same significant difference is 
observed between the D-scores relating to the well-known 
and the unknown others' responses. The well-known 
others have elicited significantly higher accuracy than 
the unknown others. But the two groups differ as to 
the difference between the accuracy in predicting the 
responses of wouen and those of the best-known other. 
Only the first group demonstrates a significant difference 
in favour of women's responses. The overall result 
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for the sample as a whole is also significant. Exactly 
the same is true of the differences between the D-scores 
in predicting women's responses and the responses of the 
least-known other. On the other hand, the difference 
between the D-scores is predicting men's responses and 
those in predicting the best-known other's responses is 
significant for the second but not for the first group 
or the sample as a whole. None of the differences 
between the D-scores for men and the least known other 
are significant. 
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GENERALITY OF ACCURACY SCORES- 
As was pointed out in Chapter I, the question 
of the generality or specificity of the ability under 
study has been investigated by various workers, but 
with inconsistent results. The question is whether 
subjects show the same degree of accuracy or inaccuracy 
in predicting the responses of various kinds of others 
facing various types of situations. In the present 
study, the hypothesis of generality will be accepted if 
the D-scores of subjects show a consistent tendency to 
vary with each other. 
to be of two main types. 
This tendency may be expected 
Subjects may demonstrate 
similar D-scores in predicting the responses of one type 
of other on various media of prediction; or they may, at 
least, show some consistency in their error scores from 
one kind or other to another. These two kinds of 
generality may be called within-other and between-other 
generality. The first kind pertains to the ability 
to predict the different response tendencies of one 
individual - or one class of individuals - and the 
second type applies to the capacity to predict the 
respanýU of different individuals - or different cate" 
gories of individuals - over one or more of the media 
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of prediction. Still a third kind of generality may 
be obtained if subjects reveal a tendency to be more or 
less accurate on any particular medium of prediction 
irrespective of the other whose response is to be pre- 
dicted. 
On the basis of the findings of previous studies - 
as reviewed in Chapter I- one would expect to find a 
fair degree of consistency between the two principal 
types of predictions employed in this study, namely 
between the D-scores in predicting the responses of 
men and women in general and those in predicting the 
responses of the two specific individuals respectively. 
Our conceptual analysis of the process of prediction and the 
different clues utilized therefor. casts some doubt on 
this possibility. There are also other confounding 
factors working against such an expectation, the most 
important of these being the'sex differences between 
the two kinds of specific predictees. As will be 
remembered, our subjects showed an overwhelming pre- 
ference to choose as their best-known predictee one of 
their own sex and vice versa for the category of least- 
known other. If there be any tendency to be better- 
that is, more accurate - in predicting the responses of 
one type of others-in-general, it is quite natural that 
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this should be reflected in the accuracy of making 
predictions for one of the two types of specific, others. 
To investigate the hypothesis of generality, 
product moment correlations were run among D-scores on 
each of the ten media of prediction and for each of the 
four types of others. This produced a 40 by 40 
correlation matrix. To this was added 12 other vari- 
ables comprising the sums of D-scores and plus and minus 
signs on each task. These signs were indicative of 
whether a subject had under-estimated or over-estimated 
the responses of others. The burden of correlating all 
these variables was undertaken by the University of London 
Atlas Computer. The resulting correlation matrix is 
presented in the following four tables, each table 
representing correlations among D. scores achieved on 
one of the four tasks. For an N of 67 (df = 65) only 
values of r equal to . 24 could be regarded as signifi- 
cant at . 05 level. These r 's are indicated by under- 
lining in the text of the tables. 
As suggested above, the distribution of D.. 
scores is known to deviate from normality. This may 
cast some doubt as to the justifiability of employing 
product moment correlation coefficient in this respect. 
The t test for r assumes normality and homoscedasticity 
either for the vertical array or for the horizontal array 
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distribution. Nothing is assumed about the total X 
and Y distributions. But, as McNemar (1962, p. 138) 
has suggested, there is evidence, as with the t test 
for means, that sizable violations of these assumptions 
are tolerable. (See also Kendall and Stuart, 1958) 
A study of the correlation matrices shows that 
there is little consistency between the accuracy of 
social perception, that is, between the D, -scores from 
one medium of prediction to another. This means that 
our subjects do not appear to reveal the same degree 
of acumen and sensitivity in predicting the various 
aspects of the responses of another individual or of a 
category of others. 
Of the 78 correlation coefficients in the first 
table which represent the generality in making accurate 
or inaccurate predictions for women in general, only 
17 (i. e. 22%) are significant at . 05 level .. or above. 
Eight of these significant r 's represent the correlation 
between each of the individual D. scores and their sum 
total over all ten media. Eight of the ten correlations 
thus produced are significant and, as expected, positive. 
Their sizes are also relatively impressive, varying all 
the way from . 55 to . 23 with a medium value of . 42. 
This amount of positive relationship, however, is more 
or less expected in view of the contribution each 
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TAME, Ylls+COE, PELATIONrCOEFFICIENTSt33ETWEEN, THE, D-SCORES ON VARIOUS 
..,, 
MEDIA OF PREDICTION IN PREDICTING THE RESPONSES OF WOMEN 
IN GENERAL. 
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D, score makes to the total D. As ED= D+ D Dl Z.. ""10' 
it is obvious that those who score high on any individual 
D should also score proportionally high on the total 
D. score. Thus some measure of artificial correlation 
is inevitable. This is, however, also true of the 
reliability coefficient based upon internal consistency 
method, i. e. upon the correlation between each item and 
the scale as a whole. 
Six of the remaining significant correlations 
are produced by the two sums of plus and minus signs. 
Thus, those who have produced a larger number of minus 
signs, that is, those who have consistently underestimated 
other women's positions, also tend to produce larger 
Dr scores - i. e. show less accuracy- in forecasting 
their responses on the dimensions of extraversion, 
aesthetic value and social value. Consequently, their 
sum of D. scores is also proportionally larger. 
A similar, albeit non-significant, correlation 
is observed between the sum of minus signs over all ten 
variables and D. scores on Radicalism, Religious Value, 
Political Value and - conversely - Neuroticism. 
Two of the remaining significant correlations 
are between the sum of plus signs, i. e. overestimations - 
and D#-scores on Tender-mindedness and the sum of the 
minus signs respectively. This means that those who 
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tend to over-estimate the responses of others show 
significantly - although slightly - less ability in 
predicting their responses on the Tender-mindedness scale. 
The highly significant negative correlation between the 
sum of plus and minus signs, although very impressive 
in size, is of little psychological significance. The 
number of plus and minus signs being dependent upon each 
other (+ +I: - = 10), it is obvious that the two should 
be negatively correlated. 
Of the 45 correlations between the D. scores 
pertaining to the ten individual media of prediction, only 
those for the Aesthetic and Religious Value (r= . 34), 
Economic Valu and Tender-mindedness (r= . 25) and bet- 
ween Political and social Value (r = . 24) reach the . 05 
level of significance. 
Six other correlations ranging in size from 
. 19 to . 21, fall between .1 and . 05 levels of signifi- 
cance. These are between D .. scores on Extraversion 
and Social Value (r = . 19), Neuroticism and Religious 
Value (r = -. 21), Neuroticism and Theoretical Value 
(r = . 19), j Aesthetic and Theoretical Values (r = . 21), 
Economic and Religious Values (r = . 19) and Economic 
Value and Radicalism (r =-%. 21 ). The same is true of 
the correlations between the DT scores on Tender-mindedness 
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and the total D. score (r = . 23), between the sum of 
minus signs and D. scores on Neuroticism (r = -. 18), 
Political Value (r = . 18), Religious Value (r = . 22) 
and Radicalism (r = . 23); and between the sum of plus 
signs and the D.. scores on Aesthetic Value (r = -. 20) 
and Religious Value (r = -. 19). 
In short, then, only three of the forty-five 
correlations between the various measures of accuracy 
in predicting women's responses can be regarded as 
significant: This amount of significant correlation, 
about 6.7%y can easily be expectedtn occur on pure 
chance level and has little bearing on the hypothesis 
of generality. Moreover, 12 of the 45 correlations 
(i. e. about 27%) are negative in sign and harshly 
challenge any suspicion of generality. So, the obvious 
conclusion is that although, as reported above, our 
subjects show every sign of a non-chance ability to 
predict the potential responses of the majority of 
women on our ten dimensions of personality, they present 
little evidence of a general ability to predict the 
responses of women in general. In fine, as far as this 
part of our study is concerned, no support is lent to 
the )iypothesis of inter-media generality. 
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Going to Table V12, the correlation coefficients 
between the D. -scores in predicting the responses of 
men in general - we find that 26 of the 78 correlations 
are significant at . 05 level on above. Seven more 
correlations, ranging from . 18 to . 23 can be regarded 
as significant between . 1. and . 05 levels. 
As in the previous table, the bulk of the 
significant correlations is produced by the sum of 
D. -scores and each of the individual D, scores. Seventy 
per cent of these are significant at above . 01 level. 
This attests to a considerably high degree of relation- 
ship between accuracy of perception on the ten media of 
prediction as a whole and that on each of the individual 
media. Here again, however, the relationship is 
vitiated by the artifacts noted above and very hard to 
interpret. 
Second major source of significant correlations 
is the sum of minus signs, i. e. the number of under- 
estimated cases out of ten media of prediction. This 
is positively and significantly related to Do-scores 
on the Aesthetic Value (r = . 24)9 Economic Value 
(r = . 34), Political Value (r = . 34), Tender-mindedness 
(r = . 36) and the sum of all D, scores (r = . 36). It 
is also relatively highly - though insignificantly - 
related to D. scores on Neuroticism (r = . 20). 
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12 
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13 
TABLE V12 = CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ACCURACY SCORES ON THE TEN MEDIA OF 
PREDICTION IN PREDICTING TEE RESPONSES OF IBN IN-GENERIL. 
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In the third place stands the sum of plus 
signs - i. e., the total number of overestimated cases - 
which is negatively correlated with the sum of minus 
signs (r = -. 75)9 D, scores on Economic value (r =-. 25) 
and, nonsignificantly, with Political value (r = -. 23) 
and Tender-mindedness (r = -. 18). It is positively 
correlated with D. -scores on the Religious value (r = . 32). 
Out of the 45 correlations produced by the 
individual D. scores on the ten media of prediction, only 
ten are significant at . 05 level or above. Thus the 
error score on the Economic value is positively related 
to those on the Aesthetic value (r = . 24), political 
value (r = . 34), Religious value (r =. 32), Social value 
(r =. 29) and Tender-mindedness (r = . 24), and negatively 
- though nonsignificantly - correlated with that on 
Radicalism (r = -. 21). This means that those individuals 
who show higher sensitivity in predicting other men's 
responses on the Economic value scale tend to show less 
sensitivity in predicting their responses on the 
Radicalism scale. Accuracy - or inaccuracy - on the 
Political value is significantly correlated with accuracy 
in predicting men's positions on the Aesthetic (r =. 43) 
Religious (r= . 27) and Social (r =. 40) value scales 
and to some nonsignificant extent on Tender-mindedness 
- 3,3! 
scale (r= . 19). On the other hand, accuracy in 
predicting men's responses on the Neuroticism scale 
is negatively correlated to that on the Extraversion 
scale (r=-. 24) and positively to that on the Economic 
value (r= . 29) and, nonsignißicantly, to those on the 
Religious (r = . 18) and Theoretical values 
(r =. 20). 
The rest of the correlations are too meagre to deserve 
any consideration. 
These results fall far short of supporting any 
hypothesis of generality in predicting men's responses. 
Only nine of the 45 correlations between the ten D.. 
scores are significant and in the expected direction. 
Sixteen of the remaining rs are in the opposite direction. 
Although only one of these is significant, their sheer 
number runs counter to any assumption of generality. 
The conclusion, then, is that although our subjects 
demonstrated an above-chance accuracy in predicting the 
responses of men in general on the ten dimensions or 
media of prediction - as judged from the size and direction 
of their deviations of the observed norms of men - 
yet they revealed little consistency or generality in 
making predictions over different media. 
In the case of the error-scores in predicting 
the responses of a well-known other, Table V13 9 it 
- 332 - 
1' 2' 3' 
-E.. N .. Ass- """f 
4506 -1 ? 




1 10 ' 11 12 
Tend. -Suns of Sum f1 1ýýý " 
13 
. Sum of, " 'T L 
1- . 14 . 03 -. 02 -. 01 . 20 -. 04 . 01 . 00 . 05 . 26 . 02 
2--. 18 . 06 -. O1 . 08 . 07 02 ;. 09 . 13 . 21 . 17 
3 - . 20 . 18 . 23 . 07 022 -. 09 -. 00 -42 . 21 . 04 
4 - -o23 . 08 . 15 -. 02 -. 13 016 S2 008 o_? 22, 
5 - . 21 . 19 . 16 . 12 -. 04 . 09 001 
6 -. 08 jet2 . 
16 . 40 . 15 *77 . 10 
7 - . 22 -. 12 -o14 -019 . 12 
8 -. 03 . 05 . 66 6.01 . 05 
9 - . 17 . 20 . 17 . 02 
10 - 24 . 15 
11 - .2 . 22 
12 - -. 2 
13 
TABLE V13 s CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ACCURACY SCORES ON THE TEN MEDIA OF 
PREDICTION IN PREDICTING THE RESPONSES OF A WELL KNOWN OTHER. 
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is observed that only 17 of the obtained values of r 
are significant at . 05 level or above. Fifteen more 
correlations fall at between .1 and . 05 levels of 
significance. 
Here again nine out of the ten correlations 
between the individual D. scores and their sum, and three 
of those between the individual D. scores and the sum 
of minus signs - i. e. underestimated cases - are 
significant. Sum of the plus signs - i. e. number of 
over-estimated predictions - produced two significant 
correlations one positive and one negative. 
But of the 45 correlations between the accuracy 
scores on ten different dimensions or media of prediction, 
only three are significant at . 05 level or above. These 
are between the D.. scores on the Religious value and 
Theoretical value (r = . 53), Religious Value and Tender- 
mindedness (r =. 40) and Neuroticism and the Theoretical 
value (r = . 25). Ten further r 's can be regarded as 
significant between .1 and . 05 levels, two of these 
being negative. 13 of the remaining non-significant 
correlations are also negative. In other words, while 
only 
1/15 
of the observed correlations significantly in- 
dicate in the direction of generality, I of the cor- 
relations indicate in the opposite direction. The 
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evidence, thus, is in clear contradiction with any 
assumption of generality. 
Exactly the same number of 17 significant 
correlations is obtained in the case of predicting the 
responses of an unknown other, Table V14, plus 14 more 
coefficients falling between .1 and . 05 levels. Once 
again the bulk of the significant rs is produced by the 
last three columns of the table, i. e., those representing 
the sums of all D. scores, under-estimations and over- 
estimations respectively. 
Of the 45 correlations between the ten indi- 
eidual measures of social perception, only those between 
D,. scores on Extraversion and Social value (r= . 35), 
Neuroticism and Political value (r = . 37), Economic value 
and Radicalism (r= -. 25) and Political and Religious 
values (r= . 38) are significant. Nine other correlations 
are significant between .1 and . 05 levels. Three of 
these are negative. Thus there is little evidence of 
generality. 
To sum up this discussion, then, there appears 
to be little consistency or generality among the accuracy 
scores of individuals over different media of prediction. 
All in all, just under 25 per cent of the obtained 
correlation coefficients are significant at . 05 level 
or above. Of this proportion, however, about 40% is 
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E 
ý2 13 14 $5 16 $7""8 t -9 110 111 212 1 13 
N -Aes. -Eoo., Pole_Rel. -Sol. -Theo... : &im 8f §p_-Sum of 
1- . 05 -. 19 . 03 -. 07 -, 11 -. 05 . 08 . 10 . 18 -. 13 . 28 
2 . 04 . 08 010 . 00 . 02 . 19 -. 10 40 -. 04 
3 - . 18 . 15 . 21 -. 01 -. 20 . 07 -. 00 ., L6 . 15 -. 05 
4 - . 04 . 12 . 00 . 14 -. 25 . 07 36 L *AO_ -10 34 
5 - ,08 . 
12 -. 09 . 22 . 07 61 . 10 . 07 
6 - . 14 . 09 . 09 . 00 21 , 70 -. 00 ý. 05 
7 . 15 -o 19 . 09 1 -*23 -ail 
8 to -. 15 -. 18 . 21 -. 2 X11 
9 - . 19 . 22 . 09 . 16 
10 - 018 . 05 . 08 
11 - 009 . 14 
12 -- J6 
13 - 
TABLE V14 s CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ACCURACY OF PREDICTIONS ON THE TEN 
MCDIA OF PREDICTION IN PREDICTING THE RESPONSES OF AN 
UNKNOWN OTHER. 
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due to the sum of the plus signs or over-estimations. 
These two kinds of correlations are very difficult to 
interpret and at any rate can bear little on the hypo- 
thesis of generality. We are left with barely 26% of 
significant correlations that can legitimately be 
regarded as indicative of generality. This constitutes 
just over 11% of the actual correlations (N= 180) bet- 
ween the deviation scores of our ten dimensions over 
the four types of predictees. Even this proportion of 
consistency would be considered more impressive or 
suggestive if it had shown any discernible trend or 
tendency. But as it appears from the tables, there is 
precious little sign of any consistent trend. The 
presence of a large proportion of negative correlations 
casts further doubt as to the generality of the ability 
under study. 
The second question in connection with generality 
is whether people show the same degree of skill in 
mkaing predictions for different categories of others. 
In other words, does a person who scores high in pre- 
dicting the responses of men in general also score high 
in predicting the responses of women in general, or the 
responses of specific individuals. 
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Our original correlation matrix provided the 
necessary information on this point. But that matrix 
is too large and unwieldy to be presented here and 
provides little proof of generality. Of the 169 
correlations between each D. -score on predicting women's 
responses and each D. score in predicting men's responses 
22 (or 13%) are above . 23. The same ratio for the 
individual D. -scores on predicting the responses of the 




15/169 (i. e. 8.9%) respectively. Of the 
169 correlations between individual accuracy scores on 
predicting men's responses and those pertaining to the 
prediction of the responses of the best-known and least 
known individuals, only 
14/169 (i. e. 8%) are significant 
at . 05. Corresponding ratio for the correlations bet- 
ween the individual D. - scores in predicting the responses 
of the two types of specific others is about 11.8% 
(20/169). All in all, then, only 9.70 of the correla- 
tions thus produced can be regarded as significant. 
This is too small to justify the reproduction of the 
whole correlation matrix here. Yet, it is interesting 
to note that here again over 30% of the significant 
correlations are produced by the last three columns 
of the correlation matrix. This leaves us with a 
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proportion of significant correlations just over 6%. 
This ratio of significant results can easily occur 
on pure chance basis. 
As < further evidence of the lack of correlation 
between the D. scores of subjects on the four different 
kinds of predictees, it is sufficient to look at the 
correlations between the sums of D's over the four types 
of others. In view of the significant correlations 
obtaining between these sums and their individual com- 
ponents, it is natural that any correlation among the 
individual measures of D should be reflected in the 
correlations among these total D. scores. These 
correlations are set out in the table below. 
D on predicting: 
1234 
1 Men's responses - . 10 -. 19 -. 07 
D2 Women's res- - . 08 . 14 ponses 
on 3A be st known -ý 27 
predict- other's responses 
ing: 4A least known - 
other's responses 
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As is seen from the table, only one of the six correla- 
tion coefficients can be regarded as significant at . 05 
level and that is the r of . 27 between the sum of D. 
scores on predicting the responses of the two categories 
of specific others. The negative relationship between 
the total D ,. scores on predicting Men's and the 
best 
known other's responses can also be regarded as signi- 
fieant at .1 level. The rest fail to reach any 
acceptable level of significance. Thus there is little 
evidence of generality over different kinds of predictees 
either. 
In view of the known lack of normality of the 
distribution of the D. -scores - as suggested above - and 
the desirability of an assumption of normal distribution 
for Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient, 
it seems desirable to check the values of correlation 
obtained through that method against another technique 
of correlation which does not require any such assumption 
of normality. To this end, Phi correlations were 
calculated between the total D. -scores on the four types 
of predictions. 
value of 
between the ý 
This done, it is found that while the,,, total 
D ,. scores on predicting the responses of the two kinds 
of generalized others is only . 013 (N = 83), that bet- 
weep the accuracy scores in predicting the responses of 
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the two specific others amounts to . 20 which, with 
an N= 90, is barely significant at . 05 level. This 
conclusion seems to corroborate the result of the product 
moment correlation. Of course, Phi is known to be 
an under-estimation of the r and thus the lower value 
of correlation obtained is not unexpected. When the 
combined D ., scores of the two kinds of generalised others 
are correlated with those of the specific others, Phi 
is found to be . 119 which, with an N of 68 is not signi- 
ficant. 
Thus, there is little evidence for regarding 
in 
the two kinds of predictive achievement as^any way the 
same. There appears, however, to be some difference 
between our two groups as to the sign and size of this 
relationship. For the first group, the relationship 
is represented by a Phi of -. 002, insignificantly small 
and negative. The same value for the second group is 
. 331 which, with an N= 27, can be regarded as signi- 
ficant between .1 and . 05 levels of significance. A 
similar difference is observed with regard to the 
correlation between the D.. scores in predicting men's 
and women's responses; though both groups produced 
completely insignificant -0-order phis, the signs of 
their correlations were different, the older group 
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giving positive correlation. The whole correlation 
table is presented below. As it shows, the values 
Phi correlations between: 
Sum of D . -scores on predicting 
1234 
sum of 
1 Iresponses Men's 1 
11 
D.. scores 
2 Women's 1 
in responses 11 
predicting 3A best-known 1 
other's responses 11 
4A least-known 1 
other's responses 11 
0.036 I . 074 . 269 
-. 038 . 196 . 045 
-. 267 -. 072 
. 045 -. 106 
. 219 
. 183 
of Fare too small to be significant. Again one third 
of the observed correlations are negative and defy any 
assumption of generality. This means that those who 
have done well in predicting the responses of one cate- 
gory of others will not necessarily do well in predicting 
the responses of another category of others and vice versa. 
Thus our finding not only does not bear out the view of 
social perception as a general ability applying equally 
in predicting the behaviour of others irrespective of the 
category of others involved or the type of behaviour 
to be predicted, it also casts some doubt on the findings 
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of those studies which have claimed two types of stereo- 
type and individual sensitivity. Clearly, our results 
show little overlapping between the two kinds of pre- 
dictive achievements as defined above. More impressive 
is the lack of any correlation between the accuracy 
in predicting the responses of the two kinds of others- 
in-general, or men and women. 
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PERSONALITY CORRELATES OF ACCURACY IN SOCIAL PERCEPTION 
As suggested in Chapter 1, the personality 
correlates of judging ability have held a central 
position in the history of this area of psychology. 
Investigations of empathic ability have inherited this 
interest from their forebears. Dymond (1950) herself 
has carried out a detailed study of the personality 
correlates of her proposed empathic ability. After 
all, if empathy or social perception is as important 
an asset as its advocates would have us believe, its 
: effects must be reflected in those recurring behaviour 
patterns or potentials which form the personality. 
Similarly, if empathic ability partakes of the same 
mental endowments or processes as the ordinary judging 
ability, then it should reveal the same kinds of relation- 
ship with personality traits as the former is reputed 
to have. Taft, 1955). 
One advantage of the media of prediction used 
in this study was that they represented a number of well- 
defined personality dimensions of obvious significance 
for interpersonal relations. Some of these dimensions 
have been shown to bear certain relationship to judging 
ability. Reviews of this field (Taft, 1955, Allport, l9kl 
Vernon, 1963) concur on the finding of a positive 
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relationship between Introversion - more or less in the 
sense used by Eysenck (1947) - and the ability to judge 
others; and a negative relationship between judging 
ability and Neuroticism or emotional instability. A 
positive relationship between empathic ability and ad- 
justment - lack of Neurotic tendencies - has been 
claimed by many recent writers on empathy (Jahoda, 195%). 
In the new field of empathy, studies by Dymond (1950) 
and Cline (1955) have unearthed similar results. But 
the relationship between empathy and Introversion appears 
to be negative rather than positive. In Dymond's words: 
"Those whose empathy is high (give a picture 
of themselves) as outgoing, optimistic, warm, 
emotional people who have a strong interest 
in others...... Those low in empathy are rather 
rigid, introverted people who are subject to 
outbursts of uncontrolled emotionality" 
(Dymond, 1950, p. 349) 
In the case of social attitudes, if our measures 
are really measures of two basic attitudinal dimensions, 
two well-established and enduring ways of viewing the 
world around us, then they should play an important role 
in shaping our understanding of other people as well. 
Indeed there is some indirect evidence partially bearing 
on this relationship. A number of studies (Scodel and 
rsussen, 1953; Scodel and Freeman, 1956) has shown the 
authoritarian individuals to be lacking in empathic ability. 
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Eysenck (1954) has developed the argument that the 
authoritarian personality factor proposed by American 
psychologists is no more than an impure version of his 
tough-minded - tender-minded factor with those high in 
authoritarianism being high on tough minded direction has 
and conservatism. He also produced some experimental 
evidence in support of this argument. 
The relationship between empathic ability and 
personal values has little been investigated. Yet if 
the values are of the basic significance attributed to 
them by 5pranger,, it is only natural that they should 
influence the process of perceiving or judging other 
human beings. What form this relationship should take 
is hard to predict. But, from findings of other studies 
on the influence of values in tachistoscopic perception 
(Brumm and Goodman, 1947) one can tentatively predict 
that those high on a value dimension should prove better 
in predicting other's responses on the same dimension or 
scale. With this information at hand we set out to 
explore the personality correlates of social perception 
through an analysis of the correlations between the 
four aspects of this ability and the ten dimensions of 
character under study. 
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The above mentioned correlation matrix in- 
eluded correlations between each of the ten variables of 
personality implied in our media of prediction and the 
accuracy or deviation score gained by each individual 
in predicting the responses of others on each of the 
same variables. This gave rise to a 528 entry 
correlation matrix. Of these, however, only a small 
proportion reached the . 05 significance level. 
Considering the sums of D. -scores on the four 
different types of predictions, only political value 
(r = . 25) was significantly correlated with accuracy 
in predicting women's responses. The positive value 
of r meant that those high on the political value showed 
less accuracy in predicting women's responses. On the 
other hand, Religious value appeared to be positively C-or - 
related to accuracy of this type of social perception 
at just under . 05 level 
(r = -. 21). Over-all accuracy 
in predicting men's responses is significantly correlated 
with the subjects sex (r = -. 48); that is men are signi- 
ficantly more accurate in this respect than women. There 
is also a slight negative correlation with Neuroticism 
(r = -. 20) which indicates that the more neurotic indivi- 
duals demonstrate higher accuracy in predicting the 
responses of other<men. A similar - but significant - 
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correlation obtains between Neuroticism and accuracy of 
predicting the best-known other's responses (r -. 28). 
This same type of accuracy is negatively correlated 
with age (r = . 23), Economic value 
(r = . 20) and Tender- 
mindedness (. 19) at . 05 level or just below. Similar 
negative correlations are observed between the accuracy 
of perception in predicting the least-known other's 
responses and the variables of age (r = . 19) and the 
Economic value (r = . 19). A slightly positive correlation 
is observed with the social value (r = -. 21). This 
indicates that people high on the social value are more 
accurate in predicting the responses of the least known 
other. 
Regarding the correlations between individual 
D. scores and various measures of personality, it is 
found that sex (i. e., being a man) is negatively 
correlated to accuracy of perception in predicting 
women's Neuroticism scores (r = . 27) and the least-known 
other's position on Radicalism (r = . 27), while it is 
positively related to accuracy in predicting men's scores 
on the Aesthetic (r= -. 32), Economic (r = -. 29), 
political (r = -. 42) and Religious values (r = -. 36) 
and to accuracy in predicting the least known other's 
responses on the Economic value (r = -. 28) and Social 
value (r = -. 34) and to some extent to the prediction 
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of the best-known other's position on the Social value 
(r = -. 20). 
Age appears to be positively related to 
accuracy in predicting women's and men's Extraversion 
scores (r = -. 31 and -. 27 respectively) and negatively 
to accuracy in guessing men's scores on Radicalism 
(r = . 34), the best-known other's score on the political 
(r = . 35) and social values 
(r = . 29) as well as the least 
known other's responses on the Social value (r =. 24). 
Extraversion produced more or less significantly 
negative correlations with accuracy in guessing women's 
Neuroticism scores (r = . 22), men's scores on the 
Economic value (r = . 32) and Tender-mindedness (r = . 26), 
the best known other's score on the same (r = . 26) and the 
least known other's Neuroticism (r = . 22). 
Similarly, Neuroticism proves to be negatively 
correlated with accuracy in predicting women's Extra- 
version scores (r = . 31) and positively correlated with 
accuracy in predicting men's Radicalism scores (r = -. 26), 
the best known other's Religious values (r = -. 23) and 
the least known other's standing on the Neuroticism 
scale (r = -. 26). Biore Aesthetically oriented people 
seem to be less accurate in predicting women's Radicalism 
(r = . 29) and men's Neuroticism (r = . 24), but are more 
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accurate in predicting men's responses on the Aesthetic 
(r = -. 21) and Political values (r = -. 22), the best- 
known other's Economic orientation (r = -. 32) and the 
least-known other's Neuroticism (r = -. 21) and Radicalism 
(r = -. 26). On the other hand, people with higher 
Economic value show less accuracy in predicting women's 
responses on Neuroticism (r = . 23), and Economic value 
(r = . 28); men's responses on Economic value; their 
best-known other's Religious value (r =. 22) as well as 
their least-known other's Political value (r = . 24). 
In a similar manner, people scoring high on the Political 
value show less accuracy in predicting women's Extra- 
version scores (r = . 26), Economic and Religious values 
(r = . 21) and their best-known other's Radicalism (r =. 30). 
They appear to be only slightly more accurate in guessing 
the Tender-mindedness of their best known other (r = -. 21). 
People with high Religious value, however, tend to show 
higher accuracy in predicting women's scores on the 
Religious value (r = -. 22); and men's scores on 
Neuroticism (r = -. 23). They tend to be less accurate 
in predicting their best-known other's responses on the 
Aesthetic (r = . 22) and Economic values (r =. 28) 
Those high on the Social value tend to be 
slightly less accurate in guessing women's Social value 
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scores (r = . 20) and men's Extraversion (r = . 24). 
They appear to be slightly better off in predicting 
their least-known other's responses on the Neuroticism 
(r = -. 20) and the Religious value (r = -. 21). Theoreti- 
cal value presents more or less significantly negative 
correlations with accuracy in predicting women's Reli- 
gious Value (r = . 23), men's Neuroticism (r = . 20), the 
best-known other's Extraversion (r = . 30) and Social 
Value (r = . 20) and the least-known other's Extraversion 
(r = . 22) and Social Value 
(r = . 19). 
Radicalism is negatively correlated with 
accuracy in guessing women's Extraversion (r = . 20) 
and Radicalism scores (r = . 25) as well as the best- 
known other's Theoretical Value (r = . 21), and with the 
least-known other's Aesthetic Value (r =. 26). It is 
positively correlated with accuracy in predicting the 
best-known other's Economic Value (r = -. 27) and Tender- 
mindedness (r =-. 23). Tender-mindedness, on the other 
hand, appears to be positively correlated with accuracy 
in predicting men's Tender-mindedness (r = -. 20), and 
negatively with accuracy in sensing the best-known 
other's Aesthetic (r = . 20) and Economic Values (r = . 26) 
and the least-known other's Radicalism (r =. 25). 
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With a d. f. = 65, only values of r= . 24 are 
significant at . 05 level and the rest fall between .1 
and . 05 levels. The interpretation of these correlations 
is made more difficult by the absence of any consistent 
trend among the correlated factors. This can be taken 
as another indication of the lack of generality in the 
ability under investigation. It accuracy in predicting 
others1responses were a general ability, then it would 
be expected to produce consistently positive or negative 
correlations with some of the personality variables 
considered above. As the evidence stands, there is 
little indication of such a consistency. 
In view of the lack of normality in the dis- 
tribution of the D. scores, it seemed reasonable to make 
a further analysis of the relationship between accuracy 
of social perception and the personality variables in- 
volved. For this purpose, the whole group was divided 
into three subgroups representing the top and bottom 
25% and the middle 50% in terms of the accuracy in 
predicting the best-known other's responses. The 
choice of this particular index of accuracy was prompted 
by the observation earlier reported, that it produced 
higher correlations with other types of accuracy. The 
result of this three-fold classification is graphically 
represented in Fig. Vii. The numerical values of the figure are 
given in Table V15. 























" is cD 
























" C+ 0 
to t1.0 >3 
o cn r" o 





OD w CA 
n' M ao 3d 
cO cn 
to N W 
CD N 
ca cn m 
t'a to 
ý o co 
N N N 1 
CTS C1t QD 
ýý" 
A. A. 
N aD Cý 
, Cat 00 
Oý C7t a Z 
N W N 
W Cý cD - 
O N O 
0ý tD tD ' 
w w w ý, 
ýº ý w 
o ý v - o 
aý ýc ao ' 
N N N v3 
N N W 
O cn 
N N N 
O O ha 
o Co w 




CO N Q0 
NNE 
1-+ NW, Oý -J 
b E: 









c+ Ä \ 
p ý 1 ö a 
m ~ 
c+ , ECONOMIC VALUE 
ä 
I'd RELIGIOUS VALUE 
4+ 
m ý+ THEORETICAL VALUE w 
y 
ý4 00 
o SOCIAL VALUE 
j 0 AGE 
N" 
FJ 
ED- Best Krk wn 
N. ID -Men 
0 
0 
0 a E D-Women 
c 
. 
5-D- Least known other 
ý-+ I -J 1-I 1-+ F-+ 1-' NNNNNN In O\ -4 Oo %0 0 1-' Nw- 
FAMILY SIZE 
RADICALISM m K y o 
4+ 
w a 0 









m TENDER-MINDEDNESS 0 
POLITICAL VALUE 
4+ 











Inspecting this figure, it appears that the top 25% 
of our group score higher than the other two groups on 
intelligence test, family size, Neuroticism, Social 
Values and Tender-mindedness. On the other hand they 
achieve lower scores on the Political Value and Radicalism. 
This gives a picture of the socially sensitive person as 
being well above average in intelligence, showing 
relatively more signs of neurotic troubles, being more 
socially oriented and tender-minded, and less interested 
in political aspects of life and more conservative. Yet 
there are certain variables which differentiate between 
the two extreme groups above. Thus the top 25% in 
accuracy of perception appear to be less extravert than 
the bottom 25%, but much more extraverted than the middle 
50%. They also score significantly higher than the 
bottom 25% in terms of Religious value but slightly lower 
than the middle 50%. In other words, the middle 50% 
of the group appear to be lower than both extremes on 
the dimensions of family size, Extraversion, Neuroticism, 
Social Value, Theoretical Value, and Tender-mindedness. 
They score higher on the variables of Aesthetic Value, 
Political Value and Religious Value. Interestingly 
enough they have also scored lower than the top 25% 
in predicting the responses of women in general and the 
responses of their least-known other. This means that 
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those who occupy a middle position in terms of the accu- 
racy of predicting the responses of a best known other 
also prove superior in predicting the responses of women 
and strangers. Hence it is possible to reverse the 
argument put forward so far and say that those who are 
top in accurately predicting the responses of women and 
strangers tend to be of more or less above average 
intelligence, come from relatively small families, prove 
to be more introvert but less neurotic, show higher 
Aesthetic, Political and Religious interests but lower 
social and Theoretical interests and Tender-mindedness. 
Their standing on Radicalism lies just between the two 
extremes. These observations cast some doubt as to the 
linearity of the relationship between our personality 
measures and the index of social perceptiveness. As 
further evidence of the lack of generality or consistency 
over various types of social perception it is of interest 
to note that the bottom 25% on accuracy of predicting 
the responses of the best-known other have actually 
shown more accuracy in predicting women's responses than 
the top 25% on accuracy of perceiving the well-known 
other! 
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SEX DIFFERENCES IN THE ACCURACY OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION 
There has been some references to sex 
differences in the foregoing section of this chapter. 
The superior intuitive ability of women seems to be 
commonly accepted. Most studies of the ability to 
judge others have found women superior to men, al- 
though not as superior as common belief would have us 
to accept (Allport, 196Q). Dymond (1950) and Cline 
(1955) have also found women slightly superior in their 
ability to forecast others responses. 
The last column in Tabley7 brings out th 0 
differences more clearly. It is observedthere that 
men of both groups tend to demonstrate more sensitivity 
- i. e. smaller values of D- in predicting the responses 
of other men in general. Not only is men's grand mean 
over the ten media of prediction smaller than the 
women's mean, but, in both group9I and II, men have made 
less errors than women in nine out of the ten variables. 
A X2 test shows the difference to be significant 
2 (X = 6.4). In predicting the responses of women in 
general, men of group I have done slightly better than 
women, their D. scores being smaller than those of 
women in six of the ten cases, but men of group II have 
committed more errors than women in seven of ten cases. 
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None of the values of X2 reaches a significant level 
here. 
In predicting the best known other's responses, 
women of group I have fared better than men in 8 out of 
the ten variables (X2 = 3.6, P just under . 05), whereas 
men and women have fared equally in group II. Conversely, 
in predicting the responses of the least-known other, 
women of group II have produced smaller D.. scores in 
six of the ten media of prediction while men and women 
of group I have done equally well. Taking the two 
groups together, men appear to have achieved smaller 
D. -scores in 43 out of the 80 cases. moreover, men's 
grand totals of D,. scores over all ten media of pre- 
diction and all four types of predictees appear to be 
smaller than those of women in both groups. Although 
the mean D. score of the group II as a whole (= 14.28) 
is smaller than the mean D. score of either men (=14.34) 
or women (15.08) of group I, yet the mean D. -score 
of women of group II, (14.79) is still larger than the 
mean D. score of the men of group 1 (14.34). 
These observations indicate to men's more or 
less superior ability over women. Because of the dubious 
nature of the D.. score distribution an ordinary t-test 
of significance cannot be applied to the individual 
differences obtained. Instead a median test of 
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significance can be utilized. This test is based upon 
the assumption that the two groups - in this case men 
and women - are random samples from a population with 
a common median. It does not require any assumption 
concerning the nature of the underlying distribution. 
The common median of the whole sample is determined and 
the number of cases falling above or below this value in 
each of the two groups is found out. The significance 
of the observed differences from the value expected 
on the null hypothesis is tested by a X2 test. The 
nullhypothesis is that the two groups are from populations 
with the same median. If this hypothesis be true, then 
we would expect about half of each group's scores to 
be above the combined median and about half to be below 
it. 
The tables below represent the dichotomized cases 
of men and women falling on either side of the combined 
median on the four types 




It is found that non(o of 
of social perception, Applying 
to these tables: 
- BCI - 
N)2 
)(C + D)(A + C)(B + D) 
the observed differences between 
men and women reach any acceptably high level of 
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significance; The highest value of X2 obtained )2.1) 
is for the difference between men and women on predicting 
the responses of men in general, which falls short of 
significance at . 10 level. The null hypothesis is thus the 
not refuted. Yet/over all trend is indicative of a 
slight superiority for men. This is in contrast to 
findings of other studies. 
- bidn + 
ID for Men 
Women 
Women 
17 13 30 
25 28 53 
42 41 83 





21 9 30 
20 33 53 
41 42 83 






13 21 34 
30 25 56 
43 4 47 90 
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15 19 34 
30 26 56 
45 45 30 
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INTELLIGENCE AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION 
Intelligence test scores were available for 
47 members of the second group. They were based on 
Morrisby's Compound Series Test (Morrisby, 1955) and 
had recently been obtained by the College. The test is 
a non-verbal intelligence test designed to cover the age 
range of 7 to 22. It is essentially an ingenious paper 
and pencil version of the familiar bead stringing per- 
formance test. Morrisby suggests that it measures 
'mental work power', ie. persistence and concentration 
in the performance of an intellectual task. But so 
far there has been little effort to verify his claims 
(See Buras, 1959,606). For the 47 members of our 
sample, I. Qs on this test varied all the way from 4 to 
100 with a median of 60 and a mean of 66.6. Phi correlation 
coefficient was calculated between the I. Qs and the total 
D... scores of each individual on each of the four types 
of predictees. If accuracy of social perception is 
related to intelligence, then the knsuing correlation 
coefficients must be negative because, as explained above, 
D. scores are in fact indicative of misperception rather 
than perception. The higher the size of the D the less 
the amount of accurate prediction and vice versa. The 
results are presented below. 
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£D; Pomen 2DMen Db. k. o k. o ZDbk lD1k F£D 
N=25 N=2 N=47 N=47 N=25 N=25 N=25 
. 03 . 19 -. 404 -. 063 -. 427 -. 238 -. 032 IýQ 
It appears that only the relationships between the 
accuracy of perception of the specific others or sensi- 
tivity and I. Q. are in the expected direction. The 
Correlation between I. Q. and the prediction of the best 
know other's responses is both in the expected direction 
and significant beyond . 01 level (X2 = 7.7). In other 
words, those above median in intelligence show much less 
error in their predictions of the responses of their 
well-known acquaintances than those below median. Over 
69% of the more intelligent subjects fall in the below 
median quadrant on £Dbk category, while 70% of those 
low in intelligence fall in the above median quadrant 
of the ZDb. k. The failure of the correlation between 
I. Q. and the accuracy of predicting the least-known 
other's response to reach any level of significance 
may be taken as indicative that intelligence plays 
very little part in guiding the behaviour of a subject 
in making predictions for an unknown other. 
The negative - although insignificant - 
correlation between intelligence and accuracy of perception 
in predicting the responses of others in general is not 
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unexpected in view of the negative correlations obtained 
between the two kinds of accuracy. One possible ex- 
planation for the more intelligent subject's tendency 
to commit more errors rather than less in predicting 
the responses of others in general may be that the more 
intelligent subjects being better aware of the relative 
frequencies or probabilities of each category of response 
in the population as a whole have intentionally tried 
to maximize the probability of their responses being in 
the correct direction by over-estimating the most fre- 
quently observed responses of the others. This is well 
in line with the findings of studies on probability 
learning in children and adults where subjects tend to 
maximize the probability of reward by converging their 
output probability curves toward a probability of 1.00, 
even though the input probability level is much lower 
(Diessisk and Solley, 1957). The higher size of Phi 
in the case of predicting the responses of men in general 
lends some support to this explanation. As will be 
remembered from the previous sections of this study, 
all subjects showed a much higher tendency to over- 
estimate the stereotype responses of men than women 
in general. That our more intelligent subjects have 
tended to demonstrate more of this trend is evidenced 
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by the higher value of Phi between I. Q. and the D. score 
in predicting the responses of men in general. 
As the correlation between I. Q. and accuracy 
in predicting the generalized other's responses is 
based upon 25 cases alone, it may be of interest to find 
out the correlation between the I. Q. and the accuracy 
of predicting specific other's responses for the 
same number of cases. These values of Phi are given 
in the last three columns of the table above. It is 
apparent that the same tendency that was seen in the 
case of the whole group is also true here. In fact, 
in the case of this particular sample both values of 
Phi are larger than those obtained in connection with the 
whole sample. However, only the correlation between 
intelligence and the accuracy of predicting the best 
known other's response is significant at . 05 level 
(X2 = 4.6. ) The overall conclusion then is that 
intelligence as measured by this particular test is 
significantly correlated with the accuracy of predicting 
the responses of one's acquaintances as defined in this 
study. 
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Social Perception and Peer-rating ; 
Peer-ratings on the following five traits were available for about 
half of the subjects : Sociable, Warm, Intelligent, Popular, and Leader. 
The rating-scale used was a five-point one running from "very high" to 
"very low". Each subject was rated by between 9 to 5 of his classmates. 
Mean ratings received by each subject on each of the five traits 
were correlated with the sum of his D-scores over the ten media of 
prediction separately for each of the four types of "ot)cers" involved* 
The result is summarized in the following table. 
Sum of D-soores in Men in Women in Beat Known Least-Kno 
predicting the responses of: General General' Other -wm Other 
Traits : N 27 x 27 x w, 46 yN 
46 
Intelligence . 038 . 113 -0109 . 26 
Leadership . 116 . 033 01 -, 044 
Popularity 
y *, -. 
112 -. 116 -. 444 
Sociability -. 113. -. 335 -. 165 -. 088 
Warmth -. 187 -. 114 . 282 -. 087 
tF"AIIIIi 
Phi Correlations between Accuracy of Social Perception and Peer-rating. 
On the basis of common-sense expectation and the findings of other 
studies, one would expect to find a positive correlation between the 
four measures of social perception and all of these traits. The evidence 
is particularly very impressive in the case of Leadership and Popularity, 
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Contrary to expectation, however, few of the expected correlations 
approach any level of significance. In fact, only the value of phi 
obtained between accuracy of perceiving a well-known other's responses 
and leadership (& . 301) is significant at just above . 05 level 
(x2a 4.14) 
and it is actually negative in meaning. As suggested above, D-scores are 
more a measure of inaccuracy than accuracy. A positive correlation 
between a D-score and another variable indicates that those who have 
been rated high on that variable have also commited more error in their 
predictions. 
This negative and significant correlation between leadership and 
social sensitivity runs counter to the findings of the majority of other 
studies. It will be remembered from the previous chapter that of the 26 
negative correlations between leadership and sensitivity found in different 75 
studies only one was significant, whereas 15 of the ATositive correlations 
were significant 
(Mann, 1959). Two of the remaining three correlations 
found in this study are also'in'the opposite direction. It is interesting 
that peer-ratings on intelligence are positively correlated with one 
type of accuracy only, that iss accuracy in predicting the responses of 
a well-known individual. This type of accuracy, it will be remembered, 
was also positively and significantly correlated with the intelligence 
as measured by Morrisby's Compound Series Test. 
The results of peer-ratings, in short, lend further support to 
the negative findings reported above as to the generality or unity of 
the ability under study and its assumed personality correlates, 
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CHAPTER VI s 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Social Perception is a new field of enquiry in the young 
science of Social Psychology. Yet it forms a happy meeting 
ground for all these concerned with the study and understanding 
of human behaviour. If we are to understand the behaviour of 
man it is only natural that we should first enquire into the 
ways and means through which we gain our knowledge about himp 
that iss about his inner world. The first step in this enquiry 
is to see how we "perceive" other human beings. The necessity of 
this first step may seem obvious, yet it is only round fifteen 
years that psychologists have seriously grasped its significance. 
The development of this new field of enquiry was dissoussed 
in Chapter I. There, we indicated the lack of consensus among 
experts as to the exact definition or delineation of the field. 
býZweerL 
Adopting Macleod's differentiation it, the "Social determination 
of perception" and the "Perception of the social" as our starting 
point, we announced the second category as our main concern in 
this study. A detailed discussion was presented concerning the 
peculiar characteristics of human beings as objects of perception. 
This led to a consideration of the major theoretical approaches 
to the problem of social perception in the sense of perceiving 
the other person or person perception, 
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w,. 
As, the" terms 11social. ýerce tion''and 11eath r" are usually 
used interchangeably, and most of the current research on social 
perception was stimulated by Dymond's studies of empathy a full 
account of the empathic theory of understanding seemed desirable. 
A comprehensive review of the pertinent literature was presented 
and the experimental investigations of the ability in question 
during the past 15 years were analyzed. In this section particular 
attention was given to such critical studies as Gage and Cronbach's 
(1955) and Cronbach's (1955; 1958) conceptual and methodological 
analyses. Special attention was also paid to studies dealing 
with the generality or specificity of the ability concerned. 
As the first part of our own experimental work concerns 
the ability of school children to predict the affective resppnses 
of their classmates, a detailed account of this special area 
of social perception, variously called "sociempathy", "sociometrio 
perception"y etc., was given at the end of the first chapter. 
On the basis of this extensive review, in Chapter II an 
attempt was made to re-define the process of social perception 
or empathy as the process of predicting the attitudes or potential 
response tendencies of other persons. It was argued that such 
a predictive ability was part and parcel of man's cognitive 
system and of utmost importance for interpersonal relations. 
Some evidence was presented to demonstrate the equivalents of 
such a predictive functioning in ordinary perception and thinking. 
This was followed by a discussion regarding the inferential 
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nature, of social perception as operationally defined. Two main 
types or categories of evidence were proposed as underlying such 
inferences : evidence provided by the individual other -or the 
category of others- whose behaviour is to be predicted, and 
evidence inherent in the context of prediction or the situation 
facing the predictee. It was pointed out that in ordinary 
experimental approaches to empathy part of the contextual evidence 
is provided by the evaluative character of the verbal situations 
or media of/rediotion used* The consequence of this for the 
accuracy of social perception was stated in the prediction that 
attitudes or responses with high social desirability value should 
prove easier to predict. The analysis cast some doubt as to the 
possibility of finding a general 'Empathic Ability' irrespective 
of the kind of predictee and the media of prediction involved. 
Two more or less independent experiments were designed to 
shed further light on the conflicting results reported by other 
workers and to test the hypothese derived from our own analysis. 
The first experiment was concerned with a study of a groupof 
13-14-year old school children'iý ability to predict the affective 
and evaluative responses of their classmates towards themselves. 
These responses were assessed by a sociometric test and a Guess 
Who Test. In the second study, the ability of a group of Training 
College students to predict the probable responses of certain 
categories of 'others' on a battery of tests was investigated. 
- 369 - 
The categories of others were men and women of the predictors' 
own age and educational background in general, one indivudal who 
was relatively well known to the predictor and one individual 
who was relatively unknown to him. The test battery consisted 
of Eysenck's (1947) Inventory of Social Attitudes, Richardson's 
Test of Values, and H senck's (1958) short Personality Qiestionnaire* 
for 
The experimental procedure, tests and subjects used, and rationale, 
their adoption have been fully discussed in Chapter III. 
The results of the two studies have been separately analyzed 
and discussed in Chapters IV and V respectively. Following is 
a brief resume of the findings of the first study. 
1. Children of this age group demonstrate a high degree of 
sensitivity to the affective responses of their classmates 
as measured by a sociomtric test. On average, five to au 
guesses out of every ten guesses as to who would choose one 
were found to be correct. This degree of accuracy is 
significantly above what would happen on a pure chance basis. 
2. The percentage of accuracy in guessing others' negative 
responses -i. e., rejections- is much lower (about 24ib) and 
does not depart from chance expectancy. 
3. There is some tendency for accuracy of perception to be higher 
on the more psyche-telic criteria of choice and lower on the 
sociotelic criteria. The reverse of this tendency obtains in 
predicting others' negative responses. 
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4" In predioting others, evaluative responses on the Guess 
Who Test, there is a definite tendencey for the more socially 
desirable characterizations to produce more accuracy than 
the socially undesirable items. The proportion of accurate 
predictions made on the latter type of items usually did not 
depart from what would happen on pure chance level. 
5. Significantly positive correlations were obtained between 
the accuracy scores gained in predicting one's choice status 
over different criteria. The same was more or less true of 
accuracy scores gained in predicting ones rejection status. 
But there was no significant correlation between the two types 
Af 
accuracy scores. The correlation between the accuracy in 
predicting one's choice status and the over-all accuracy on 
the Guess Who Test was also insignificant. 
6. There was no difference between boys and girls in the accuracy 
of predicting their choice status. Boys, however, appeared 
to be superior in predicting others' negative responses, their 
percentage of accuracy being about twice that of girls. This 
is mainly due to the strong tendency among girls to afford 
their negative choices to boys and, naturally, to expect in 
return much more negative responses from boys than what is 
actually forthcoming. 
7. Both boys and girls showed a strong tendency to guess as 
choosing or rejecting them those others whom they had chosen 
or rejected themselves. This tendency to be congruent could 
result in both accuracy and inaccuracy of perception. 
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8, Such correlations between accuracy of social perception and 
measures of personality, intelligence and social status that 
'too 
are obtained showLlittle signs of significance to deserve any 
attentiono Accuracy of social perception, however, is 
significantlýoorrelated with the aociometric status and, in 
fact, most of the other correlations between accuracy of 
perception and other variables can be regarded as artifacts 
of this high relationship between one's sociometric status 
and his ability to predict those who have chosen him. 
Ake, 
Coming to the results of4second study, it is found that: 
1. In predicting the responses of men in general, both men and 
women of thid study demonstrate a very high degree of aggreement 
as t-Q the relative sizes of men's mean scores on the ten 
dimensions involved. That is to say, they show a highly 
consistent tendency to over-estimate men's responses on some 
dimensions and to under-estimate their responses on other 
dimensions. The tendency is significantly in accord with the 
relative positions of the same variables as determined by 
the actual means of the sample of men included. in this study. 
Despite this consistency, however, most of the predicted means 
are significantly different from the actual means of the 
sample of men involved. Women's prediotions show more of 
such significant differences than men's predictions* In other 
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words, men seem to be better aware of the response tendenoies 
or norms of their own sex. 
20 In predicting the responses of women in general, both men's 
and women's predictions show much less deviation from the 
actual means of women, only a few of the differences between 
the two set of means reaching significance level. This 
suggests that the sample of subjects involved in this study 
are better aware of the response tendencies of women in general 
than men in general. Yet the amount of agreement between 
various groups of prediotors as to the relative prominence 
of various dimensions is much less than that observed in 
the case of predicting men's responses. In other words, while 
predictors tend to show much less deviation from the actual 
means of women, they show relatively more difference among 
themselves as to the direction of this deviation. Moreover, 
contrary to expectation, the means of men's predictions 
demonstrate less deviation from the actual means of women 
than women's own predictions. 
3. Means of the predicted responses for the "best-known" other 
are closer to the actual means of the group as a whole than 
the predicted means of either men or women in generalo Few 
of the observed differences between the predicted and the 
, µ, z, r, 
observed, means are significant. 
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4. The predicted means of the least known other, however, show 
much larger differences with the actual means of the group. 
5. Considering the accuracy of predictions over various media 
and for different oategories of others, it is observed that 
the subjects show consistently higher ability in making pre 
-dictiona on same variables and for some kinds of others. 
The values test produced the largest amount of accuracy, 
being closely followed by the inventory of social attitudes, 
ands not so closely, by the personality questionnaire. Within 
each of these three measures also different dimensions were 
associated with different amounts of accuracy. The over all 
indication is that variables or response areas enjoying higher 
degrees of prevalence or objectiveness are easier to predict 
than those having little objective manifestations. Thus the 
Neuroticism scale with its predominantly subjective items 
produced the smallest amount of accuracy. On the other hand, 
among the six dimensions of the values test, Religious Value 
appeared to be hardest to predict accurtely. This was partly 
due to the observed lack of consensus among the members of the 
sample under study as to the significance of this dimension. 
The Religious Value scale of the test had by far the largest 
standard. deviation of all the six scales. 
6. Subjects appeared, to be most aocurate in ]? redioting the responses 
of their own-se$ others-in-general. They were least accurate 
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in predicting the responses of an unknown other. The predictions 
of the responses of the best-known other and the opposite -sex 
others-in-general occupied the second and third places respectively, 
in terms of accuracy of prediction. 
There appears to be little consistency or generality in accuracy 
of predictions over either the media or the subjects of prediction. 
Only about 6% of the correlation coefficients obtained among 
the ten media of prediction reach the . 05 level of significance 
and some of these are negative in sign. Of the correlations 
between the sum of accuracy scores over the four types of 
predicteea involved only that between the two spoific others 
is significant at . 05 level. This casts some serious doubt ,.. 
both on the generality of the ability under study and on the 
existence of two types of interpersonalsenaitivity and sensitivity 
to the generalized other. 
8. There is little evidence of any consistent relationship 
between accuracy of perception and the personality dimensions 
included in the study. Only a very small proportion of the 
correlations obtained is significant. But the sign and size 
of most correlations vary from one type of predictee to the 
other casting further doubt on the generality of the ability 
under study. 
9. Men demonstrate some degree of superiority over women in 
terms of over all accuracy scores in both groups and on all 
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four types of predictions. None of the differences, however, 
reach the significance level. Women, on the other hand, prove 
to be much easier to predict than men. 
10. Intelligence showed a significantly positive correlation 
with accuracy in predicting the best-known others' responses. 
But the correlations between ijtelligence and accuracy in 
predioting the generalized others' responses, although not 
significant, were negativen 
All in all, then, our results fail to support the notion of 
social perception as a general ability. In this they are more in 
line with the findings of Crow and Hammond's (1957) studyi than 
those of Cline and Richards'(1960,1961) studies. The failure of 
our findings to corroborate the correlations found by other workers 
between accuracy of social perception and certain aspects of 
personality and effectiveness in group activities further 
supports this oonclusion. 
As will be remembered from Chapter I, Cronbaohfa (1955; 1958) 
critical analyses have cast serious doubts as to the possibility 
of finding a general empathic ability. Later work, e. g. Cline, 
'19559 Cline and Richards, 1940-1961, however, seemed to contradict 
his predictions. Most of these studies have used one form or other 
of rating-scales which by their nature are biased for generality. 
Our study, on the oi16h hand, is wholly based on questionnaires 
that cannot be suspected of any of the known response-sets of the 
rating-scales. 
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Of course, questionnaires have their own vitiating factors - 
response styles- some of which have already been discussed in the 
third Chapter of this study. These response styles, however, are 
different from those associated with rating scales and their 
implication for the pcuracy or inaccuracy of social perception 
is not as clear-cut as that of the rating scale response sets. 
Moreover, recent studies have cast serious doubts as to the real 
significance and function of these stylistic tendenciees in 
questionnaires. In fact, Rorer (1965), after an exhaustive review 
of literature has reached the conclusion that these response sets 
are a great myth rather than reality. 
Among the response sets common to both rating-scales and 
questionnaires, social desirability has been singled out in our ' 
analytical scheme as a main source of accuracy in social perception. 
It is probable that predictions on equally desirable items or 
trait names will result in comparable degrees of accuracy, and 
hence in the finding of a "general ability", This possibility 
has not yet been investigated. One of the advantages of questionnaires 
as media of prediction is that by employing more than one item 
for each dimension or trait I items that are not of equal 
desirability, they reduce the possibility of finding such artifatual 
A 
generality. Whether this same tendency may result in an equally 




AA number of unavoidable restrictions arising from shortage of 
time and lack of experimental facilities made it impossible for us 
to devise an experiment covering all the hypotheses derived from our 
conceptual analysis or to investigate the application of some of the 
results obtained with our media of prediction to other types of media, 
Further research is called for both to test the hypothdses derived 
from our analytical chapter and to i, find out their applicability 
to other media of prediction such as Dymond's and Speraff and Kerr's 
tests of empathy. among these hypotheses are the situational forces 
or elements aiding social perdeption, major clues mediating the 
perception or inference of such forces, their acquisition and 
functioning. In this respect, the study by Hokanson & Doerr (1964) 
of the application of probability learning to interpersonal events 
is well worth further repetition and extension. Of particular interest 
is their finding that the anticipation of various types of such 
events is largely a matter of their frequency of occurrence in the 
previous encounters and experiences of the subject. 
The implications of the social desirability factor for various 
modes of measuring social perception is also in need of further 
research. Here, social desirability must not be regarded as merely 
a vitiating influence preudicing the process of judgement but, 
rather, it must be regarded as an index of the relative prevalence 
of an interpersonal event and its sovial reward or reinforcement 
value. It may perhaps be a good idea to combine the study of social 
desirability with the probability learning approach of Hokanson and 
Doerr and to investigate their joint contribution to the process 
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and outcome of social perception. Such a study can be of immense 
significance for theory and resaarch in person perception and 
personality psychology as well. 
Personality and other correlates of social perception are 
also in need of further research. Here it is high time that simple 
correlational approaches gave way to controlled experimental studies 
using proper designs to partial out the probable influences of 
other variables. So far almost all studies of the relationship 
between social perception, personality and effectiveness in group 
aotipities have been of an uncontrolled simple correlational nature. 
It is not known whether the correlations reported are due to the 
influence of social perception or to a higher process common to 
both variables concerned. Of particular interest is the relationship 
between social perception and intelligence. Our conceptual analysis 
seems to suggest a very high correlation between the two cognitive 
processes. The failure of reported research -including our own 
study - to corroborate this suggestion may be due to the fact that 
because of the prevalence of the interpersonal events and attitudes 
all those with normal intelligence tend to learn these events 
more or less equally. A comparison of the performances of an average 
group with those of an under-average or above-average group can 
shed further light on this problem, 
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Your nae : Your age : 
Eoy or Girl : Your 'Ac_m 
Your address : how long have you been in this 
school : 
In this paper you are asked a number of questions ahcii your clasqL 
mates and yourself. We want to know how well you k -now y.. r c? a, 3i-mates 
and their feelings towards you. There are no right cr wrong ar_swerve 
What we want is your opinion on how your class=-tos foci "Loii. -ar(1you 
Md how you feel towards them. Your paper will be koir c; nt: re).: 
confidential. PLEASE TRY AND ANSWER ALL THIS Q S'ý' CO? 'G .; S 
_D23T YOU CLN. 
1" If you were asked bja your English master to d, ) your r, 
_c :: ; rock 
in a group of six a 
A" Which five girls or boys in your claBs would you most 
lice to 
have in your group ? Give their names in order of pref. 'ronco. 
1" 2.3- 
4.5- 
B, Which five pupils in your class would you least like to have in 
Your group ? Give their names 
1" 2.3- 
4- 5" 
CO Which five pupils in your class -boys or girls- dc you think 
would most like to have you in their groups? Name them in order. 
1.29 3. 
4.5" 
D. Which five pupils in your class do you think would least like to 
have you in their groups ? Give their names. 
12 2.3. 
4" 5" 
2. If you warn asked by your Maths master to do your olasswork in a 
group of six s 
A" Which five of your classmates would you most like to have in your 
group ? Give thchir names in order of proferonce. 
1" 2.3. 
4" 5" 
$" Whioh five classmates would you least like to have in your grou!, ? 
G. ve their names in order. 
1.2.3. 
4.5- 
C. Which live classmates do you think would most like to have you in 
their groups? Give their names in order. 
1.2.30 
4" 05" 
D. Which five of your classmates do you think would least like to 
have you in their groups,? Give their names. 
lý 2.3. 
3. Which five pupils in your class would you most like to spend 
your free time with ? Give their names in order of preference. 
1.2.3. 
4" 5- 
4- Which five pupils in your class would you least like to spend your 




5. Give the names of five classmates who you think tv ;: i . I1 ti c like to 
spend their free time with you. 
1.2. 
r 4" 
6. Give the names of five classmates who you 'chiiil_ wcu' c- 
to spend their free time with you. 
1.2.3. 
4" 5- 
7- Which five boys or girls in your class do you like most ? Give 
their names in order. 
1.2.3, 
4" 5" 
8. Which five boys or girls in your class do you like least? Name them. 
1.2.3. 
4" 5- 
9. Which five of your classmates do you think like you most ? Flame them. 
1.2.3. 
4.5- 
10. Which five of your classmates do you think like you least? Fame them. 
1.2.3. 
4.5. 
11. Give the names of five of your best friends in -'. h: clasp. 
1.2.3,. 
4" 5- 
12, If there were a national conference of stude_it loadorg in Lothon to 
discuss the role of students in modern society and you wore ariked to 
choose five of your classmates to attend it, Wiuhich fi. -, *e be-ys or girls 
would you choosa? -Give their-name -in -order- YOU can c'f! cC , 3e vcurS(3lf'toor. 
1.2. 
4' 5- 
13. Do you think you will be chosen by many people on question 12 
that is as a.. leader) ? Yes No 
14" Give the names of five of your classmates whom you regard as the 
most popular in this class. 
1.2.3" 
4.5- 
15. Give the names of five of your classmates whom you regard as the 
least popular in this class. 
1.2.3a 
4.5" 
1" Someone whom you regard as very good ai sports : 
1.2.3. 
4" 5" 
2. Someone who takes life easily, who does not worry and get upsets 
ý.. 1.2.3- 
4* 5. 
3. Someone very good at English : 
1.2.3. 
4,5- 
4. Someone who is very fond of people, who mixes with other people easily 
d has a lot of friends : 
' 1.2.3. 
4.5- 
5. Someone whose feelings are easily hurt and who is quickly offended. 
1.2.3- 
4- 5- 
6. Someone you can rely on, who is very sincere and keeps his or her word : 
1.2.3- 
4.5- 
7. Someone who does not care much about other people and 
is concerned 
only with his or her own interests : 
1.2.3" 
4" 5" 
8. Someone very co-operative and friendly who is always willing to help others: 
1.2.3" 
4.5" 
9. Someone who is very ill-tempered and quarrelsome, who loses his or her 
temper very quickly and gets irritated easily : 
1.2.3. 
4.5- 
10- Someone with a very good sense of humour, who is very fond of cracking 
jokes and telling stories to his or her friends : 
1.2.3" 
4.5- 
11- Someone who worries a lot about his or her failmzres, mistakes and blunders: 
1.2.3. 
4" 
12; ', Someone who is shy, who does not like bieng watched or criticised by people: 
1. 2" 3" ý, 
4" 5. 
13" Someone who is bossy and domineoring, who likes to order other people about: 1. 
2.3. 
4.5. 




Here are as mmbvr of etatem. m4 *4 Mºe*xib+ i&esºa wad AJ-'vl& 
of wur ago. RorA each statoazent carefully and eae which of the 
boys and girls in this class fit that statement beat. Write down 
their names under that statement. Put the name of the person whom 
you regard as best described by a statement after number 1, the 
name of the second best described person after number 2, and the 
name of the fifth best described boy or girl after number 5 under 
that statement. Do not write more than five names in each case. 
Do this for all of the statements. REM BER THAT YOUR ANS? ER WILL 
NOT BE SEEN BY ANY OF YOUR CLASSMATES OR TEACHERS. 
7. Someone who does not care much about other people and is concerned 
only with his or her own interests : 
1.2.3. 
4.5" 
8. Someone very co-operativo and friendly who is always willing to help others: 
1.2.3" 
4.5" 
9. Someone who is very ill-tempered and quarrelsome, who loses his or her 
temper very quickly and gets irritated easily : 
1.2.3. 
4.5- 
10. Someone with a very good sense of humour, who is very fond of cracking 
jokes and telling stories to his or her friends : 
1.2.3. 
4.5. 
11. Someone who worries a lot about his or her failures, mistakes and blunders: 
1.2.3. 
4. S. 




who is bossy and domineering, who likes to order other people about: 1. 
2.3" 
4.5. 
Someone Who is not interested in being with other people 
. 1. 2.3. 
4. 
5. 
15. Someone with a strong influence on others; someone whose opinions are 
generally accepted by most of his friends : 
1.2.3. 
4. ' 5" 
16. Someone with a very low opinion of herself or himself; this person 
never thinks he or she does anything well : 
1.2,3- 
4.5- 
17- Someone very good at Maths : 
1.2.3" 
4.5- 
18* Someone who always takes the lead in group activities : 
1.2.3- 
4.5- 
19. Someone who frequently gets stuck, grows disheartened and so never 
finishes what he has started : 
1.2.3. 
4" 5" 
20. Someone who feels sure he can cope, who just gets on with a job and 
gets it done : 
1.2.3. 
4" 5- 
21* Someone whom you regard as most similar to yourself, similar in 
thinking, feeling and likes and dislikes : 
1.2.3. 
4.5. 
T Nog o back ovcar tho statements again, read them carefully and see 
which of them describe you best. Put a circle round the number beside THOSE 
5TJ. TE=, '1T S WHICH9 YOU THINK, DESCRIBE YOU BEST. 
WHO ARE YOUR BEST FRIENDS IN THIS CLASS ? GIVE THEIR NAMES BELOW. 
YOUR NAAE s YOUR FORM s 
J 
Here are a number of statements said to describe girls and 
boys of your age. Last time you mentioned the names of some of 
your classmates on each of these statements. In the same way, 
some of the boys and girls in this class have mentioned your 
name on some of these statements, saying that those statements 
fit you very well. Now, I want, you to guess those statements on 
which your name is likely to have been mentioned by one or more 
of your classmates. Read these statements carefully. Mark those 
statements on which, you think, your classmates are likely to 
have mentioned your name by putting a circle round their numbers. 
Undor each of these statements write down the names of those 
boys and girls who, you think, may have mentioned your name on it. 
Remember that this is not a test; there is no right or wrong 
answer and what I want to know is how best you can guess the 
opinions of your classmates about yourself. PLEASE TRY AND GUESS 
AS BEST YOU CAN. Your paper will not be seen by any body but me. 
1" Someone whom you regard as very good at sports : 
1.2.3. 
4" 5- 
2. Someone who takes life easily, who does not worry and get upsets 
1.2.3. 
4.5" 
3. Someone very good at English : 
1.2.3. 
4.5- 
4. Someone who is very fond of people, who mixes with other people easily 
and has a lot of friends : 
1.2.3. 
4.5- 
5. Someone whose feelings are easily hurt and who is quicl: ly offended. 
1.2.3. 
4.5 
6. Someone you can rely on, who is very sincere and keeps his or her word s 
1.2.3" 
4,5- 
7. Someone who does not care much about other people and 
is concerned 
only with his or her own interests s 
1.2.3" 
4.5. 
8-Someone very co-operativo and friendly who is always willing to help others: 
I. 2.3" 
4" 5" 
9. Someone who is very ill-tempered and quarrelsomo, who loses his or her 
temper very quickly and gets irritated easily s 
I. 2.3- 
4.5. 
10. Someone with a very good sense of humour, who is very fond of cracking 
jokes and telling stories to his or her friends s 
1.2.3. 
4.5. 
11. Someone who worries a lot about his or her failtres, mistakes and blunders: 
1.2.3. 
4.5" 
12. Someone who is shy, who does not like bieng watched or oritioised by people: 
1. 2.3- 
4.5. 




14. Someone who is not interested in boing with other people 1.2. 
3. 4.5. 
15. Someone with a strong influence on others; someone whose opinions are 
generally accepted by most of his friends s 
1.2.3. 
4" 5- 
16. Someone with a very low opinion of herself or himself; this person 
never thinks he or she dons anything well : 
1.2,3. 
4.5. 
17. Someone very good at Maths : 
1.2.3- 
4* 5- 
18. Someone who always takes the lead in group activities 
1.2.3. 
4.5. 
19. Someone who frequently gets stuck, grows disheartened and so never 
finishes what he has started s 
1.2.3. 
4" 5" 
20. Someone who feels sure he can cope, who just gets on with a job and 






YOUR NAL : YOUR FIRM 
7-1 
CAILDRE' S QJFST. IGNATý+. TRF 
flame: 
""""""""""" s"""". """"""""""8", """""""a""aa"""o. 




of Firth.. .. ". 
1. I like friends more than books. Ycs No 
2. I get angry when the class leader is too "bossy". Y No 
I 'm not the sort who gets ill. No 
4. I can be scolded without g hurt. No 
5, I often talk to myself. No 
6. I don't mind thunderstorms. No 
?. I like to be in school plays. No 
r8. I soon get over a quarrel. Yr. 0 No 
SI like to go camping rather than read about it. No 
t0. Everything gets on my nerves. No 
ý1. I want to work alone because I don't want other people 
to be praised for my ideas. 7'... 3 No 
Z2. It takes a lot to make me love my temper. Y: 13 No 
)3. I would tell off a friend for being "boso., " `. - No 
1,4, I get so angry I can't talk. Y: 1 's No 
5. I like to tell my friends all about things that happen Yt"" No 
I worry about the little mistakes I make. Yzä No 
ý-7. I'd rather not get my own way if I have to fight for it. yo No 
8. I often giggle and laugh for no reason at all. Ye-1 No 
9. I don't like to show people aroubd to meet other people. No 
O, If I'm crying it's always about something definite. -, ý No 
I start the fun .ta quiet party. Yes No 
C12, I often feel ill when I have to go to eohool. lee No 
I am often against what people say, and say so. Yo No 
ý4. I find it hard to forget my troubles. YFs No 
ý5. I keep quiet when I am with other people. 'i^s No 
6. T like swimming. 0 
k r7 I got the boys and girls together for parties. s chub. N, 
'O 
on 't often get blamed for things I did not do '"o 
3 like'4o, work alone.., ! ý, ;. x`! o 
-5- NO 
30. I think most children like to make fun of mea. V 
31. When some child tries to push into line ahead. of me x1 ýý'"A' t No 
like to tell him to get back. NO 
32. I think I'm happier now than when I was little. 
'Fes 
No 
33. I do not like to have people ask me questions about my: '"'-ý'" No 
34. I very seldom lie awake at night thinking. 
ýfcc 
35" 1 raise my hand so that the teacher will call on me to r,; `"'' äßo 
an errand. o 
36. 1 am always afraid that sad things will happen t: ) mo, *to 
37" games. I do not like to be the leader in . ýý 
38. I say one thing and do another. ; ýto 
39. I like to spend my holiday at some quiet place. NO 
40. I often think people follow me at night. 1"3 NO 
41" I feel at home at parties. 
No 
42. I think my parents pick on me too much. 
ýTo 
43, I x7ould. rather go to a party than stay at hone. 
44" I wish to do the right thing, but sometimes I aan`t get 
No 
myself to do it. 
45. I do almost everything other people tell me to do. 
ITI 
46. I always want to have my way with other people. 
;. o 
47"- I hate to have people look at me when I am working., go 
48.1 believe almost anything that anybody tells me. 
'ýý 
49" I don't like to tell the grccer that it is my turn when : ia trý"ýý 
ttý o 
to wait on someone else first. 
54.1 often feel sad för no reason at all. 
1 to 
jjw e 51. Oive the names of those classmates who, you think, are . st 
" 
anwwered this questionnaire t the same way as you have done. 
INVENTORY OF SOCIAL ATTITUDJ]S 
YOUR NAME s SEX s CLASS: 
Below are given forty statements which represent widely held 
aopiniöns on various social questions, selected from speeches, books, 
newspapers, etc. They were chosen in such a way that most people are 
likely to agree with some and to disagree with others. After each 
statement, you are requested to record your personal opinion regarding 
it. If you strongly approve, put two crosses after it -like thiss 
If you approve on the whole, put one cross after the statement. If you 
can'tt`decide for or against, or if you think the question is worded 
in such a way that you can't give an answer, put a zero -like this: 0. ' 
If you disapprove on the whole, put a minus sign. And if you strongly 
disapprove, put two minus signs, like this: - -. BE SURE NOT TO 
OMIT ANY QUESTIONS. 
Attitude statements Your opinion 
1. Coloured people are innately inferior to white people. 6.0.0001 
2. Present laws favour the rich as against the poor. ....... 2 
3. War'is inherent in human nature. """""". 3 
4. The marriage bar on female teachers should be removed. ....... 4 
5. Persons with serious hereditory defects and diseases 
should be compulsorily sterilized. "". ". ". 5 
6. Our treatment of criminals is too harsh; we should try to 
cure' not to punish them. ....... 6 
7. Our present difficulties are due rather to moral than to 
economic causes. """""""7 
8. In. the'interests of peace, we must give up part of our 
national sovereignty. " .8 
90 Sunday-observance is old fashioned and should ceaso to 
govern our behaviour. """ 09 
10. It is wrong that men should be permitted greater sexual 
freedom than women by society. 0 .. . 10 
11, Unrestricted freedom of discussion on every topic is 
" desirable in the Press, in literature, on the stage, etc. ... . 1l 
12. Ultimately, private property should be abolished, and 
complete socialism introduced. ... . 12 
-13. Conscientious objectors are traitors to their country, 
and should be treated accordingly. ... . 13 
-14. - A certain amount of sex education should be given at 
school to all boys and girls. """ " "14 
15. The laws against abortion should be abolished. ... . 15 
16. Only bn going back to religion can civilization hope 
to survive. ... . 16 
17. Marriage between white and coloured people should be 
strongly discouraged. ... . 17 
Attitude statement Your opinion 
18. Jews are as valuable, honest, and public-spirited 
citizens as any other group. "'" . 
18 
19. Major questions of national policy should be decided 
by reference to majority opinion (e. g. by referendum) ... . 19 
20. There should. be far more controversial and political 
discussion over the radio. """ . 20 
21. The present licensing lays should be altered so as to 
remove restrictions on hours of opening. ... . 21 
22. All human beings are born with the same potentialities. ... . 22 
23. Divorce laws should be altered to make divorce easier. ."" . 23 
24. Patriotism in the modern world is a force which works 
against peace. ... "24 
25. Modern life is too much concentrated in cities; the Government 
should take steps to encourage a "return to the country". .e. . 25 
26. Crimes of violence should be punished by flogging. ... . 26 
27. The nationalization of groat industries is likely to load 
to inefficiency, bureaucracy, and stagnation. ,". . 27 
28. It is right and proper that religious education in 
schools should be made compulsory. .. " . 28 
"29, 
Men and women have the right to find out whether they are 
sexually suited before marriage (e. g. by companionate 
marriage). .. . . 29 
30. The principle "Spare the rod and spoil the-child" has 
., much 
truth in it, and should govern our methods of 
bringing up children. ". . . 30 
31., W men are not the equals of men in intelligence, 
organizing ability, etc. .. . . 31 
32. Experiments on living animals should be forbidden. .. . . 32 
33. The Jews have too much power and influence in this country. . . . 33 
34" Differences in pay between men and women doing the same 
work should be abolished. -.. . . 34 
35. Birth control, except when medically indicated, should 
be made illegal. ." " 935 
36.. The death penalty is barbaric' and should be abolished. ." . . 36 
37. There will be another war in twenty-five years. ." " "37 
38. Scientists should take no part in politics. .. . . 38 
39. The Japanese are , by nature a. cruel peoplo. .. . 01-5 
, 
40. Only people with a definite>minimum of intelligence 
and education should be allowed to vote. 
. 40 
---------------------------------- Your Name: Age : Sex : 
Father's occupation : 
To which political party or W oup do you belong ? 
Do you take part in the student activities of your college? YES NO In what capacity or capacities? 
To which religious denomination do you belong? 
Are you satisfied with the prospects of your future profession? Have you answered all the items in this questionnaire? 
RICIURDSON TEST OF INTERESTS 
PART II 
, IRECTIONS : Each of the 
following situations or questions is followed by 
four possible attitudes or answers. Arrange these answors in the order 
of your personal preference by writing, in the appropriate 
box at the 
right$ a score of 3,29 1, or 0. To the statement you prefer most give 
3, to the statement that is second most attractive 29 and so on. 
.0 
To which of the following "good causes" would you more willingly. 
contribute - 
(a) Church missionary work 
( b) The provision of playi rg space for children in large cities 
(c) the purchase for the nation of works of art which are in 
danger of being taken out of the country 
(d) the funds of some political party ? 
Zw If you had a child growing ups would you bo moro pleased 
to 
ßee it showing 
( a) an interest in academic work 
(b) an interest in religion 
(c) artistic ability 
(d) ability to lead and influence others ? 
3ý If you were shipwrecked alone on an uninhabited island, 
which book would you rather have with you 
(a) The Bible 
(b) Shakespeare 
(c) A History of Philosophy 
(d) The Practical Handyman ? 
q, History is chiefly interesting because it 
(a) shows the development of different economic systems 
(b) gives us some idea of what life was like for ordinary 
people in different ages 
(o) is necessary in order to understand the art and 
literature of different periods 
(d) shows the evolution of different systems of government ? 
S 
" Do. you think that any wealth the nation can spare should be 
used for 
(a), subsidising arts which cannot pay their own way, such as 
ballet and., opera 
(b)subsid1Ding-original research in fields which have no 
immediate praotioal usefulness 
_ 
ýa) raising th© general-standard 
of living and reducing hardship 
d th©=devolo me n -off induc try_ and trade 3 
P. T. O. 
-2- 
6. If you werd arranging a school curriculum, which of the 
following subjects would you regard as more important - 
(a) current affaires 
(b) religious education 
(c) music 
(d) practical subjects such as woodwork and domestic science? 
7. Would you rather work with people who are 
(a) efficient 
(b) artistic and imaginative 
(c) important and distinguished 
(d) have intelligent interests ? 
8. If you were an architects would you rather design 
(a) a church 
(b) a tovm hall 
(o) a public library 
(d) a hospital ? 
9. Which of the following conditions would be more likely to 
make you leave your job - 
(a) ugly surroundings 
(b) unsatisfactory human relationships 
(c) little chance of promotion 
(d) work which is too easy to keep your mind fully occupied? 
10. Would you be more likely to read the Bible - 
(a) for its religious significance 
(b) as imaginative literature 
(c) for its philosophical or historical interest 
(d) for its hur.,. Li interest ? 
11. Which of the following you think could do most towards 
achieving international peace - 
(a) clear thinking on all sides 
(b) a spread of religious faith 
(c) a steady rise in the standard of living everywhere 
(d) some form of international organisation with a strong 
"police force" at its disposal ? 
12, One should guide one's conduct according to - 
a the praotica needs of the moment 
(b) reasoned principles of behaviour 
(o) consideration for others 
(d) one's religious faith ? 




(d) successful ? i; 
i{if 
-3- 
14" If you were in great trouble and could do nothing to 
improve the situation' would you find more comfort in - 
(a) prayer 
(b) being with other people 
(c) getting on with some useful work 
(d) listening to music or reading imaginative literature ? 
15" In order to be happy, man needs 
(n. ) a. raa. anna. hln etanAa. rA of matnrin. 1 wA11-haine 
a bý of d; 
(b) the feeling of being accepted by a social group ji 
(c) an awareness of something beyond the material world 
(d) success in some important activity ? 
----- --------- --------------------------- -------------------------- -! 
Your name ý-$F u Sex 
res--eac a 
id 




Please answer the following questions as accurately as you can. Do not 
omit any question. If you feel uncertain on any question put a question 
mark after your answer. To answer a question, underline YES or NO after it. 
1. Do you sometimes feel happy, sometimes depressed, without 
any apparent reason ? YES No 
2. Would you be very unhappy if you were prevented from 
making numerous social contacts ? YES NO 
3. Do you have frequent ups and downs in mood either with 
or without apparent cause ? YES NO 
4. Would you rate yourself as a lively individual ? YES NO 
5. Are you inclined to be moody ? YES NO 
6. Are you inclined to be quick and sure in your actions? YES No 
7. Does your mind often wander while you are trying to 
concentrate ? YES NO 
8. Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends? YES NO 
9. Are you frequently"lost in thought" even when supposed 
to be taking part in a conversation ? Yes 110 
10. Are you happiest when you get involved in some projeot 
that calls for rapid action ? ; uä NU 
11. Are you sometimes bubbling over with energy and sometimes 
very sluggish ? YES NO 
12. 
- 
Do you prefer aotion to planning for action ? 
------------------ -- --------- 
3 NO 
IJe. E.. 
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Which of the above traits would you consider as very 
imp ortant in making 
your choices for the abov, 3 mentione d student co nforence? 
Give them in 
order hero: 
What other characteristics would you consider as 
important in making your 
choices for the same purpose? Give them hero. 
I 
YOUR NAME s 
Following are a number of traits s. id to represent the basic aspects of 
human personality. You are requested to rate your self and your classmates 
(whose names are printed on the attached paper) in terms of each of 
these 
traits. by giving them a mark from 1 to 5; where 
"1" means "Very High" on the given trait, 
"2" moans "High, Above Average but not Very High" on the given 
trait, 
"3" means "About Average, Neither High Nor Low" on the given 
trait, 
"4" means "Low, Under Average, but not Very Low" on the given 
trait, 
and "5" means "Very Low" on the given trait. 
The only thing you have to do is to put one of these numbers in the space 
after each name (or its corresponding number) under the trait name. In 
the 
general population, these traits are supposed to be normally distributed, 
that is j in a manner that only 10% of people can be rated as "Very High'19 
20% as "High"p )401/4, as "Average", 201/"- as "Low" and only 10% as "Very Low". 
Please try and keep to those pereentagýs in distributing your ratings. Do 
not start rating on a trait befoxe you have finished rating on all traits 
before it. The traits, in order they appear on the following table, are: 
1. SOCIABLE 9 vo. UITSOCIABLE. I" 
2. TOUCHY, easily offended, too sensitive, vs. EVEN-TEMPERED. 
INTELLIGENT, vs. DULL. 
4. IMNATUIýE , vs. MATURE. 
5. TALKATIVE, vs. RESERVED 
JARM, vs. COLD. 
7. AGGRESSIVE, vs. PEACEFUL. 
8. HELPFUL, vs. NOT HELPFUL. 
9. SHY9 vs. BOLD. 
10. LIVELY, Vs. QUIET. 
11. INFLUENTIAL, vs. LACKING SOCIAL INFLUENCE. 
1T 
I 
12. IMPULSIVE, vs. CAREFUL. 
13. EASYGOING, VS. SOBER. 
14. -; JOBRIED, vs. CAREFREE. 
15. LEADERSHIP ABILITY, vs LACK OF LEADERSHIP ABILITY. 
16. POPULARITY JITH OTHJRS, i. e. ) whether he is liked by the group. 
17. IMAGINATIVES vs. UNIMAGINATIVE. 
18. DESIRABILITY AS A COMPANION, i. e., to spend Zour freotime with. 
19. EXTRAVVRTED9 vs. INTROVERTED. 
20. EMOTIONALLY BALANCED, vs. NOT EMOTIONALLY BALANCED. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
If there were an important conference of student leaders and you were asked 
to elect five of your classmates 
(i. o., those listed in the attached paper) 
to represent you in the conference, which five would you choose 
? Give their 
names in order of preference: 1.2" 
3.4" 5" 
Give the names of five of your closest friends in this group. 
pQ i- L INSTituC'i'Ioi , ýa 
The aim of this study is to find ou how i. -all. ycu can predict the responses 
of Certain others to certain questions. There ese three short questionnaires. 
Read the instructions for each questionnaire carefully and give your own answer 
for each question in the space provided after each question, When you have 
finished this, go over the quest&. onnairee again and on each question think 
of the most probable answer that the in your ýý". J /"ýý ýýr irr 
class are likely to have given. Register this answer in the appropriate 
section of this sheets after the number of each question. Do do same thing 
from the point of view of the _ _"_ __ _w _yycur 
class and 
register their responses in the appropriate sc, otion of thh. s sbuet. Please 
do not leave out an- xosticn even ý. f .1 
What wo are intevet3 red in io your predictions reg c. rdJ e (; f whctho ' they are 
accurate or not. Try and. guess as best arc : can. 'cur o. azor V. Ti11 be kept 
entirely confident-, al. 
t : 1T : n"'CR OF S36. 'L AT, TT. JD 
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APPENDIX 
COPIES OF TEE TEST MATERIAL, USED 
1. Sociometric Questionnaire. 
2. Guess Who Test. 
3. Junior Maudsley Personality Inventory. 
4" Inventory of Social Attitudes. 
5. Richardson's Test of Values, Part II. 
6o Eysenok's Short Personality Inventory. 
